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INTRODUCTION
Enactment of the windfall profit tax on April 2, 1980, represented the
climax of an intense, seven-year debate on national oil policy. The focus of the
debate was the distribution of increased domestic oil production income attrib-
utable to the exercise of oligopolistic pricing power by the members of the
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).' Initially, domestic
oil producers were denied a portion of such increased income by a system of
price controls that required domestic crude oil to be sold at prices substantially
below world prices. The controls program, however, created economic distor-
tions, particularly, excessive consumption of petroleum and unnecessarily high
dependence on imported oil.' These distortions led to four attempts between
1973 and 1979 to replace or supplement price controls with a tax that would
prevent the full transfer of income from consumers to producers while, at the
same time, encouraging conservation by bringing domestic oil prices to world
levels. The first three attempts were unsuccessful. 3 The fourth resulted in
phased decontrol of domestic crude oil prices and the windfall profit tax. 4 Con-
' Certain initials are used throughout the article. Each is set out below, along with its
full meaning and the location in the article where first used and defined.
Initial Full Meaning First Used At
ABPCL Adjusted base production control level note 69
ANS oil Alaska North Slope oil note 61
BPCL Base production control level note 38
DOE Department of Energy notes 34-35
ECPA Energy Conservation and Production Act note 59
EPAA Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act note 37
EPCA Energy Policy and Conservation Act note 54
OPEC Organization of Petroleum Exporting note 1
Countries
2 See, e.g. , EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN 51
(Apr. 29, 1977) [hereinafter cited as NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN]; S I.B.5. infra.
' On December 19, 1973, the Nixon Administration proposed a windfall profits tax,
based upon the difference between the sales price and a base price. On May 4, 1974, the Ways
and Means Committee reported a bill which included the windfall profits tax. The bill was never
taken up on the House floor. H.R. 93-14462, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., later reported as Title I of
H.R. 93-17488, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. On January 21, 1975, the Ford Administration also proposed
a windfall profits tax. The tax was not included in a subsequently reported Ways and Means
Committee bill, but was agreed to by the Finance Committee, contingent on decontrol. H.R.
94-6860, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). On April 29, 1977, the Carter Administration proposed a
crude oil equalization tax as part of its first National Energy Plan. NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN,
supra note 2, at 51-52; part D of Title II of H.R. 95-6831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). The
crude oil equalization tax was an excise tax levied on first purchasers of crude oil equal to the dif-
ference between the world market price and the regulated price. The crude oil equalization tax
passed the House of Representatives, Part III of Title II of H.R. 95-8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1977), but was not adopted by the Senate. The conference agreement on the tax provisions of
National Energy Plan I did not adopt the crude oil equalization tax. S. REP. NO. 95-1324, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 55 (1978).
• Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 et seq.
(Apr. 2, 1980).
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sequently, the price of crude oil produced in the United States is to be estab-
lished by the world market, but a significant portion of the resultant increase in
revenue will flow, through the mechanism of the windfall profit tax, to the
federal government rather than to the producers of crude oil.
The windfall profit tax is, in principle, a modified ad valorem excise tax.
The tax base, labeled the "windfall profit," is determined by subtracting a
base price and an adjustment for state severance taxes from the price for which
a barrel of crude oil is sold. 5 In no event, however, may the windfall profit per
barrel exceed 90 percent of the net income attributable to that barrel.° The
amount of the tax is equal to the windfall profit multiplied by the applicable tax
rate.' Domestic crude oil is either exempted entirely from the tax, or assigned
to one of three categories, or "tiers. "8 With each tier is associated a tax rate
depending on the status of the producer, 9 a set of rules for determining the base
price,'° and a method for adjusting the base price for inflation."
The windfall profit tax is extraordinarily complex, replete with question-
able provisions, and likely to lead to years of controversy. Despite these ob-
vious deficiencies, the windfall profit tax may make an important contribution
to domestic energy policy by making possible the elimination of one of the most
counterproductive of domestic energy programs, the regulation of oil prices.
The windfall profit tax is, therefore, properly viewed as a stage in the evolution
of U.S. oil policy. Consequently, in order to explain the role of the tax, the arti-
cle begins with background on oil production and oil price controls.
The first section of this article will focus on the geophysical and economic
characteristics of production and the nature of the oil industry, and will outline
important regulations prior to price controls and point out the role of imports.
The article will then review the history of oil price controls, beginning with the
wage and price freeze of 1971, and concluding with the decontrol programs of
Presidents Carter and Reagan. In this section, price control rules will be dis-
cussed and criticized." Next, the legislative development of the tax will be
described with a view towards explaining why the various substantive provi-
sions were adopted," but without extensive criticism of those provisions. Thus,
this section is neither an analytical essay nor a guide to how the tax works. The
final section evaluates the tax in the context of U.S. energy policy. It is con-
3 I . R . C . 4988(a).
6
 I.R,C. 4988(b).
7 I.R.C. S 4987(a).
fi I.R.C. 55 4986(a); 4991(a); 4991(b).
9 I.R.C. 5 4987(b).
10 I.R.C. 55 4989(c); 4989(d).
" I.R.C. 5 4989(b).
12 The extended discussion of price controls is intended to serve two purposes: (1) it
helps explain the choice of phased decontrol as a policy, and (2) because many of the price control
concepts and rules survive today in substantive provisions of the windfall profit tax, it provides
necessary background for the tax provisions.
" The administrative and procedural provisions of the windfall profit tax are not dis-
cussed herein.
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eluded that the windfall profit tax, despite all its deficiencies, may well repre-
sent an important step forward to a more rational domestic energy policy.
I. ORIGINS: PRODUCTION AND PRICE CONTROLS
A. Oil Production
To provide background both for price controls and the windfall profit tax,
certain general aspects of the domestic oil industry are discussed here. This sec-
tion begins with some of the basic physical and economic characteristics of oil
production, and a brief description of the division of the U.S. oil industry into
major and independent companies. Next, state regulation of oil production
through conservation and prorationing is considered, with particular emphasis
on the concept of the "stripper" well. Finally, the vital and changing role of oil
imports in the domestic petroleum market is summarized.
1. Geophysical and Economic Characteristics
Subsurface deposits of oil generally occur in separate natural reservoirs,
each under a single natural pressure system physically separated from other
reservoirs," such that production in any part of the reservoir affects pressure
throughout the reservoir." The terms "field," "property," "interest,"
"lease," "tract," etc., are commonly used to describe surface boundaries. It is
possible for a single welt and, perforce, wells from any surface area, however
delineated, to tap more than one reservoir, and for a single reservoir to be
tapped from more than one property.
The process of oil production involves the exploration for and develop-
ment of reservoirs. Once an exploratory well has discovered a reservoir, devel-
opment wells are drilled for the purpose of extracting the oil. Initially, oil flows
from a well because the well creates a point of low pressure in a reservoir
through which the fluids attempt to escape." Over time, however, pressure in
the reservoir decreases as fluids are removed from it. The decline of reservoir
pressure with depletion largely accounts for the decline in producing capacity
of oil wells.'
The rate of production from a reservoir is maintainable only by additional
investment, either by pressure maintenance processes, such as water injection,
steam injection and other, more exotic enhanced recovery techniques, or by
drilling more wells.' 8 All of these activities involve increased costs. Thus, the
14- F. LAHEE, STATISTICS OF EXPLORATORY DRILLING IN THE UNITED STATES,
1945-1960 132 (1962), cited in M. ADELMAN, THE WORLD PETROLEUM MARKET 30 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as ADELMAN].
18 Id.
18 S. MCDONALD, PETROLEUM CONSERVATION IN THE UNITED STATES: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 15 (1971) [hereinafter cited as MCDONALD].
17 MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 16.
19 ADELMAN, supra note 14, at 30.
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costs of production of a given quantity of oil from a reservoir generally increase
as the reservoir is depleted. The economic debates over price controls and
related taxation of oil frequently have ignored the increasing costs of maintain-
ing the rate of production. The usual assertion has been that production from a
reservoir that began when oil prices were at a certain level can continue in-
definitely, if the amount received for the oil remains at the initial level. Thus,
many have argued that actions that would allow oil initially produced at low
cost to be sold at higher prices would only confer an "economic rent" upon the
producer.i° As a consequence of this attitude, the control program, and later,
the windfall profit tax, have been designed to prevent producers from captur-
ing such rents. 2° Because they ignore increasing costs, however, such programs
may result in discouraging or delaying the more expensive secondary and ter-
tiary recovery programs. 21
2. Institutions
a. Majors and Independents
Oil is usually marketed in the field at prices posted by the principal
buyers, generally, refining companies. While the large, integrated companies
dominate refining, they do not dominate domestic oil production. In 1977, the
eight largest oil companies produced roughly 50 percent of all domestic crude
oil; the twenty-four largest companies produced roughly 75 percent." The re-
maining 25 percent was produced by more than 5,400 other firms and individ-
uals. These other firms are commonly referred to as "independent" pro-
ducers. The term "independent" came into use because these firms usually
19
 Typically, economists speak of conferring a rent or quasi-rent on a factor of produc-
tion, the supply of which is temporarily or permanently fixed. In such cases, shifts in demand for
the factor of production do not induce changes in supply but only in the price of the factor in
question. On those occasions where the demand increases, an increase in the price of the factor
results. "Rent" has been defined as "a payment above the minimum amount necessary to at-
tract this amount of the input." E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS, THEORY AND APPLICA-
TIONS 370-371 (1975). Mansfield notes,
Why is it important to know whether or not a certain payment for inputs is a rent?
Because a reduction of the payment will not influence the availability and the use
of the inputs if the payment is a rent; whereas, if it is not a rent, a reduction of the
payment is likely to change the allocation of resources.
The concept of rents has been extended to exhaustible resources, such as oil and gas. Hotelling,
The Economics of Exhaustible Resources, April 1931, J. POL. ECON. 137. Rents from the production
of depletable resources decrease over time because costs of production increase as reserves are
depleted. This characteristic of rents suggests that a tax based upon the existence of rents should
decrease accordingly. See notes 166, 313 infra.
2° Price controls and the windfall profit tax were also designed to provide incentives for
certain production, such as the incremental production from tertiary projects. See text at notes
73-88 (price controls) and 363-69 (tax) infra. The major emphasis, however, has been on limiting
producer income.
" See $ I.B.5. (effect of controls) and notes 166 and 313 (effect of tax) infra.
22
 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, ANNUAL SURVEY OF OIL
AND GAS 1977 22-23 (1979).
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have little or no vertical integration." This meaning has carried over into the
federal income tax laws. Since 1975, only independent producers have been
allowed percentage depletion. For tax purposes, "independent" producers are
taxpayers who do not, beyond certain threshhold levels, refine crude oil or
engage in retail sales of oil or natural gas.24
b. State Conservation and "Stripper" Oil
State conservation programs were initially established in the mid-1920's
and 1930's to assure that oil reservoirs were developed in an optimal fashion."
Later, these programs exerted an important influence on the development of
price controls and the windfall profit tax. The objectives of the conservation
programs were to assure that reservoirs were utilized at maximum efficient
rates and that competition between two or more producers tapping the same
reservoir did not result in excessive rates of production which would lead to
damage to the reservoirs and prevent producers from recovering the maximum
amount of oil from the reservoir. State conservation programs operated by
means of regulations pertaining to gas flaring, well spacing, maximum rates of
production, and occasionally, compulsory unitization. 26
During the 1930's, state conservation activities took on another, econom-
ically more questionable, role — that of market demand restrictions. Whereas
maximum efficient rate restrictions had been imposed to prevent rates of pro-
duction that significantly reduced ultimate recovery, market demand restric-
tions were adopted in order to maintain and stabilize prices. Under this pro-
gram, state regulatory commissions sought to determine the quantity of oil
"expected" to be demanded per period in the state or sub-area of the state. If
this expected market demand was less than the basic volume of production
allowed by the state commission, the state would further limit the production of
oil to a fixed percentage of each well's normal production." The limitation
process was referred to as "prorationing."
Not all wells were necessarily subject to prorationing, however. Wells that
had a low production rate usually were exempt. The exact definition of an ex-
empt well differed from state to state." In Texas they were referred to as
"marginal wells" and the volume limitations depended on production at
various depths." In many other states, the exempt category was known as
23 A. COPP, REGULATING COMPETITION IN OIL: GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN
THE U.S. REFINING INDUSTRY 1948-1975 3 (1976).
24 I.R.C. § 613A.
23 State conservation programs do not refer to reducing consumption, as most conser-
vation programs do today.
26 MCDONALD, supra note 16, at 47.
27 Id.
2, W. LOVEJOY AND P. HOMAR, ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF OIL CONSERVATION 154
(1967) [hereinafter cited as LOVEJOY AND HOMAR].
29 For wells from 0 to 2,000 feet deep the maximum allowable rate of production was 10
barrels per day. For wells from 2,000 to 4,000 feet deep the limit was 20 barrels per day, while for
638	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 22:631
"stripper wells." In Kansas every well was allowed to produce up to 25 barrels
per day without becoming subject to prorationing, while in Oklahoma the
maximum was equal to the lowest allowable rate for any allocated well, which
had been about eight to nine barrels per day. In Louisiana the rate of produc-
tion was not restricted if the well was "incapable of producing the current
allowable at any depth bracket."" These various prorationing schemes thus
represented the first means by which domestic oil prices were directly influenced
by government intervention. They remained a major economic control in the
oil industry until the 1970's, when increasing demand and escalating import
prices eliminated the purported need for prorationing.
3. Imported Oil
The role of imported oil in the domestic petroleum market has changed
radically during the post-World War II period. Until 1973, for the stated pur-
pose of insuring a stable, healthy domestic petroleum industry, the United
States limited the volume of imports of crude oil and oil products by a man-
datory import quota program. During the 14-year history of the import quota,
prices of crude oil produced in the United States exceeded the prices which
prevailed on world markets. 3 '
By the spring of 1973, however, as the price of imported oil surpassed the
price of domestically produced crude, President Nixon lifted the quota on the
importation of oil. These events marked a fundamental change in domestic
crude oil policy. Prior to 1973, market demand prorationing of U.S. produc-
tion was required to maintain stable crude prices, leaving the United States
with surplus crude production capacity. Thereafter, production of crude oil in
the United States has continuously been at full capacity. 32
Nineteen seventy-three also marked the point at which the determination
of the world price for oil shifted from the United States to the petroleum export-
ing countries. Imported oil prices caught up with and then surpassed U.S.
prices. 33 After 1973, changes in prices of U.S. crude oil not subject to price
controls have followed changes in world crude prices. This characteristic of the
wells from 4,000 to 6,000 feet deep the limit was 25 barrels per day and for wells from 6,000 to
8,000 feet deep the limit was 30 barrels per day. Wells over 8,000 feet deep were allowed to pro-
duce up to 35 barrels per day and still qualify for exemption. See TEX. RES. CODE ANN. tit. 3, §
85.122 (Vernon).
3° LOVEJOY AND HOMAR, supra note 28, at 188.
31 D. BOHI AND M. RUSSELL, LIMITING OIL IMPORTS, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY AND
ANALYSIS 211 (1978) [hereinafter cited as BOHI AND RUSSELL].
32 The history of U.S. oil imports and the role of the oil import quota may be found in
BOHI AND RUSSELL, supra note 31.
33 Owens, History of Petroleum Price Controls, in HISTORICAL WORKING PAPERS ON THE
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION PROGRAM 1265 (A. Munroe, H. Peret and J. Brock eds. 1974)
[hereinafter cited as Owens]. Owens was the deputy director of the Cost of Living Council
responsible for the oil price control program. See text at note 36 infra.
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oil market had important ramifications for determining the burden of the wind-
fall profit tax."
B. Price Controls on Crude Oil
Oil price controls originated as part of a general wage and price freeze,
but continued after the general freeze ended, for a total of almost 10 years.
Described below are the initial oil price control program and its subsequent
development through numerous statutory and regulatory revisions. The major
deficiencies of price controls are discussed, as are the Department of Energy's
(DOE) proposals addressing those problems.
1. Initial Program
Federal price controls were first imposed on crude oil as part of the August
15, 1971, wage and price freeze imposed by President Nixon under the Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act of 1970." Oil was subsequently singled out for special
treatment in the Phase IV price control program introduced in August, 1973,
by the Cost of Living Council." The Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act
(EPAA), 37 adopted in November, 1973, replaced the Economic Stabilization
Act as the statutory authority for crude oil price regulations. The Cost of Liv-
ing Council's authority over crude oil price controls was replaced initially by
the Federal Energy Office, then by the Federal Energy Administration (FEA),
and, finally, by the Economic Regulatory Administration of the Department of
Energy.
Under Phase IV, oil was divided into two tiers: "old" oil and "new" oil.
The distinction between old oil and new oil was determined by the "base pro-
duction control level" (BPCL) of the property. 38 The BPCL for a particular
month was, in general, the volume of oil produced from the property during
34 See text at notes 124, 175 infra.
" Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat, 796 (1970).
36 6 C.F.R. part 150, subpart L, 38 Fed. Reg. 22536 (Aug. 22, 1973). During Phases I,
II, and III of wage and price controls, covering the period from August 15, 1971 to August 12,
1973, oil prices were controlled generally in concert with price controls imposed throughout the
economy. Under Phase IV, however, significant changes in the price control rules were adopted
specifically for oil prices. The framework established by the Phase IV oil price controls would be
continued in subsequent oil price regulations. Consequently, this detailed analysis of oil 'price
controls begins with Phase IV. For a discussion of Phases I, II, and III, as applied to the oil in-
dustry, see Bom AND RUSSELL, supra note 31, at 208-21.
37
 Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-159, 87 Stat. 627
(1973).
" The term "property" is fundamental to the price control regulations since other im-
portant regulatory terms are defined with respect to the production characteristics of a "proper-
ty." See "BPCL," text at notes 38-39 infra; "stripper oil," text at notes 59-60 infra; "marginal
property," note 113 infra; "newly discovered oil," note 110 infra; "heavy oil," note 116 infra.
The price control definition of property is discussed herein in connection with the application of
the windfall profit tax. See notes 187, 219 infra.
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the same month in 1972. 39 New oil was the excess, if any, of production in the
current month above the BPCL, 4° and was not generally subject to price con-
trols. Initially, old oil sold for approximately $4.30-$4.40 per barrel, while new
oil sold, on average, for $5.30-$5.40 per barrel."
This two tier system was adopted to hold down the average cost of crude
oil to refiners while theoretically allowing the market to determine the price of
incremental production. The economic effect on production was argued to be
the same as that of lifting price controls, although the producer was supposedly
denied the economic rents which could be earned on the inframarginal barre1. 42
It was believed that the two tier price system would contribute to a reduced rate
of inflation by lowering the refiner's average cost of acquiring a barrel of crude.
To ensure that consumers actually enjoyed lower prices, the Cost of Living
Council imposed controls on all phases of the industry, down to the filling sta-
tion."
In addition, the initial Cost of Living Council regulations created a "re-
leased" oil program. Under the released oil rules, if new oil was produced from
the property, the ceiling price on all of the old oil could be increased by an
amount which would produce the same benefit as if an amount of old oil equal
to the amount of new oil were sold at the uncontrolled price." The released oil
mechanism was adopted in order "to encourage producers to stay at home and
work existing reservoirs where it was practical . . . . " 45 This incentive "was
included in recognition of the fact that the United States needed more oil as
rapidly as possible and the surest way to get more oil was to look for it where it
was fairly certain to be found." 49
The released oil incentive created some potential for abuse. Theoretically,
a producer could hold back production one day and obtain a potential surge the
next, enabling him to sell more old oil at released oil prices. To prevent such
39 6 C.F.R. S 150.354(b) (1973). "The property's BPCL was the cornerstone of the
Phase IV price regulations." Southland Royalty Co. v. FEA, 4 EN. MNGT. (CCH) 1 26,234
(N.D. Tex. 1980).
40 6 C.F.R. 5 150.354(b) (1973).
41 Platt's Oil Price Report, Aug. 26, 1973, at 1.
42 The theory of production requires that the marginal cost of producing the last unit
should be equal to the marginal revenue derived from that unit. E. MANSFIELD, MICRO-
ECONOMICS, THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 200 (1975). The theory of production also requires
that the marginal cost of producing units other than the marginal unit (the "inframarginal" unit)
shall be less than the marginal revenue derived from them. Id. Thus, in theory, the Cost of Liv-
ing Council was attempting through price controls to deny to a producer the excess of marginal
revenue over marginal cost for any inframarginal unit.
+ 3 Owens, supra note 33, at 1265.
44 6 C.F.R. S 150.354(c) (1973). When the price control regulations were later revised,
the released oil rules were simplified. "Released crude oil" was defined as an amount of oil equal
to the amount of new oil, and could be sold at new oil prices.
43 Owens, supra note 33, at 1265.
46 Id.
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abuses, the "cumulative deficiency" rules were introduced.'" The "cumula-
tive deficiency" was the aggregate amount by which production fell below the
BPCL after the month in which new oil was first produced and sold. The Cost
of Living Council required that a producer first sell new oil at old oil prices un-
til he made up for any cumulative deficiency.
To illustrate these rules, consider the following example. John Smith and
his family operate Smith Oil Field Number 1, a property with five wells from
which a total of 10,000 barrels per day of crude oil was produced in every
month during 1972 and through May of 1973. Thus, the BPCL for any month
was 10,000 barrels per day. During the balance of 1973, less than 10,000 bar-
rels per day were produced due to various mechanical problems. Thus, from
the onset of the price control program in August, 1973, the Smiths were re-
quired to sell every barrel of their production at the old oil price since produc-
tion was less than the BPCL.
In January, 1974, after reworking a well, the Smiths were able to increase
production to 10,100 barrels per day. Under the controls program, 100 barrels
per day of this production was considered to be new oil and could be sold at un-
controlled prices. In addition, 100 barrels of the 10,000 barrels of production
which would otherwise have to be sold as old oil also qualified, in effect, to be
sold at uncontrolled prices because it was released oil. Thus, the Smiths were
limited to old oil prices on the equivalent of only 9,900 barrels per day of the
January, 1974 production.
On February 1, 1974, one of the five wells was shut down for mainte-
nance. Production immediately slumped to 9,000 barrels per day. Since the
Smiths had sold oil at new oil prices in a prior month, a cumulative deficiency
was created at the rate of 1,000 barrels a day. By March 1, 1974, when produc-
tion returned to the 10,000 barrel per day level, a cumulative deficiency of
28,000 barrels had accumulated. Accordingly, until production from Smith Oil
Field Number 1 exceeded 10,000 barrels per day by an aggregate of 28,000
barrels, the Smths were not permitted to sell any oil produced from Smith Oil
Field Number 1 at new oil prices. 48 If a new well was completed and operating
on May 1, 1974, thereby increasing production from the property to 11,000
47 The cumulative deficiency rules initially appeared as a "special release rule." 6
C.F.R. S 150.354(c)(2) (1973). The stated purposes of the cumulative deficiency concept are to
preclude the benefits of upper tier prices for mere month-to-month variations in production
unless the property was exceeding its BPCL on a cumulative basis, 41 Fed. Reg. 4931 (Feb. 3,
1976), and to provide further incentive to maintain production above the BPCL, 41 Fed. Reg.
1564 (Jan. 8, 1976). The concept of current cumulative deficiency "would act as an additional
incentive to maintain increased levels of production, and would prevent producers from building
up production inventories for periodic sales, thereby qualifying for new crude oil where there has
been no actual increase in cumulative production." Id.
" The Smiths would, however, be permitted to sell production from a different proper-
ty at new oil prices if the production from that property otherwise qualified as new oil.
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barrels per day, all production through May 28, 1974, would be sold at the old
oil price, even though the BPCL for the property was only 10,000 barrels per
day. After May 28, 1,000 barrels per day could be sold as new oil and an addi-
tional 1,000 barrels per day could be sold, in effect, as released oil.
2. Stripper Wells and Price Controls
The initial program of price controls was to apply to all oil wells. Owners
and operators of stripper wells, principally independent producers, however,
did not concur. An amendment exempting stripper oil from controls was intro-
duced in Congress in July, 1973, weeks before Phase IV was even promul-
gated49
 and was enacted in November, 1973. 5 ° Congress initially provided that
production on a lease was exempt from price controls if the average daily pro-
duction on that lease during the preceding calendar month did not exceed ten
barrels per well. The exemption was almost immediately replaced by a similar
rule in EPAA based upon lease production during the preceding calendar year
rather than the preceding calendar month. 5 ' Thus, as had occurred with state
conservation programs, and would occur with the windfall profit tax, stripper
wells were able to avoid significant economic limitations.
3. Price Controls on Crude Oil, 1976-1979
Motivated by the scheduled expiration of price control authority in April,
1975, legislative activity began in January, 1975, that eventually led to sub-
stantial revisions of the price control program. In his January 15, 1975, State of
the Union message, President Ford announced his intention "to take Presiden-
tial initiative to decontrol the price of domestic crude oil on April 1. "52
 At the
same time, he proposed that Congress enact a windfall profits tax to "ensure
that oil producers do not profit unduly.""
Congress responded with the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
(EPCA). 54
 EPCA extended mandatory controls on crude oil for 40 months, 55
and provided that controls could continue thereafter at the President's discre-
tion until October, 1981. 55
 EPCA required the imposition of regulations that
established ceiling prices, or the manner of determining ceiling prices, such
that the resulting actual weighted average first sale price for domestically pro-
duced crude oil did not exceed a maximum of $7.66 per barrel, adjusted for in-
_
4° Owens, supra note 33, at 1257.
50
 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-153, .5 406, 87
Stat. 576 (1973).
Section 4(e)(2)(A) of EPAA.
72
 Ford State of the Union Message, January 15, 1975, reprinted in 1 EN. MNGT. (CCH)
1691.
55 Id. See also note 3 supra.
m Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat, 871 (1975).
35
 To June, 1979.
5° Section 461 of EPCA, adding new S 18 to EPAA.
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Elation. Considerable administrative discretion was delegated to determine the
manner in which the weighted average rule would be met. In addition, al-
though crude oil price ceilings were required to be lowered if it were found that
the actual weighted average exceeded the $7.66 limit," additions to oil prices to
compensate for an actual weighted average that fell below the limit were discre-
tionary. 58
Price controls on stripper oil were reimposed by EPCA. Congress
retreated from this action seven months later, however, when price controls
were lifted from stripper oil under the Energy Conservation and Production
Act (ECPA)." ECPA specified that crude oil production was not subject to
price controls "from a property whose maximum average daily production of
crude oil per well during any consecutive 12-month period beginning after
December 31, 1972, does not exceed 10 barrels." Once qualified for this
status, the property remained permanently qualified regardless of future pro-
duction volume." Thus EPCA effected significant changes in the price control
program. Additionally, because of the broad administrative discretion pro-
vided by the Act, those charged with implementing it were given flexibility in
classifying oil in tiers and extensive authority to set prices for the various tiers
of crude oil.
4. Implementation of EPCA Amendments
a. The Price of Alaskan Oil
In 1973, when price controls were first imposed, oil had been discovered
in the Sadlerochit field at Prudhoe Bay, on Alaska's North Slope. Production
could not take place, however, until 1977, when the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
System was completed. EPCA permitted the President to exempt up to 2
million barrels per day of oil transported through the Alaska pipeline (Alaskan
North Slope, or ANS oil) from the computation of the maximum average first
sale price and, instead, specify a price, or manner of determining prices, of
ANS oil such that the average first sale price was no higher than the highest
price for any other classification of domestic crude. 8 ' This discretion was pro-
vided to encourage production of ANS oil without discouraging production in
the lower 48 states."
Since the wellhead price of ANS oil was less than the mandated weighted
average, inclusion of ANS oil in the weighted average computation would have
created administrative flexibility to increase ceiling prices on other types of
" Section 401(a) of EPCA, adding new $ 8(c)(2) to EPAA.
3$ Section 401(a) of EPCA, adding new S 8(c)(3) to EPAA.
39 Energy Conservation and Production Act, Pub. L. No. 94-385, 90 Stat. 1125, 5 121
(1976), adding new 5 8(i) to EPAA.
6° This rule is referred to as "once a stripper, always a stripper."
61 Section 401(a) of EPCA, adding new 5 8(g)(2) to EPAA.
62 S. REP. No. 94-516, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 194 (1975).
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oi1. 65
 Consequently, in April, 1977, President Carter elected to include ANS
production in the weighted average price computation. Since ANS oil was
classified as upper tier oil, the maximum ceiling price on ANS oil was estab-
lished initially as $10.87 per barrel and allowed to increase with inflation. At
the time the decision was made, subjecting ANS oil to the upper tier ceiling
price was equivalent to exempting the production from crude oil price controls,
because, after subtracting transportation costs of approximately $7.00 per bar-
rel ($5.50 for the pipeline and $1.50 for shipping from Valdez to U.S. refiners)
from the market price of $13.60 at the refinery, the oil could command no more
than $6.80 at the wellhead.
b. Modification of Base Production Control Levels
EPCA implied that the definition of old oil should be determined with
respect to production of old crude oil, determined under existing rules, in the
last three months of 1975. 64
 The Federal Energy Administration responded by
providing generally that BPCL's would be equal to the corresponding monthly
production of old crude oil in 1975. 65 It was concluded that this revision elim-
inated the need for continuing the released oiI program, 66 which was therefore
terminated. 67
EPCA also authorized adjustment to BPCL's if "necessary to take into ac-
count declining production from such properties," thus recognizing the physi-
cal decline process for the first time." The Federal Energy Administra-
tion created a new definition, the "adjusted base production control level"
(ABPCL), to implement this change. 69 For properties where no new crude oil
had been produced in any month from February through June, 1976, a pro-
63
 In early 1977, the mandated weighted average price of nonstripper oil was limited to
approximately $8.50 per barrel, whereas the wellhead price of ANS oil was less than $7.00 per
barrel. Thus, by including ANS oil in the weighted average price calculation, the price on ether
controlled oil could be increased without violating the weighted average limitation.
64 Section 401(a) of EPCA, adding new 5 8(b)(3) to EPAA.
65 10 C.F.R. 5 212.72 (1976).
66
 41 Fed. Reg. 1564 (Jan. 8, 1976).
67 The Federal Energy Administration's rationale is best explained by an example.
Suppose additional wells were drilled in Smith Oil Field Number 1 to increase production in 1975
to 12,000 barrels per day. Under pre-EPCA regulations, recalling that the BPCL for the property
was 10,000 barrels per day, 2,000 barrels per day would qualify to be sold as new oil, and, under
the released oil rules, an additional 2,000 barrels per day could also be sold as new oil. Conse-
quently, only 8,000 barrels per day were required to be sold as old oil. Under the post-EPCA
regulations, since 1975 old oil production was 8,000 barrels per day, the post-EPCA BPCL was
set equal to 8,000 barrels per day. Thus, if 1976 production continued at 12,000 barrels per day,
4,000 barrels per day would be new oil, and 8,000 barrels per day would be old oil.
66 Section 401(a) of EPCA, adding new $ 8(b)(2)(B) of EPAA. It was noted above, see
text .supra at notes 16-19, that production tends to decline over time as oil is drawn from the reser-
voir. This decline can be counteracted by additional investments, the costs of which increase
steadily over time. By providing two barrels of decontrolled oil for every one barrel produced in
excess of the BPCL, the released oil program created meaningful investment incentives for old oil
fields. Elimination of the released oil program made investment in secondary and tertiary
recovery less economic. Thus, absent further regulatory change, additional investments
necessary to arrest the rate of decline in old oil fields would likely not have been made.
69 10 C.F.R. 5 212.76, 41 Fed. Reg. 15566 (Apr. 13, 1976).
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ducer was permitted, beginning on July 1, 1976, to reduce the BPCL for his
property. During the six-month period from July 1, 1976, to December 31,
1976, the rate of adjustment was three-quarters of the average annual rate of
decline on the property between 1972 and 1975. For each successive six-month
period, the rate of adjustment was half the annual rate of decline between 1972
and 1975. 70 Similar adjustments were provided for properties where produc-
tion of new crude oil occurred in any month between February and June, 1976,
except that the first adjustment was delayed until after production from the
property fell below the aggregate BPCL for a six-month period ending after
June 30, 1976. 7 '
If in the Smith Oil Field Number 1 example, 72 new oil was produced from
February to June, 1976, no adjustment in the BPCL could be made until pro-
duction fell below the aggregate BPCL for six months. Assuming the BPCL
was 8,000 barrels per day, no adjustment of the BPCL could be made until
production averaged less than 8,000 barrels per day for a six-month period
ending after June 30, 1976. If production was at 12,000 barrels per day, the ad-
justment would not affect Smiths' ceiling price for many months. Moreover,
any eventual adjustment would not be significant because there was no appre-
ciable rate of decline between 1972 and 1975. Thus, although the ABPCL con-
cept was a step in the right direction because it recognized the physical decline
process, it was flawed because it took no account of why declines did or did not
Occur.
c. Modification of Regulations to Encourage Enhanced Recovery
As an additional incentive to increase production, regulations designed
to encourage enhanced recovery projects were also promulgated. Like the
ABPCL program, however, these rules were insufficient to produce the desired
result. Enhanced oil recovery is "the recovery of oil from a petroleum reservoir
resulting from application of a recovery process beyond secondary oil
recovery."'" Secondary.recovery has no precise definition, but usually refers to
the injection of water or gas to increase pressure in an oil reservoir. 74 Examples
of enhanced recovery are thermal recovery, miscible flooding, and chemical
flooding. 75 In general it is recognized that enhanced recovery can substantially
7° Thus, if the annual rate of decline for a property was 12 percent and the initial BPCL
was 1,000 barrels per day, the ABPCL during the first six months would be 910 barrels per day
(calculated by multiplying 1,000 by (1 - 13/411.12D), while the ABPCL for the next six-month
period would be 855.4 barrels per day (obtained by multiplying 910 by (1 - [1/2][.12])).
7 ' 10 C.F.R. 212.76, 41 Fed. Reg. 15566 (Apr. 13, 1976).
22 See text following note 46 supra through the end of § I.B.1. supra and note 67 supra.
23 ENERGY INFORMATION AGENCY, U.S. DEPT OF ENERGY, ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS 219, 224 (1980).
24 See, e.g., A. J. BRUEN AND W. B. TAYLOR, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF OIL
AND GAS INVESTMENTS 13-8 (1980).
75 Thermal recovery involves injecting heat into the reservoir; miscible flooding in-
volves injecting a material such as carbon dioxide which is miscible with water into the reservoir;
and chemical flooding involves injecting a mixture of chemicals and water into the reservoir.
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increase the amount of oil that can be recovered from a reservoir, but at an in-
creased cost. For example, a National Petroleum Council report noted that
average recovery for U.S. oil fields using conventional methods was perhaps
only one-third of all oil in place, and would yield a total of roughly 100 billion
barrels. Enhanced recovery methods were expected to increase the volume of
recovery by as much as 24 billion barrels:18 The National Petroleum Council
report noted, however, that the results were uncertain because the technology
was unproven, and investment was highly sensitive to economics, including
price regulations, tax treatment," and the world price of oil."
Both EPCA and ECPA encouraged the Federal Energy Administration to
foster the development of enhanced recovery through modifications of the
crude oil price regulations." The initial DOE enhanced recovery regulations,
issued in August of 1978, 80 imposed stringent requirements and did not
significantly alleviate the uncertainties noted by the National Petroleum Coun-
cil 8. 1
Initially, the price control benefit, deregulation, applied only to incremen-
tal production. 82 The Federal Energy Administration defined incremental pro-
duction in the following manner:
Incremental crude oil (resulting from the implementation of a quali-
fied tertiary enhanced recovery project) means, in the case of a new
project, the amount of crude oil which is or will be produced as a
result of such a project and which is in excess of the amount of crude
oil ("non-incremental crude oil") which could have been produced
from the property or project area through continued maximum feas-
ible production from methods of production employed on the prop-
erty prior to the receipt of certifications provided for in paragraph
(d) of this subsection."
76
 THE NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY 3-5 (1976).
" The most important tax question pertained to the capitalization or expensing of some
tertiary expenditures. This problem is now addressed by I.R.C. 5 193, added by N 251(a)(1) of
the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-223, effective for taxable years begin-
ning after Dec. 31, 1979. Section 193 allows a current deduction for certain tertiary injectant ex-
penses.
78
 THE NATIONAL PETROLEUM COUNCIL, ENHANCED OIL RECOVERY 3-5, 53-54
(1976).
" Section 401(a) of EPCA, adding new .55 8(b)(2)(A)(i) and 8(d)(3)(B) to EPAA; 5 122
of ECPA, adding new $ 8(j) to EPAA.
8° Section 122 of ECPA was implemented by a notice of proposed rulemaking, 42 Fed.
Reg. 2646, Jan. 12, 1977, a notice of decision, 42 Fed. Reg. 41572, Aug. 17, 1977, and the
August 1, 1978 final rule.
" These stringent requirements were followed in early drafts of the windfall profit tax,
but were eventually replaced by more liberal provisions. See text at notes 202-15, 270-82, and
363-69 infra.
82
 10 C.F.R. S 212.78(a)(I)(A), 43 Fed. Reg. 33679 (Aug. 1, 1978).
" 10 C.F.R. 5 212.78(c), 43 Fed. Reg. 33679 (Aug. 1, 1978) (definition of "incremen-
tal crude oil"). A similar definition applied for increased production from existing enhanced
recovery projects.
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Non-incremental production from the project could be sold only for the price it
otherwise would have received. The Federal Energy Administration was re-
quired to determine, on the basis of an application, whether the project
qualified and, if it did, the amount of incremental and non-incremental crude
oil." A project could not be certified:
unless it [was] determined that, under all the circumstances, the pro-
ducer could not reasonably be expected to undertake (or expand or
continue) the project in the absence of an ability to charge prices for
the expected incremental crude oil in accordance with paragraph
(a), because the project would not be economic under the otherwise
applicable ceiling price."
In summary, a producer was allowed to receive uncontrolled prices for incre-
mental production only upon a showing that the incremental production,
determined in accordance with stringent standards, would not be profitable in
the absence of the incentive.
Not surprisingly, the incremental tertiary regulations failed to inspire a
large number of new enhanced recovery projects." The regulations were per-
ceived as granting an inadequate benefit under uncertain conditions." In addi-
tion, other regulatory action suggested that the amount of decontrolled incre-
mental tertiary oil might be reduced to reflect deregulation benefits granted
elsewhere. BB
5. Detriments of Price Controls
The system of price controls on domestic crude oil and oil products and
the related system allocating the benefits of controlled oil to refiners presented
consumers of oil with a price below the replacement cost set by world markets.
Consequently, the economic benefits of price controls served to subsidize the
consumption of oil, which, in turn, increased oil imports. 89 For example, in
84 10 C .F. R. 212.78(d)(2), 43 Fed. Reg. 33679 (Aug. 1, 1978).
85 Id.
86 OIL & GAS J., Aug. 28, 1978, at 42. At the time crude oil decontrol was being
debated in January, 1979, one of the authors, who was then an official of the U.S. Treasury
Department, was told by DOE officials that there had been one application in the first six months
of the enhanced recovery program.
a" OIL & GAS" , Sept. 11, 1978, at 38.
as Under a companion proposal to the incremental tertiary rules, price controlled oil
could be deregulated in order to finance the cost of tertiary projects. Such benefits, however,
would reduce the amount of oil eventually decontrolled as a result of implementing the tertiary
project. 43 Fed. Reg. 33679 (Aug. 1, 1978). See also note 112, infra.
89 As a consequence of oil price controls, prices paid for petroleum products were
reduced by four to ten cents per gallon, thereby increasing the demand for petroleum products.
See J. Kalt, Federal Regulation of Petroleum Prices: A Case Study in the Theory of Regulation
(1980) (unpublished Ph.D thesis on file at the University of California at Los Angeles; to be
published by MIT press). Since 1973, the marginal barrel of crude oil has been supplied by oil
imports. See text at notes 33-34 supra. Therefore, a marginal increase in the U.S. demand for oil
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February, 1979, the landed cost of imported oil was $15.80 per barrel, while
the average refiner price for oil, reflecting the benefits of price controls, was
$13.24 per barrel. Thus, at that time, domestic oil regulation created a subsidy
of $2.56 per barrel to consumers to increase oil imports. Similarly, by lowering
the cost of oil, price controls subsidized the consumption of oil and energy, and
discouraged energy conservation and the use of alternative energy sources.
In addition, price controls on domestic oil discouraged domestic oil pro-
duction. Use of historical decline rates in the calculation of ABPCL's provided
an inadequate incentive to increase production. To the extent that production
from a property declined below the BPCL or ABPCL and a cumulative defi-
ciency developed, a producer evaluating an investment to increase production
would compute the revenues from incremental production from the investment
at the old oil price. Thus, to the extent that the per barrel cost of an investment
to increase production was greater than the old oil price but less than the new
oil price, the investment would lose money and hence not be made, even
though the production was incremental and the national interest was served by
increased oil production.
For example, in October, 1978, the Smiths could have shut down a well in
Oil Field Number 1 for one week to undertake maintenance that would in-
crease production from that well from the current level of 100 barrels per day to
120 barrels per day, and increase cumulative production by 14,000 barrels over
two years. Due to a current cumulative deficiency for Field Number 1, how-
ever, none of the incremental production could be sold at the upper tier price.
Thus, unless the maintenance could be accomplished for less than $70,000, the
approximate present value of the increased income that would be realized by
selling the increased production at the old oil price, the Smiths would lose
and oil products results in a corresponding increase in oil imports. Thus, the effect of oil price
controls, by lowering product prices and increasing the demand for oil, has been to cause oil im-
ports to be higher than they would have been in the absence of price controls.
A regulatory system comprised solely of price controls on domestically-produced oil
would not have lowered prices of petroleum products to consumers, and therefore would not have
increased demand for imported oil (except to the extent that controls caused production of U.S.
oil to decline), since the financial benefits of price controls would have been captured entirely by
U.S. refiners. Under such a system, since oil imports provide marginal supplies, refiners would
have continued to pay the world price for their incremental crude oil, notwithstanding the sav-
ings realized from purchasing price-controlled domestic oil. Since the price of petroleum products
to consumers is determined by the price of incremental oil supplies, consumer prices would re-
main determined by the price of imported crude oil. Thus, in the absence of further market in-
tervention, the benefits of oil price controls would not be passed on to consumers.
In November, 1974, however, a second regulatory program was adopted for the express
purpose of allowing all refiners to share equally in the benefits of price-controlled oil. By
spreading the financial benefits of price-controlled oil equally among refiners, this program,
referred to as the entitlements system, had the effect of reducing the marginal cost of crude oil to
all refiners by an identical amount. As a result, since the price of petroleum products is deter-
mined by the marginal cost of crude oil, the price of petroleum products to consumers was re-
duced accordingly. Thus, the entitlements system transferred the benefits of oil price controls to
consumers, leading to increased demand for oil products that could be satisfied only from in-
creased oil imports.
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money by undertaking the investment. If, on the other hand, the 14,000 in-
cremental barrels could be sold at new oil prices, the Smiths might be willing to
proceed with the maintenance as long as the cost was less than roughly
$175,000, the value of the incremental production if it could be sold for the new
oil price. Thus, cumulative deficiencies tended to discourage investments to in-
crease production. Cumulative deficiencies were, however, only one example
of the production disincentives built into the price control program.
There were several other problems with the structure of the program. One
problem was the setting of decline rates for individual properties. Since April,
1976, decline rates had been reflected in adjustments to BPCLs based upon
property by property experience. Unfortunately, the historical periods used to
establish decline rates created inequities. During those periods, the federal
government urged producers to increase production. Those producers who
responded received low decline rates under the price control regulations,
thereby increasing their exposure to old oil treatment. In fact, a producer who
maintained a constant rate of production during the periods used to determine
decline rates was forced continually to expand development every year simply
to avoid cumulative deficiencies. A producer who did not respond at all to the
appeal to increase production and who allowed production to decline at a high
rate was considered to have a high historical decline rate. Consequently, the
unresponsive producer could sell a smaller and smaller volume of production at
old oil prices. 90 Thus, incremental production that resulted from additional in-
vestment made after 1975 generally qualified for new oil price treatment if pro-
duced on a property where little effort had been made to increase production
from 1973 to 1975, while usually being treated as old oil on properties where
the effort had been made. Use of historical decline rates, therefore, tended to
discourage increases in production. 9 '
A second problem was created by the stripper oil exemption. 92 The eco-
nomic effect of this exemption was frequently to make further investments in
oil fields unprofitable until a property qualified for stripper status. There are
actions that a producer can take to increase the flow of oil from a property, in-
cluding water injection and workovers. By postponing such actions, production
from a property could be allowed to decline more rapidly while still proceeding
at the maximum efficient rate, thereby accelerating the achievement of stripper
status. Once this status was achieved, the deferred investment could be made,
increasing production above the 10 barrel a day limit. Since the law specified
that wells qualifying as stripper wells were permanently exempt from price con-
trols, the increased production would not be controlled.
99 Furthermore, had he succeeded in reducing production over a 12-month period to 10
barrels a day or less, his production would have qualified as stripper oil, and would have been
permanently exempt from price controls. See text at notes 59-60 supra.
91 If, however, a uniform decline rate for all properties were used which generally ex-
ceeded historical decline rates, the historically diligent producer would not be treated unfairly
and would not be discouraged from increasing production.
92 See text at notes 49-50 and 59-60 supra.
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For example, suppose production from Smith Oil Field Number 2, an old
oil property, averaged 12 barrels a day during July, 1977, and, through natural
decline, would probably qualify as exempt stripper production by January 1,
1979. Under the regulatory program that existed from 1976 to 1979, the Smiths
could anticipate receiving approximately $6.00 per barrel until December,
1978. Thereafter, all production from Smith Oil Field Number 2 would qualify
for the uncontrolled price, then approximately $13.25 per barrel. On the other
hand, if the Smiths made investments in July, 1977, to increase production, the
investment would delay the date the property would qualify for stripper status.
Such an investment might raise average output to 14 barrels per day and the
two incremental barrels per day might qualify for new oil prices." In January,
1979, however, the incremental production would prevent the well from quali-
fying for stripper status. Therefore, beginning January, 1979, the investment
would reduce revenue from Smith Oil Field Number 2 by approximately $36.00
per day" below that which would have been realized had no investment been
made. The potential loss in revenues resulting from efforts to increase produc-
tion could be avoided by delaying the investment. If the Smiths waited until
January, 1979, to make their investment, their property would have per-
manently qualified for stripper status, and all production would receive uncon-
trolled prices. Thus, the statutory and regulatory regime encouraged producers
to delay investments. 95
 This delay reduced U.S. oil production.
6. The November, 1978 Notice
In November, 1978, DOE published a notice in the Federal Register that
solicited comments on alternative proposals for incentives to encourage in-
93
 As noted above, however, it is more likely that the two incremental barrels would
have qualified for old oil treatment. See text at notes 90-91 supra.
94
 Assume that in January, 1979, production from the property is eight barrels per day
absent the investment, and ten barrels per day with the investment. Since, absent the invest-
ment, the property qualified for stripper status at the end of 1978, the eight barrels per day of
production may be sold for the uncontrolled price of $13.25 per barrel, for total revenues of $106
per day. If the investment is made, at most two of the ten barrels per day of production will
qualify for the new oil price of $11 per barrel; the balance will be sold as old oil at $6 per barrel.
Thus, with the investment, total revenues will be $70 per day. Consequently, in January, 1979,
the investment has reduced revenues by $36 per day.
93
 Premier Consolidated Oil Fields, Ltd., an English firm, even described its action in
its annual report:
Production from six leases owned by Premco Petroleum Incorporated, the com-
pany's U.S. subsidiary, in the Midway Sunset Field in California gave good
returns during the past year as shown in the accounts. Over a year ago the decision
was taken to terminate the steam drive operation in the Metson lease and conse-
quently there was a sharp drop in production. However, since lease oil was not be-
ing consumed to produce steam, revenues fell only slightly. In September, 1977,
the Metson reached "stripper status," average production per well below ten bar-
rels per day, which permitted the oil to be sold at much higher prices under
government regulations. Accordingly it became economic to resume steaming and
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creased production of domestic crude oi1. 96 The proposals contained in the
November, 1978, notice reflected in part the production disincentives discussed
above, and eventually defined the parameters of the discussion of oil price de-
control." In the November, 1978, notice, the following proposals were pre-
sented:
a. Marginal Oil
DOE proposed to decontrol production from a marginal property in ex-
cess of that property's BPCL." DOE solicited comments on the definition of a
marginal property and the determination of decontrolled production.
b. Updating Base Production Control Levels
DOE also proposed to update BPCLs for all properties." Under this pro-
posal DOE suggested that the BPCL might be based upon 1977 production in-
stead of the three-month period in 1975 that had been established in EPCA.
The proposal also indicated that the producer would be able to eliminate any
current cumulative deficiency, thus permitting a "fresh start". The proposal
would allow producers to receive upper tier prices for production that is in "ex-
cess of the property's more recent decline rate without requiring the producer
to 'pay back' from such increased production the amount by which prior pro-
duction was less than the property's prior BPCL."'" DOE also suggested that
producers might be allowed to compute their decline rates using the average
decline rate for any three consecutive years from 1972 to 1978.
c. Decontrol Some Production from All Wells
A third proposal suggested by DOE would have allowed producers of old
oil to sell a certain volume of crude oil from each well on a property at the
market price, effectively giving all wells the advantage accorded to stripper
wells for the initial production. The rationale of this proposal was that it would
"counteract any tendency of producers to refrain from stimulating recovery,
but instead allow production to decline normally, in order to qualify for strip-
this was done in October with a sharp increase in production as a result; over 500
barrels per day from September to December.
Premier Consolidated Oil Fields, Limited, Report and Accounts, 1978, at 10.
96 43 Fed. Reg. 52186 (Nov. 8, 1978), supplemented by Notice of Proposed Rulemak-
ing, 44 Fed. Reg. 892 (Jan. 3, 1979).
97 The only other preliminary action was the publication of a proposal to deregulate
newly discovered oil. 44 Fed. Reg. 1888 (Jan. 8, 1979).
98 43 Fed. Reg. 52186 (Nov. 8, 1978).
94 Id.
too Id.
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per well pricing under the current regulations."'°' Alternatively, the proposed
benefit might be limited only to properties that have secondary or tertiary
recovery projects .
d. Raise the Price of Lower Tier Crude Oil
As a final alternative, DOE asked whether the ceiling price for lower tier
crude oil should be increased because costs of maintaining oil production were
increasing faster than the gross national product deflator, the measure of infla-
tion used to adjust ceiling prices. DOE asked for information to determine
whether operating costs were rising to the currently permitted ceiling price.
The proposals made by the November, 1978 notice helped formulate the
alternatives for implementing decontrol of domestic crude oil prices. Although
the November, 1978 proposals were not explicitly adopted, much of their sub-
stance was incorporated in various aspects of the Carter decontrol program.
Section I of this article surveyed the development of domestic oil price con-
trols from the 1971 wage and price freeze through 1978. The controls system
defined a standard of production — the BPCL — for each property in order to
implement a ceiling price distinction between pre-1973 production and
post-1972 production. Price controls were then imposed separately on old oil
and new oil. In addition to noting this development, Section I reviewed the
special treatment under price controls accorded Alaskan oil, stripper oil, and
incremental production from tertiary projects. The discussion then considered
the major problems of price controls, including the subsidization of domestic
oil consumption, increased demand for oil imports, and discouragement of
domestic oil production and the development of alternative energy sources.
The November, 1978 DOE notice tentatively addressed certain of these prob-
lems, and became the starting point for the next phase of domestic oil policy,
the Carter Administration's decontrol and windfall profit tax proposals
described below.
H. DECONTROL AND THE WINDFALL PROFIT TAX
A. The Administration's Proposal'°2
In April, 1979, the Carter Administration adopted a domestic crude oil
policy consisting principally of phased decontrol of domestic crude oil prices,
lot Id.
102
 The Administration's decontrol and windfall profit tax proposals were released and
explained in a series of documents and statements. The initial description was provided in an ad-
dress to the nation by the President on April 5, 1979. President Carter's Energy Address to the
Nation, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 609 (Apr. 5, 1979) [hereinafter cited as President's
April, 1979 Energy Address]. The President's April, 1979 Energy Address was accompanied by an ex-
planatory fact. sheet. White House Fact Sheet on the President's Program, Office of the White
House Press Secretary, Apr. 5, 1979, reprinted in 1 EN. MNGT. (CCH) i 761 [hereinafter cited as
April, 1979 Fact Sheet]. The initial description was amplified in a message to Congress. President's
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and a windfall profit tax related to, but not a precondition for decontrol. '° 3 The
decontrol program is described below, followed by a discussion of the windfall
profit tax proposal.
1. Decontroll"
The decontrol program was the result of an intense six-month debate
within the Administration, which led to the following conclusions. First, com-
plete decontrol of all crude oil on June 1, 1979, would be ill-advised because of
unacceptable impacts on the rate of inflation. Consequently, phased decontrol
should be adopted so that by October 1, 1981, the scheduled expiration of price
control authority, full decontrol will have been achieved. Second, decontrol
should be implemented by gradually decreasing the volume of oil subject to
controls, rather than by gradually increasing ceiling prices to market prices.
Volumetric decontrol could be effected through a simple, pre-set formula. By
contrast, requisite ceiling price increases would be dependent on subsequent
world price changes, and, therefore, would be difficult to implement evenly,
Message to Congress Transmitting Windfall Profits Tax and Energy Security Trust Fund, 15
WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 721 (Apr. 26, 1979) [hereinafter cited as President's April, 1979
Energy Message]; Remarks on Signing President's April, 1979 Energy Message, 15 WEEKLY
COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 728 (Apr. 26, 1979). A draft bill "embodying" the President's proposal,
with some "technical amendments," was introduced by Congressman Ullman, then Chairman
of the House Ways and Means Committee. H.R. 96-3919, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 9, 1979)
[hereinafter cited as the Ullman Bill]; see 125 CONG. REC. H2675 (daily ed. May 3, 1979)
(remarks of Rep. Ullman). Finally, the Secretary of the Treasury explained the windfall profit
tax in testimony before the House Ways and Means Committee. Windfall Profits Tax and Energy
Trust Fund.- Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-66 (1979)
(statement of W. Michael Blumenthal) [hereinafter cited as Ways and Means Committee Hearings].
1 °3 The April, 1979 policy reflected the major objections to the Carter Administration's
first domestic oil policy, which consisted principally of continued price controls and the proposed
crude oil equalization tax. See note 3 supra. Under the earlier policy, Congress was required to
take the initiative, and, therefore, the responsibility, for raising oil prices, and producers received
no benefits. Under the revised policy, since decontrol, rather than a tax, would raise oil prices,
the President, not Congress, would appear to bear the responsibility for raising prices.
Moreover, through decontrol, oil producers would receive benefits, subject to the proposed wind-
fall profit tax. The proposed tax was made independent of decontrol since the energy policy
benefits flowed from decontrol; the tax was perceived more as an equity measure. In addition,
the President had only a limited period of time — until October 1, 1981 — within which to phase
in deregulation administratively.
1 °4 In the spring of 1979, domestic oil usage was as follows. Imports totalled approx-
imately eight million barrels per day at a landed cost of approximately $16 per barrel. (By the end
of 1979, this cost would nearly double.) Domestic production was 8.5 million barrels per day.
Lower tier oil, controlled at an average price of approximately $6 per barrel, comprised about
one-third of domestic production. (One-fourth of lower tier oil was thought to consist of marginal
oil. See note 113 infra.) Upper tier oil was controlled at an average price of approximately $13 per
barrel, and also comprised about one-third of domestic production. Alaska North Slope oil,
about 14 percent of domestic production, although technically controlled at an upper tier ceiling
price of $13 per barrel, actually sold for a wellhead price of approximately $7-8 per barrel. Un-
controlled oil, consisting mostly of stipper oil, comprised 15 percent of domestic production, and
sold for slightly less than $16 per barrel.
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and would be more vulnerable to administrative recalcitrance. If deferral of
ceiling price increases occurred, a large gap might remain between controlled
and market prices on October 1, 1981, which could stimulate legislative action
for continued controls.
The economic justification for decontrol was described in some detail by
the President:
The gradual deregulation of domestic oil prices will bring the
price of oil to world oil price levels, with the following benefits: First,
it will eliminate the current subsidy provided to imported oil, which
has increased consumption and dependence on foreign supplies.
Second, it will encourage producers of oil to seek out additional sup-
plies and to continue production from marginally economic opera-
tions. Third, decontrol will phase out the complex system of controls
which presently produces inequities and inefficiencies. Fourth,
through replacement cost pricing, new sources of energy will come
into commercial use, further reducing U.S. dependence on foreign
oil. Fifth, it will strengthen the stability of the dollar and reduce
balance of payment flows, both directly through reduced oil pay-
ments abroad and indirectly through confidence that the U.S. is at-
tacking its energy problem.'"
Phased decontrol was adopted "in order to minimize sudden economic
shock"'" and to "ensure that decontrol does not add unnecessarily" to infla-
tion. 107
The program of phased decontrol included some of the elements described
in the November, 1978, notice. New categories of oil would be defined and de-
controlled, partially or completely, in order to provide "special new incentives
to those categories of oil where the maximum amount of new exploration and
production will result."'" In addition, the balance of controlled oil would be
gradually deregulated, a process that would begin generally on January 1,
1980, and end on October 1, 1981. 109
The special incentive categories consisted of newly discovered oil, margin-
103
 President's April, 1979 Energy Message, supra note 102, at 721-22. This statement should
be contrasted with the Administration's policy two years earlier: "The President is committed to
the retention of domestic oil price controls for the foreseeable future to prevent windfall profits for
oil producers who would otherwise be able to charge the OPEC-determined world price of oil."
National Energy Program, Fact Sheet on The President's Program, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. Doc. 573, 580 (Apr. 20, 1977).
"6
 President's April, 1979 Energy Address, supra note 102, at 610.
107
 April, 1979 Fact Sheet, supra note 102, at 10.
1 °8 Id. at 9.
109 Under EPCA, the expiration of price controls was authorized as of June 1, 1979, and
all statutory authority to impose oil price controls expired on October 1, 1981. Section 461 of
EPCA, adding new § 18 to EPAA.
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al production, incremental production attributable to certain enhanced
recovery techniques, and heavy oil. As of June 1, 1979, newly discovered oil"°
and the incremental production resulting from introducing tertiary recovery
"15 Newly discovered oil was defined as domestic crude oil which is (1) produced from a
lease on the Outer Continental Shelf entered into after 1978 of an area from which there was no
production in 1978, or (2) produced from a property (other than on the Outer Continental Shelf)
from which no crude oil was produced in 1978. 10 C .F. R. S 212.79, 44 Fed. Reg. 25828 (May 2,
1979). The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for newly discovered oil was issued on January 8,
1979, and was described as being a part of the implementation of President Carter's April 20,
1977, National Energy Plan. 44 Fed. Reg. 25828 (May 2, 1979). See National Energy Program,
Fact Sheet on the President's Program, 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 573, 578 (Apr. 20,
1977); NATIONAL ENERGY PLAN, supra note 2, at 50-51; 44 Fed. Reg. 1888 (Jan. 8, 1979)
(Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). The April 20, 1977, proposal differed substantially, however,
from the final rule adopted on May 2, 1979. Under the earlier proposal, newly discovered oil
would have been defined as oil from a well drilled more than 2'/2 miles from an existing onshore
well as of April 20, 1977, or more than 1,000 feet deeper than any well within any 2 1/2 mile
radius. Newly discovered offshore oil was to be oil from lands leased after April 20, 1977. The
price of newly discovered oil would have been allowed to increase to the then current world price,
but only over a three-year period. Thereafter, the price would have been adjusted only for infla-
tion.
On June 23, 1980, a proposal was issued to amend the newly discovered oil rules. 45
Fed. Reg. 42222 (June 23, 1980). The initial definition of newly discovered oil required that no
crude oil be produced from a property in 1978. The June 23, 1980 proposal set forth two alter-
natives, each of which would have expanded the definition of newly discovered oil by restricting
the 1978 production limitation: (1) that no crude oil be produced and sold from the property in
1978, or (2) that no crude oil be produced and sold in commercial quantities in 1978. The proposal add-
ed the following:
The Conference Report on the Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 states that, for pur-
poses of the windfall profit tax, newly discovered oil includes production from a
property which did not produce oil in commercial quantities during calendar year
1978. The Report also indicates that commercial production does not include pro-
duction which is incidental to the drilling of exploratory or test wells and which is
not continuous. Comments on what constitutes commercial quantities should ad-
dress the language in the Report and also the degree of need for uniformity in the
definition of "newly discovered crude oil" for purposes of DOE's pricing regula-
tions and for purposes of the windfall profit tax.
45 Fed. Reg. at 42223 (June 23, 1980). In DOE Ruling 1980-3, July 14, 1980, DOE took the
position that oil produced during well tests constituted "production" for purposes of the defini-
tion of newly discovered oil, and rejected the above-cited conference report interpretation. Rul-
ing 1980-3 was found to be a reasonable interpretation of "production" in Williams Exploration
Company v. DOE, 4 EN. MNGT. (CCH) 126,271 (N.D. Okla., Dec. 24, 1980).
On November 18, 1980, DOE revised the definition of newly discovered oil, effective
after December, 1980, to include properties "from which no crude oil was produced and sold in
commercial quantities in calendar year 1978." 10 C.F.R. SS 212.72 (definition of "produced
and sold") and 212.74(b) (definitions of "newly discovered crude oil" and "newly discovered
crude oil property"), 45 Fed. Reg. 78588 (Nov. 25, 1980). Prior to 1981, the interpretation ex-
pressed in DOE Ruling 1980-3 appears to govern the definition of newly discovered oil. 45 Fed.
Reg. 78588 n.2. DOE believes that its revision "should result in a similar meaning for newly
discovered crude oil under our regulation and under whatever regulations that the IRS ultimate-
ly adopts for 'purposes of the Windfall Profit Tax." 45 Fed. Reg. at 78590. Certain ad-
ministrative provisions promulgated in the November 18, 1980, final rule were later deleted in
response to President Reagan's decision on January 28, 1981, to decontrol all domestic crude oil.
46 Fed. Reg. 11804 (Feb. 11, 1981). See note 122 infra.
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programs"' would be decontrolled. In addition, beginning on January 1, 1980,
producers investing in enhanced recovery projects would be able to decontrol
certain volumes of lower tier oil to finance the investment." 2 As of June 1,
1979, 80 percent of all production from marginal properties would be released
to upper tier prices." 3
 The balance of marginal well production was to be
"' Incremental production from implementation of qualified tertiary enhanced recovery
projects had already been decontrolled effective September 1, 1978. 10 C.F.R. S 212.78, 43 Fed.
Reg. 33679 (Aug. 1, 1978). See text at notes 79-88 supra. Thus, the June I, 1979, effective date
used by the President appears to be inaccurate. The incremental tertiary oil regulations were
subsequently amended to coordinate properly with the decontrol of lower tier oil. 10 C.F.R. S
212.78(g)(1) (last sentence), 45 Fed. Reg. 47622 (July 15, 1980).
"2 10 C.F.R. S 212.78, 44 Fed. Reg. 51148 (Aug. 30, 1979). The price benefit at-
tributable to the released lower tier oil became known as "front-end" tertiary money, and the
released oil as "front-end tertiary" oil. The front-end money rule was proposed prior to the
President's April, 1979, Energy Address, and was an alternative to a proposal arising from
ECPA. 44 Fed. Reg. 18677 (Mar. 29, 1979) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking). See note 79
supra, and text at note 88 supra. Front-end money may be used to finance 75 percent of project
costs, up to a maximum of $20 million per property. 10 C.F.R. 212.78(a)(2), 212.78(c)
(definitions of "allowed expense," "recoupable allowed expenses," and "tertiary incentive
revenue"). The amount of the benefit was initially defined as the allowed price increase less any
ad valorem and severance taxes. This definition was later amended also to exclude from the benefit
the windfall profit tax attributable to the allowed price increase. 10 C.F.R. § 212.78(c) (defini-
tion of "tertiary incentive revenue"), 45 Fed. Reg. 40106 (June 13, 1980). By excluding
severance taxes and the windfall profit tax from the definition of the front-end tertiary price
benefit, greater amounts of oil could be sold at uncontrolled prices. See note 375 infra. Certain of
the provisions of the front-end tertiary program were later revised. 46 Fed. Reg. 1246 (Jan. 5,
1981).
10 C.F.R. 5 212.72 (definitions of "average completion depth" and "average daily
production," paragraph (d) of the definition of "base production control level," and definitions
of "completion depth" and "marginal property"), 44 Fed. Reg. 22010 (Apr. 12, 1979). Price
incentives for marginal properties had been considered since 1976. See 41 Fed. Reg. 18873 (May
7, 1976) (notice of proposed rulemaking); 43 Fed. Reg. 52186 (Nov. 8, 1978) (notice of proposed
rulemaking). The concept of "marginal property" applied to all the wells on a particular proper-
ty, rather than to any one well. A marginal property is a property whose average daily production
during 1978 did not exceed the limits below for the corresponding average completion depth of all
of the production wells on the property:
Average completion depth (in feet)
at least 2,000, but less than 4,000
at least 4,000, but less than 6,000
at least 6,000, but less than 8,000







35 or less 
See text and note at note 29 supra. Marginal oil was to be redefined as upper tier oil in two stages:
(1) by defining the BPCL of .a marginal property, as of June 1, 1979, as equal to 20 percent of
1978 production, and (2) by defining the BPCL of a marginal property, as of January 1, 1980, as
equal to zero. The definition of marginal property was later amended retroactively to increase the
average daily production limitation by five barrels per day for each additional 2,000 feet of
average completion depth at or below 10,000 feet. 45 Fed. Reg. 47406 (July 14, 1980). Marginal
properties were estimated to account for approximately 25 percent of all lower tier oil. Staff of the
Joint Committee on Taxation, Design of a Windfall Profit Tax 18 (June 1, 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Design of a Windfall Profit Tax]; Congressional Budget Office, The Windfall Profits Tax: A
Comparative Analysis of Two Bills 76 (Nov. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Comparative Analysis of
Two Bills].
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released to the upper tier on January 1, 1980." 4 Finally, on July 16, 1979, the
President announced that "heavy oil," "a highly viscous, almost tar-like
crude, which must be heated to be produced,"" 5 would also be decontrolled." 6
Lower and upper tier oil were to be phased out generally beginning on
January 1, 1980. In addition, certain regulatory modifications effective prior to
that date would have the effect of reducing the amount of oil subject to the
lower tier ceiling price. Producers of lower tier oil could elect an updated BPCL
for any property.'" If the election was made, producers would be allowed to
reduce the volume of oil they were required to sell as lower tier oil by 1 1/2 per-
cent for each month of 1979. 18 Lower tier oil producers would also receive a
"4 The second stage of the marginal oil price increase was delayed by the President for
three months. Executive Order No. 12187, 45 Fed. Reg. 3 (Jan. 2, 1980) (indefinite postpone-
ment of second stage); Executive Order No. 12209, 45 Fed. Reg. 26311 (Apr. 18, 1980)
(postponement limited to three months).
" 5 President's Energy Address Fact Sheet, pt. V, July 16, 1979, reprinted in 1 EN. MNGT
(CCH) 1 776 [hereinafter President's Energy Address Fact Sheet]. "Much of this reserve is in Califor-
nia." Id. Heavy oil production is approximately 265,000 barrels per day. Of this amount,
110,000 barrels per day were classified as stipper oil, and, therefore, were already decontrolled;
15,000 barrels per day were classified as marginal oil, and would have followed the marginal oil
decontrol plan; 60,000 barrels per day were classified as lower tier oil other than marginal oil;
and 80,000 barrels per day were classified as upper tier oil. Comparative Analysis of Two Bills, supra
note 113, at 76.
1 " President's Energy Address Fact Sheet, supra note 115. Decontrol of heavy oil was im-
plemented by Executive Order No. 12153, 44 Fed. Reg. 48949 (Aug. 21, 1979) ("heavy" de-
fined as weighted average gravity of 16.0 degrees API for sales on or after August 17, 1979); Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12186, 44 Fed. Reg. 76477 (Dec. 27, 1979) ("heavy" redefined as weighted
average gravity of 20.0 degrees API for sales on or after December 21, 1979); Executive Order
No. 12189, 45 Fed. Reg. 3559 (Jan. 18, 1980) (redefinition not retroactive); 10 C.F.R. 5 212.59,
45 Fed. Reg. 21206 (Apr. 1, 1980) (crude oil pricing regulations conformed to Executive
Orders). Further refinements on the treatment of heavy oil have been proposed. 45 Fed. Reg.
42222 (June 23, 1980).
As with other categories of oil, the 1979 heavy oil rules represented the culmination of a
process that had begun several years earlier. In enacting ECPA, Congress specifically directed
that the additional crude oil pricing flexibility provided under 5 122 of that Act was to be used to
mitigate the California crude oil problem: "One of the factors which led this Committee to agree
upon the amendment which removes the three percent limitation on price adjustments as a pro-
duction incentive was the understanding that this flexibility be used by the Administrator to ad-
just prices for heavy California crude oil to more equitable levels." S. REP. No. 94-119, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 73 (1976). The response was 10 C.F.R. 5 212.73(c), 41 Fed. Reg. 48324 (Nov.
3, 1976), which provided increases in the lower tier ceiling price for oil of higher density. The
issue of gravity price differentials also had been considered in proceedings prior to ECPA. 40
Fed. Reg. 28637 (July 8, 1975) (Notice of Proposed Rulemaking), withdrawn by 40 Fed. Reg.
54263 (Nov. 21, 1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 1564 (Jan. 6, 1976); 41 Fed. Reg. 4939-40 (Feb. 3, 1976).
17 The new BPCL for any property would be effective as of January 1, 1979, and would
be the average monthly production of lower tier oil from the property for the six-month period
ending March 31, 1979. 10 C.F.R. 5 212.72 (paragraph (c)(1) of the definition of "base produc-
tion control level"), 44 Fed. Reg. 22010 (Apr. 12, 1979).
" 8 This rate was said to be equal to the natural decline rate experienced for lower tier
wells in 1978. April, 1979 Fact Sheet, supra note 102, at 10. The first adjustment under the 1'A per-
cent decline rate would be made as of June 1, 1979, but would be calculated as if the new rate had
become effective on January 1, 1979. 10 C.F.R. 212.76(a)(3)(i), 44 Fed. Reg. 22010, 22016
(Apr. 12, 1979). Thus, if the election was made, the BPCL for a property would be reduced by
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one-time forgiveness of cumulative deficiencies. 19 Finally, effective January 1,
1980, the quantity of oil required to be sold as lower tier oil could be reduced by
three percent per month."° The overall effect of these changes would be
gradually to phase out lower tier oil so that, by October 1, 1981, the date price
controls would terminate, most lower tier oil would already have been decon-
trolled. Upper tier oil would also be decontrolled, beginning on January 1,
1980, by gradually increasing the amount of upper tier oil which was decon-
trolled so that the world price for all upper tier oil was reached by October 1,
1981."'
Thus, by administrative action, President Carter directed the adoption of
regulatory changes designed gradually to decontrol oil prices. New categories
of oil were defined and given special price control treatment, including newly
discovered oil, incremental tertiary oil, marginal oil, heavy oil, and front-end
nine percent (1 % percent per month multiplied by six months) as of June 1, 1979. 44 Fed. Reg.
22010, 22012 (Apr. 12, 1979).
"9
 10 C .F. R. 4 212.72 (paragraph (c) of the definition of "current cumulative deficien-
cy"), 44 Fed. Reg. 22010, 22016 (Apr. 12, 1979).
1" 10 C.F.R. 5 212.76(a)(3)(ii), 44 Fed. Reg. 22010, 22016 (Apr. 12, 1979). The three-
percent decline rate was available regardless of whether a revised BPCL was elected, and, as a
consequence, regardless of whether the 1%2 percent decline rate was adopted. Moreover, as of
January 1, 1980, the BPCL for a property for which the 1 1/2
 percent decline rate was not elected
could, nonetheless, be reduced by 18 percent, the aggregate reduction for electing properties for
1979.
10 C.F.R. 55 212.72 (definition of "market level new crude oil"), 212.74(a), 44 Fed.
Reg. 66186, 66187-88 (Nov, 19, 1979). The President informed Congress that upper tier crude
oil would be decontrolled by gradually increasing the controlled price: "Beginning on January 1,
1980, the upper tier oil price will increase in equal monthly increments until it reaches the world
price on October 1, 1981." President's April, 1979 Energy Message, supra note 102, at 723. The
Department of Energy did not find itself constrained, however, by the President's message. Its
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to implement decontrol of upper tier oil followed volumetric
decontrol rather than gradual price increases. 44 Fed. Reg. 50605 (Aug. 29, 1979). No reference
was made in the Notice to the President's statement. DOE's proposal was adopted unchanged: a
percentage, beginning with 4.6 percent in January, 1980, and increasing by 4.6 percentage
points each month thereafter, of crude oil that would otherwise be subject to upper tier ceiling
prices would instead receive market prices. The choice of decontrol method was explained as
follows:
We believe that a gradual decrease in the volume of crude oil subject to price con-
trols would be simpler and surer; would ease industry's transition to the rigors of
unregulated dealings; and would involve less administrative burden than ceiling
price adjustments, particularly in view of the uncertainty as to what world market
prices for crude oil will be on October 1, 1981. In addition, such action would per-
mit the prices for first sales of an increasing amount of domestic crude oil to be
determined by actual market factors without reference to the crude oil pricing
regulations, and, thus, ease the transition to a market in which prices are deter-
mined solely by market factors. Finally, gradual release of increasing volumes of
upper tier oil to market levels would not create an incentive to withhold produc-
tion, as a gradual increase of upper tier prices to market levels might.
44 Fed. Reg. at 50605. It is important to recall that, each month, the amount of crude oil other-
wise subject to upper tier ceiling prices would also include increasing amounts of decontrolled
lower tier oil. Thus, not only was lower tier oil to be gradually released to the upper tier, but an
increasing portion of such lower tier oil would, in effect, be released to market prices as upper tier
oil was decontrolled.
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tertiary oil. In addition, old oil would be phased out by reducing BPCLs, and
new oil would be gradually decontrolled. 122 All of these considerations and
many others would become involved in the legislative process of developing a
windfall profit tax, described below.
2. The Windfall Profit Tax
In addition to implementation of decontrol, the Administration proposed
an excise tax on the domestic production of crude oil, to be effective on January
1, 1980. 1 " It was stated that the tax would be borne by producers of crude oil
because the marginal price of crude was set by imported oil, not domestic oi1. 124
The tax would be imposed at a uniform rate of 50 percent, and would apply to
two separate elements: producer revenues attributable to the decontrol of lower
and upper tier oil, and producer revenues attributable to future OPEC price
increases.'" The principal reason given for imposing the tax was "equity." It
1 " The Carter decontrol program continued until January 28, 1981. On that date, pur-
suant to the administrative authority delegated by EPAA, President Reagan signed an executive
order decontrolling oil prices effective immediately. Executive Order No. 12287, 46 Fed. Reg.
9909 (Jan. 30, 1981). The reasons given for President Reagan's action were virtually identical to
those cited by President Carter in support of phased decontrol:
For more than nine years, restrictive price controls have held U.S. oil produc-
tion below its potential, artificially boosted energy consumption, aggravated our
balance of payments problems, and stifled technological breakthroughs. Price con-
trols have also made us more energy-dependent on the OPEC nations, a develop-
ment that has jeopardized our economic security and undermined price stability at
home.
S	 *
This step will also stimulate energy conservation. At the same time, the
elimination of price controls will end the entitlements system, which has been in
reality a subsidy for the importation of foreign oil.
Statement on Signing Executive Order 12287, 17 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. Doc. 53 (Jan. 28,
1981); compare text at note 105 supra. Pursuant to the President's action, virtually all of the
crude oil price regulations were made unnecessary, and, therefore, were revoked. 46 Fed. Reg.
20508 (Apr. 3, 1981).
President Reagan's action was expected to increase gross industry revenues by $5 billion
to $13 billion, and to increase federal tax revenues, mostly through the windfall profit tax, by
$3.5 billion to $8 billion. OIL & GAS J . , Feb. 2, 1981, at 25-27. It was estimated that at the time
of President Reagan's action, only 25 percent of U.S. oil production, comprising 15 percent of
U.S. refinery input, remained subject to price controls. Fact Sheet, Decontrol of Crude Oil and
Refined Petroleum Products, reprinted in DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Jan. 28, 1981, at J- . 7.
The validity of President Reagan's decontrol order was challenged by a lawsuit alleging
violations of the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act, the Economic
Stabilization Act of 1970, and the Department of Energy Organization Act. The plaintiffs sought
a preliminary injunction to halt enforcement of Executive Order No. 12287. The district court
denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, noting the insubstantial likelihood that the plain-
tiffs would succeed on the merits. Metzenbaum v. Edwards, Civ. No. 81-0405 (D.D.C. Mar. 4,
1981). In addition, an amendment voiding President Reagan's decontrol order was defeated in
the Senate, 68 to 24. 127 CONG. REC. S1952-63 (daily ed. Mar. 10, 1981).
123 See sources cited at note 102 supra.
124 125 CONG. REC. H2675 (daily ed.) (remarks of Rep. Ullman). See text at note 34
supra.
12S April, 1979 Fact Sheet, supra note 102, at 10.
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would be unfair to permit domestic oil producers to retain all of the revenues
attributable to decontrol and future OPEC price increases. 126
a. General Structure
The windfall profit tax was to be an "excise tax . . . imposed on the
windfall profit from taxable crude oil removed from the premises during each
taxable period. "127
 The amount of the tax would be 50 percent' 28 of the wind-
fall profit, determined with respect to each barrel of taxable crude oil.'" The
tax base was labeled the "windfall profit," and was defined as the excess of the
"removal price" — generally, the 'sales price — 130 of the barrel of oil over the
"adjusted base price" of such barrel."' The windfall profit could not exceed
the "net income" attributable to each barrel, determined by reference to
percentage depletion concepts.' 32 The adjusted base price consisted of a base
price derived from the crude oil price regulations as of May, 1979, adjusted for
126
 "As Government controls end, prices will go up on oil which has already been
discovered, and unless we tax the oil companies, they will reap huge and undeserved windfall
profits." President's April, 1979 Energy Address, supra note 102, at 610. "But decontrol could also
further inflate the already enormous profits of the oil companies. As I've said, part of this ex-
cessive new profit will be totally unearned — what is called a 'windfall' profit." President's April,
1979 Energy Address, supra note 102, at 611. "This windfall profits tax protects against two areas of
excessive producer revenues: those which may result from the future actions of the OPEC cartel;
and those which will result from the lifting of price controls on ordinary lower and upper tier oil
which does not qualify for special production incentives." April, 1979 Fact Sheet, supra note 102, at
10. See also President's April, 1979 Energy Message, supra note 102, at 721, 722; Ways and Means Com-
mittee Hearings, supra note 102, at 16 (statement of Treasury Secretary Blumenthal).
121 Section 2(a)(1) of the Ullman Bill, supra note 102, adding new I.R.C. S 4986(a).
[Hereafter, references to bill sections will be dropped. Instead, section references will be only to
proposed sections of the Internal Revenue Code, unless otherwise indicated.] The Ullman Bill
labeled the tax base as the "windfall profit," and, as a result, referred to the proposed excise tax
as the "windfall profit tax." Since the Ullman Bill nomenclature was adopted by the Congress,
the tax is referred to herein as the "windfall profit tax."
126
 The 50 percent rate was selected to allow for errors in estimating the impact of infla-
tion, for delays in revising base prices to reflect inflation, and for royalties and severance taxes.
"9 Ullman Bill, supra note 102, 5 4987(a). The per barrel computation could be signifi-
cant in certain cases. If the base price exceeded the sales price on one barrel, the difference would
not offset the excess of sales price over base price on another barrel.
"9
 Ullman Bill, supra note 102, S 4989(c). Special constructive sales price rules were pro-
vided for sales between related persons, removal of oil from the premises before sale, and refining
begun on the premises.
121 Ullman Bill, supra note 102, 5 4989(a). Consideration was given to other formulations
of the tax. For example, the tax base could instead be the increase in profits, earnings, or net in-
come attributable to some factor such as increases in controlled prices. This approach, however,
required a satisfactory, simple means of measuring the "excess" profit. Another alternative was
to adopt a severance tax structure, and impose a flat-rate tax either on the total sales proceeds or
on a per-unit basis. Under this approach, the tax base would clearly not correlate to decontrol or
future OPEC price increases. See also text at note 175 infra, and note 399 infra.
192 Ullman Bill, supra note 102, 5 4989(6). The Administration proposal did not include a
net income limitation because it had been concluded that the 50 percent tax rate provided ade-
quate protection against imposing a tax in excess of the actual income derived from the barrel of
oil. In addition, the Administration proposal provided special treatment for certain potentially
high-cost categories of oil: Stripper oil and incremental tertiary oil were to be taxed using the
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inflation.'" The holder of the economic interest with respect to the oil was re-
quired to pay the tax. 134
Under the Administration's proposal and the Ullman Bill,'" distinctions
among categories of oil were generally made through the definition and compu-
tation of base price. The base price was determined with respect to three
"tiers" of oil corresponding, roughly, to lower tier oil, upper tier oil, and de-
controlled oil. The base prices for Tiers 1, 2, and 3 were, at the time, approxi-
mately $6, $13, and $16 per barrel, respectively, and the price for uncontrolled
oil was in excess of $16 per barrel. Thus, under Tier 1, a barrel of decontrolled
lower tier oil sold at the upper tier ceiling price had a potential windfall profit of
$7 ($13 minus $6), and tax of $3.50; if sold at the market price, the windfall
profit would be $10 ($16 minus $6), with a $5 tax. If, however, the barrel of de-
controlled lower tier oil were taxed as Tier 2 oil, the windfall profit would be
zero if sold at the upper tier price, and $3 if sold at the market price. Accord-
ingly, "tier" classification carried with it substantial tax consequences.
b. Tier 1
The Administration proposed to use the lower tier base price to tax only the
amount of lower tier oil that was decontrolled by the three-percent decontrol
most favorable base price, and marginal oil was to be taxed using the upper tier, rather than
lower tier, base price. The Administration did not, however, seek to delete the net income limita-
tion.
133 Ullman Bill, supra note 102, S 4990. Thus, the base prices for the tax reflected
regulated prices at the time of the windfall profit tax proposal. As sales prices increased due to
either decontrol or future OPEC price increases, the tax base would increase accordingly, but
would be reduced for inflation. This formulation of the tax followed earlier windfall profits tax
proposals. See note 3 supra.
Since regulated prices were adjusted for inflation, if the base prices for tax purposes were
left unadjusted, the tax base would accrue an element clearly unrelated to decontrol. Thus, to
reconstruct in part what the applicable base price would have been under price controls, the base
price needed to be adjusted for inflation. The measure of inflation was the gross national product
(GNP) implicit price deflator, lagged by two calendar quarters to allow for the information to
become available. The base for lOwer and upper tier oil would be the last quarter of 1978; for
decontrolled oil, the base would be the second quarter of 1979. Thus, in the first quarter of 1980,
when the tax was proposed to begin, the inflation adjustment for lower and upper tier oil would
be the percentage by which the GNP deflator for the third quarter of 1979 (the latest available in-
formation) exceeded the deflator for the last quarter of 1978. This system is similar to that used in
the energy regulations. See President's April, 1979 Energy Message, supra note 102, at 724, 725. The
later base quarter for uncontrolled oil reflects the choice of a December, 1978, rather than May,
1979, base price for that part of the tax. See text at notes 157-58 infra.
1 " Ullman Bill, supra note 102, 55 4986(b) and 4991(a)(1). The Ullman Bill provided one
exception to the general rule imposing the tax on the holder of the economic interest in the crude
oil. In the case of production payments dischargeable in specific dollar amounts, rather than a
fixed volume of oil, the tax would be imposed on the holder of the economic interest from which
the payment was created. Ullman Bill, supra note 102, S 4991(a)(2). "In these cases, the windfall
from higher prices really is received by the owner of the residual interest in the oil, not the holder
of the production payment, because the payment can be worked off with fewer barrels of oil ow-
ing to the higher price." WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, infra note 171, at 40.
'" See note 102 supra.
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decline rate 136
 in excess of a two-percent decline rate.' 37
 As explained by Treas-
ury Secretary Blumenthal:
The decontrol plan uses a 3 percent decline rate while the windfall
profits tax uses a 2 percent rate. The difference is dictated by eco-
nomics. As I noted above, a 3 percent decontrol decline rate was re-
quired to provide the incentive of replacement cost pricing for old oil
properties and also to allow for a smooth transition to complete de-
control in 1981. Had a lower decline rate been employed, the "gap"
when complete decontrol is required in 1981 would have been larger
and the inflationary shock in 1982 greater.
However, the 3 percent decline rate exceeds the actual decline
rate observed in almost every oil field. Thus, a 2 percent decline rate
was selected for tax purposes as being closer to historical experience.
Using a lower decline rate than 2 percent for tax purposes would ob-
viously increase the amount of old oil subject to tax, but would risk
discouraging production to some extent. The 2 percent decline for
tax purposes represents a reasonable balance between capturing
windfalls and assuring maximum production. 138
The two-percent decline rate for windfall profit tax purposes would begin on
January 1, 1980, and continue past the expiration of price controls on Septem-
ber 30, 1981. Thus, by the end of May, 1983, the tax base attributable solely to
the decontrol of lower tier oil was to be eliminated.'"
In order to implement this policy, the base price for Tier 1 oil was defined
as the lower tier ceiling price as of May, 1979, determined under the March,
1979, energy regulations.'" Tier 1 oil was defined in two parts: (1) oil that is or
would be subject to the lower tier ceiling price rule of the June, 1979, energy
regulations,"' and (2) oil that would be subject to the lower tier ceiling price
rule of the June, 1979, energy regulations if the energy regulation decline rate
138 See text at note 120 supra.
1 " President's April, 1979 Energy Message, supra note 102, at 724; Ways and Means Committee
Hearings, supra note 102, at 17; Ullman Bill, supra note 102, 1 4988(b).
' 38
 Ways and Means Committee Hearings, supra note 102, at 18.
19 See President's April, 1979 Energy Message, supra note 102, at 724.
' 4° Ullman Bill, supra note 102, 4990(c). The effect of this rule is to select a unique price
determined by the energy regulations, which price then becomes a part of the tax law, to be ad-
justed (if at all) through the tax law, not the energy regulations. .
141 Ullman Bill, supra note 102, 11 4988(b)(1) and 4988(e)(1). If the oil "is" subject to the
June, 1979, lower tier ceiling price, a windfall profit would arise only if the price control inflation
adjustment is more generous than the windfall profit tax inflation adjustment. The Ways and
Means Committee indicated its expectation that the Department of Energy would adjust lower
tier ceiling prices so that oil subject to the lower tier ceiling price would not be subject to the wind-
fall profit tax. WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, infra note 171, at 18. By including in Tier 1 oil which
"would be" subject to the June, 1979, lower tier ceiling price, oil released due to subsequent
lower tier decontrol regulatory action would not escape the lower tier windfall profit tax base
price unless the tax was amended, thus "freezing" the status quo.
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were two percent instead of three percent. 142 Thus, the tax base corresponding
to lower tier oil would start with the June, 1979, energy regulations, and add
back to the lower tier the difference between using a two-percent and a three-
percent decline rate. The effect would be to subject only that difference to a
windfall profit tax computed with the lower tier ceiling price" as the base
price. All other lower tier oil decontrolled by the President in April, 1979,
would escape the $6 base price, including marginal oil, 14 front-end tertiary
oil, 145 and oil released to the upper tier because of the election of a new
BPCL' 46 and elimination of cumulative deficiencies."' In addition, oil from
stripper wellsi" and incremental tertiary production' 49 were not included in
the Tier 1 tax base.
c. Tier 2
The windfall profit tax using the upper tier base price would apply to all
oil that is or would be subject to the upper tier ceiling price rule of the June,
1979, energy regulations,'" except for oil taxed in Tier 1. The upper tier base
price would be determined as of May, 1979, using the March, 1979, energy
regulations.'" Since the Tier 1 tax base was defined narrowly, much of the oil
subject to price controls as of April, 1979, would be taxed using the Tier 2 base
price. Thus, the Tier 2 base price would apply to pre-decontrol upper tier oil,
marginal oil, front-end tertiary oil, 152
 oil released to the upper tier as a result of
the BPCL and cumulative deficiency adjustments, and other decontrolled
lower tier oil, except oil included in Tier 1. The Tier 2 tax base did not include
stripper oil, newly discovered oil, or incremental tertiary oil.
Upper tier oil was to be decontrolled gradually by October 1, 1981) 53
Thus, by that date, the sales price for upper tier oil would be the market price,
142 Ullman Bill, supra note 102, S 4988(b)(2).
143 The lower tier ceiling price was, on average, approximately $6 per barrel as of May,
1979.
' 44 See note 113 supra.
See note 112 supra. Treatment of front-end tertiary oil was unclear. The Administra-
tion stated that "Itlhe lower tier taxable volume will not include production that is released
beginning on January 1, 1980, in order to finance investment in tertiary recovery." President's
April, 1979 Energy Message, supra note 102, at 725. The Ullman Bill, however, which purported to
embody the Administration's proposal, is described as making "no special provision for [front-
end tertiary] oil on the theory that DOE would provide enough 'up front' money through the
pricing structure and would take into account the fact that additional price increase would be
subject to tax." Design of a Windfall Profit Tax, supra note 113, at 26.
18 See notes 117-18 supra.
"7 See note H9 supra.
' 48 See text at notes 49-51, 59-60 supra.
149 See note 111 supra.
"° Ullman Bill, supra note 102, SS 4988(c) and 4988(e)(2).
151 Ullman Bill, supra note 102, 5 4990(d)(1).
" 5 But see note 145 supra.
133 Decontrol was to be accomplished by increasing the ceiling price. Instead, decontrol
was implemented by increasing the volume of upper tier oil that is decontrolled. See note 121
supra.
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while the windfall profit tax base price would be $13, adjusted for inflation.
The Tier 2 tax was to phase out between November, 1986, and December,
1990, by increasing the upper tier base price to the Tier 3 base price in accord-
ance with a schedule to be prescribed by the Treasury Department.'" Thus, by
1991, that portion of the tax base attributable solely to the decontrol of upper
tier oil was to be eliminated. This decision was explained as follows:
The upper-tier tax is phased out in order to simplify the windfall
profits tax at a point in time when fine distinctions are no longer
needed. Computing the upper-tier requires reference to the last
vestiges of price controls. Since revenue from the upper-tier tax will
decrease substantially after 1985 as the volume of upper-tier oil
diminishes, we decided to phase out the upper-tier tax after 1986.'"
Thus, by 1991 only the Tier 3 base price would remain.
d. Tier 3
The Tier 3 tax base reflected the objective of taxing windfall profits attrib-
utable to future OPEC price increases.' 56 The Tier 3 base price was set, there-
fore, at $16 per barrel,'" the estimated prevailing price as a result of
December, 1978, OPEC price increases.'" The Tier 3 tax base included all
'" President's April, 1979 Energy Message, supra note 102, at 725; Ullman Bill, supra note
102, 5 4990(d)(2).
'" Ways and Means Committee Hearings, supra note 102, at 18 (statement of Treasury
Secretary Blumenthal).
156 See note 126 supra.
'" The Administration proposed a flat $16 per barrel Tier 3 base price, regardless of
quality or location or other factors. President's April, 1979 Energy Message, supra note 102, at 725.
The Administration's proposal would have been easy to administer, and would have provided an
additional incentive for lower-priced crudes, such as heavy oil. It would have led, however, to
situations in which high quality oil selling above $16 was taxed too much, and low quality oil sell-
ing below $16, too little, on the assumption that profits attributable only to future OPEC price
increases were to be taxed. The Ullman Bill, by contrast, required the Treasury Department to
assume an average price of $16 per barrel in December, 1979, and then to publish regulations that
provided a method for determining the price for which oil of a particular grade and location
would have sold. Ullman Bill, supra note 102, S 4990(c).
Ise
	
April, 1979 Energy Message, supra note 102, at 725; Ullman Bill, supra note
102, S 4990(e). The selection of the $16 base price was discussed by Treasury Secretary Blumen-
thal;
A number of questions have been raised concerning the $16 per barrel
base price for the uncontrolled tier tax. The $16 figure is based on the estimated
world price which would be in effect as of the first quarter of 1980 as a result of the
December, 1978, OPEC price announcement. The base price was calculated to
allow for uncertainties about the difference between the posted price of Saudi Ara-
bian marker crude, and transportation costs, quality differentials and other rele-
vant factors. By choosing $16, most domestically produced uncontrolled crude oil
would pay no tax unless OPEC were to raise its prices in excess of inflation.
Second, it has been suggested that the $16 base be increased because re-
.
cent OPEC surcharges have already increased the price of oil. However, the Presi-
dent's windfall profits tax proposal is designed to prevent domestic producers from
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domestic crude oil that was not included in Tier 1 or Tier 2, except Alaskan
North Slope oil.'" Tier 3 oil initially would include, therefore, newly
discovered oil,'" incremental tertiary oil,' 6 ' and stripper oi1. 162 ANS oil was
excluded because, at the time of the proposal, the wellhead price of ANS oil
was substantially below the base price for tax purposes."'
Although, when proposed, the Tier 3 tax covered less than one-third of
domestic oil production, the Tier 3 tax would eventually include all domestic
oil production, other than ANS oil, as Tier 1 phased into Tier 2 164 and Tier 2
phased into Tier 3. 165
 At such time, the entire windfall profit tax base would be
limited to the amount, if any, by which OPEC price increases after December,
1978, had outstripped inflation. In addition, the Tier 3 tax was to be perma-
nent. This controversial feature was addressed at length by Secretary Blumen-
thal:
Fit has been argued that since the tax on the uncontrolled oil tier is
permanent, the United States is permanently condemning producers
to a lower price at home than they might realize abroad, and that the
United States will produce less oil than would be produced in the
absence of a permanent tax.
benefiting from just these kinds of sudden price increases. There is no rational
reason for exempting the profits domestic producers are realizing from these sur-
charges from the windfall profits tax.
Ways and Means Committee Hearings, supra note 102, at 19.
1S9
 The exemption for ANS oil was implemented by excluding from the definition of
"taxable crude oil" "any crude oil produced from a well north of the Arctic Circle." Ullman Bill,
supra note 102, 55 4988(a) and 4991(b)(6).
' 6° See note 110 supra.
See note 111 supra.
1 " See text at notes 49-51, 59-60 supra. Tier 3 also included production from the Naval
Petroleum Reserve, which was exempt from crude oil price controls, 10 C. F.R. S 212.55, and
production from "various other Federal enclaves," WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, infra, note 171,
at 22 n.3. Since production from these sources is quite small, their treatment under the windfall
profit tax will not be discussed further herein.
"3 See S I.B.4.a. supra. As explained by the Treasury Department:
The exemption of Alaskan North Slope oil is based on the economies of
Alaskan production. According to the most recent DOE data, the average
wellhead price of Alaskan crude was only $5.40 a barrel, due to the extraordinarily
high transportation costs which must be incurred to bring this production to
market. While this wellhead price will rise dollar-for-dollar with increases in the
world price of oil, it would not reach $16 per barrel until the wellhead price of
Saudi Arabian marker crude reaches $22 a barrel (in 1980 prices). Although prices
of imported oil have been increasing rapidly over the last few months, we will not
likely see posted prices at the $22 level in the near future. It is easier to exempt
Alaskan production from the tax than to require Alaskan producers to file tax
returns solely for the purpose of showing that no liability has been incurred.
Ways and Means Committee Hearings, supra note 102, at 19. The $22 figure was reached before the
end of 1979.
"4 By June 1, 1983.
167 By January 1, 1991.
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The world price of oil has major noncompetitive aspects. Since
1973, it has been set well above the cost of production by a cartel.
Given these circumstances, there is no economic reason for allowing
domestic producers to receive the world price of oil on their produc-
tion
Moreover, it is simply not true that producers can earn even more
abroad than they can at home if the uncontrolled tier tax is enacted.
In every other producing country, increases in the price of oil have
immediately been accompanied by increases in taxes on producers
or by nationalization. Either action deprives the producers of the in-
creased revenues. Even in the U.K., the tax on North Sea producers
is designed to make the government the principal beneficiary of
higher world oil prices. This same effect has been realized in
Venezuela through nationalization. Similar examples can be found
in most other countries.
Finally, those who argue that we will lose a small amount of
domestic production due to the uncontrolled tier tax fail to recognize
the risk of imposing no tax at all. Political forces will not allow com-
plete and permanent decontrol of oil so long as we face an unquali-
fied threat of embargoes and sudden price increases. In the absence
of a permanent tax, a future surge in oil prices may compel a return
to regulation. It is preferable to risk sacrificing the very small poten-
tial supply response in order to avoid such a situation. By imposing a
permanent tax with a base which is adjusted . for inflation, I believe
we will, in the long run, allow producers to receive approximately
the same price as is received outside the U.S. but with standby pro-
tection that will prevent them from receiving sudden windfall profits
due to increases in prices as a result of anti-competitive cartel prac-
tices. 166
Thus, despite the resulting loss of production, the Administration committed
itself to a permanent tax on domestic crude oil, in order to reduce the risk of
having price controls reimposed on oil at some future date.
166 Ways and Means Committee Hearings, supra note 102, at 19. The detail and emphasis of
the Secretary's statement were understandable. The tax was premised on the need to limit
"windfalls" (presumably, economic rents) attributable to decontrol and to future OPEC price
increases. Windfalls, however, dissipate over time as the market adjusts to new price levels, and
higher prices encourage greater risks to be assumed in development and production. See note 19
supra, note 313 infra. Consequently, the justification for a permanent tax, unless required to raise
revenue, was questionable. Note that the tax bases attributable solely to decontrolling lower and
upper tier oil would phase out by June 1, 1983, and January 1, 1991, respectively. Thereafter,
the tax base would be attributable solely to post-December, 1978, OPEC price increases in excess
of inflation.
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e. Other Provisions1€7
Two additional provisions in the Administration proposal merit mention.
First, the Administration proposed to delete the amount of the windfall profit
from gross income for purposes of computing the percentage depletion dedue-
tion.' 68 This proposal was premised on the argument that if a portion of gross
income was sufficiently a windfall to merit imposition of the windfall profit tax,
such portion ought not, at the same time, provide the basis for a tax subsidy.
Second, the windfall profit tax would generally be deductible for federal in-
come tax purposes as a business expense.' 69 The Ullman Bill provides a federal
income tax deduction as a tax."fi
Thus, the Carter Administration presented Congress with a windfall prof-
it tax proposal for a permanent 50 percent excise tax applied to a tax base con-
sisting of the difference between the amount received for the oil, and a base
price derived from the price control regulations. The tax base could not exceed
net income. Special treatment was accorded to marginal oil, Alaskan oil, newly
discovered oil, incremental tertiary oil, and stripper oil. In addition, the base
for the percentage depletion allowance would be reduced by the amount of the
windfall profit. The need for, and basic structure of, the Administration's pro-
posed tax would be accepted throughout the ensuing congressional review.
Considerable attention would be devoted, however, to the detailed provisions.
B. The Ways and Means Committee Bill
1. In General
On June 22, 1979, the House Ways and Means Committee reported out a
windfall profit tax bill."' The Ways and Means Bill followed the basic struc-
'" One provision was notable by its absence. A major issue in prior windfall profits tax
proposals and in the crude oil equalization tax proposal, note 3 supra, was whether the tax base
(or, alternatively, the tax) should be reduced by reason of certain energy-related investments, a
reduction popularly known as "plowback." Plowback could be viewed either as a further tax in-
centive for production, or as a means to dilute the tax. If the object of decontrol, insofar as pro-
ducers were concerned, was to present them with production incentives through market prices,
and if the purpose of the tax was to absorb "windfalls," then there was no need for plowback as
an incentive. Although not ultimately adopted, plowback played (and continues to have) an im-
portant role in consideration of the windfall profit tax. See text at notes 230 and 241 and notes
323 and 393 infra.
'" President's April, 1979 Energy Message, supra note 102, at 725; 2(b) of the Ullman Bill,
supra note 102, amending I.R.C. 5 613(a).
169 See Treas. Reg. 1.164-2(0; President's April, 1979 Energy Message, supra note 102, at
'" Section 2(b)(1) of the Ullman Bill, supra note 102, adding new I.R.C.	 164(a)(5).
The Ullman Bill provision was eventually enacted by 101(b) of the Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act of 1980. For the proper timing of a deduction of the windfall profit tax by a cash basis
taxpayer, see Rev. Rul. 81-99, I.R.B. 1981-13, 32.
" 1 H.R. 96-3919, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Ways and
Means Bill]; H.R. REP. No. 96-304, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as
WAYS AND MEANS REPORT].
723.
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ture of the tax, and its relationship to crude oil price controls, as proposed by
the Administration and introduced in the Ullman Bill. The Ways and Means
Bill, however, attempted to identify and subject to tax more of the windfall
revenues attributable to decontrol. The general effect of changes adopted by
the Ways and Means Committee was to widen the tax base and increase the tax
rate while, at the same time, either minimizing the imposition of production
disincentives or providing production incentives where appropriate. The Ways
and Means Committee generally adopted the Administration's rationale for
the tax:
For most types of oil, after a certain point, these higher [domestic,
oiI] prices will only lead to very limited increases in production. The
revenues resulting from these higher prices, however, would provide
income to oil producers far in excess of what most of them originally
anticipated when they drilled their wells and in excess of what they
might now be expected to invest in energy production. Indeed, some
producers are now using their excess revenues to acquire unrelated
businesses.
Thus, the committee believes that the additional revenues re-
ceived by oil producers and royalty owners, both as a result of de-
control of oil prices and as a result of increases in world oil prices
substantially above those prevailing in 1978, are an appropriate ob-
ject of taxation. The windfall profit tax in this bill will tax away a fair
portion of these additional revenues while allowing producers to
receive very high prices for those types of oil whose production can
be expected to increase in response to that incentive.'"
The Committee specified its taxing strategy as follows:
The committee's windfall profit tax is carefully designed to im-
pose relatively high tax rates where production cannot be expected
to respond very much to further increases in price and relatively low
tax rates on oil whose production is likely to be responsive to price.
The lowest tax burden will be on newly discovered oil, incremental
oil produced on properties using tertiary recovery techniques, and
Alaskan oil. The highest tax burdens will be on old oil, which is oil
discovered before 1973. The first tier of the tax, the tier applying to
old oil, also is carefully structured so that increases in production
will command a lighter tax burden, thus creating an incentive to in-
crease production from old oil properties.'"
The Committee believes that a relatively heavy tax on tier one and
tier two oil, along with more lenient treatment of newly discovered,
' 72 WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 171, at 7.
1 " Id.
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Alaskan and tertiary oil, strikes the appropriate balance between
revenue needs and production incentives. 14
Finally, the Committee noted that the tax would have to be absorbed by oil
producers since imported oil sets the marginal price of domestic oil, and also
pointed out that an excise tax was a "far simpler approach" to taxing windfalls
than a true excess profits tax.'" Thus, the objectives and structure of the Ways
and Means Bill were similar to those of the Administration Bill. The Commit-
tee made significant changes, however, in the tax rate and the tax base.
2. General Structure
The Ways and Means Committee Bill increased the general rate of tax
from 50 percent to 70 percent, 18 but allowed a deduction from the removal
price for certain amounts of state severance taxes"' and refined the net income
limitation on the amount of windfall profit subject to tax. 18 The decision to im-
pose a 70 percent tax rate may have necessitated adoption of the severance tax
deduction in order to avoid combined tax rates approaching and beyond 100
percent.'" No severance tax deduction was allowed, however, for that portion
of the windfall profit that remained subject to the 50 percent rate of taxt" since
the Committee concluded that "undue burdens" were not created at the lower
rate."' Thus, in small part, the increase in tax rate was offset by the allowance
of the severance tax deduction.'" For the most part, however, the rate increase
meant that the federal government would simply recoup a greater share of the
windfall profit tax base than the Administration had proposed. The severance
tax adjustment was limited to the severance tax attributable to the windfall
profit. 1 e" The severance tax adjustment was also limited to the severance tax
14 Id. at 14.
'" Id. at 7. Compare note 131 supra.
16 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, S 4987(a). The Committee specifically rejected
rates of 60, 65, and 85 percent. Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), June 14, 1979, at G-6. A 50 percent rate
was allowed in certain narrow instances, discussed below. See text at notes 223 and 226 infra;
Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, SS 4987(b), 4991(a)(2), and 4991(b)(1)(A).
'" Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4989(a)(2).
178 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, S 4989(b).
"9
 "The severance tax adjustment is necessary to avoid placing an undue burden on the
producer of oil when the combined effect of the 70 percent windfall profit tax rate, the severance
tax, and State and Federal income taxes is taken into account." WAYS AND MEANS REPORT,
supra note 171, at 35. See Design of a Windfall Profit Tax, supra note 113, at 12. Note that the
allowance of a deduction for state severance taxes operates as a form of revenue sharing with
respect to the windfall profit. See note 358 infra.
' 8° Taxable Alaskan oil, Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4991(b)(1)(E), and the
first $9 of windfall profit of newly discovered oil were to be subject to a 50 percent tax rate.
181 WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 171, at 35.
182 "The same amount of revenue can be raised either by a 50 percent rate and no
severance tax deduction or by a 53 percent tax rate and a deduction for increases in severance
taxes." Design of a Windfall Profit Tax, supra note 113, at 12.
18' Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4992(d)(1).
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imposed by state law in effect on March 31, 1979, 184 in order "No discourage
States from raising severance taxes at the expense of the federal Treasury. "185
In addition to the severance tax deduction, excessive windfall profit tax
burdens were also to be prevented by a net income limitation. The net income
limitation started with the determination of taxable income from the property
under existing percentage depletion law.'" For this purpose, the term "prop-
erty" followed the income tax rules, not the crude oil price rules.'" Taxable in-
come was then modified to eliminate any deduction for the windfall profit
tax, 188 and to require that the computation of the depletion deduction be on an
actual or deemed cost depletion basis.'" Thus, intangible drilling expenses,
other than dry-hole costs, were required to be capitalized and taken into ac-
count in computing cost depletion for this purpose.'" In addition, taxable in-
come was determined by including in gross income the income attributable to a
production payment carved out of the property,'" and in order to prevent the
use of property transfers to increase the cost depletion basis •for the property
and so avoid the windfall profit tax, post-1978 transfers of a proven oil or gas
property increased basis only to the extent of costs incurred after the
18'
	 and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4992(d)(2).
185 WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 171, at 35.
186 I.R.C. 5 613(a); Treas. Reg. 5 1.613-5. Under 5 613(a), the allowance for percent-
age depletion "shall not exceed 50 percent of the taxpayer's taxable income from the property
(computed without allowance for depletion)." Thus, the 5 613(a) computation limits a tax
benefit, whereas the windfall profit tax net income rule limits a tax.
1 " Section 613(a) of the Internal Revenue Code is subject to the definition of property in
5 614 of the Code: the term 'property' means each separate interest owned by the taxpayer in
each mineral deposit in each separate tract or parcel of land." "Property" is defined in the crude
oil price regulations as "the right to produce domestic crude oil, which arises from a lease or from
a fee interest." In addition, at the election of the producer, a separate and distinct producing
reservoir, if recognized as such by the appropriate governmental agency, may be a property. 10
C.F.R. 212.72 (1980) (definition of "property"). See also DOE Ruling 1975-15, 40 Fed. Reg.
40832 (Sept. 4, 1975); DOE Ruling 1977-1, 42 Fed. Reg. 3628 (jan. 19, 1977); DOE Ruling
1977-2, 42 Fed. Reg. 4409 (Jan. 25, 1977); Grigsby v. Doe, 585 F.2d 1069 (TECA 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 908 (1979); Pennzoil v. Doe, 4 EN. MNGT. (CCH) 1 26,305 (D. Del. 1981).
Under the Ways and Means Bill, the federal income tax definition of property applies only for
purposes of the net income limitation, and in reference to percentage depletion. WAYS AND
MEANS REPORT, supra note 171, at 29. The price regulation definition of "property" applies for
all other windfall profit tax purposes.
1 " Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4989(b)(3)(B)(iii).
1 B 9 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 55 4989(b)(3)(B)(i) and (ii), 4989(b)(3)(C), and
4989(b)(3)(D).
190 Id. Thus, the cost history of a particular property must be reconstructed historically
in order to determine what the current cost depletion deduction would be. Cf. I.R.C. 55 57(a)(8)
and 57(a)(11).
1 " Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4989(6)(5). Presumably, the committee meant
to follow the definition of "production payment" in I.R.C. 5 636. Including the gross income
from the property attributable to the production payment in the producer's gross income is con-
sistent with treating the production payment as a secured loan.
1" Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4989(6)(4). A property whose capitalized cost is
low relative to its value might be subject to a stiff windfall profit tax, and, because of the low cost,
receive no benefit from the net income limitation. A purchaser or lessee of all or a portion of the
property would likely benefit from the net income limitation because the cost depletion basis
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transfer.'" Thus, the Ways and Means Committee generally increased wind-
fall profit tax burdens by increasing the tax rates, but provided some relief
through the severance tax deduction and net income limitation. Furthermore,
beyond these general changes, the Committee also modified the coverage of
each of the three tiers.
3. Tier 1
• The Ways and Means Committee broadened considerably the Tier 1 tax
base. The Committee reduced the windfall profit tax decline rate from two per-
cent to 1 1/2 percent. 193 Thus, the volume of oil included in Tier 1 became the
excess of oil decontrolled using the price control three-percent decline rate over
what would have been decontrolled using a 1 1/2 percent decline rate. In addi-
tion, the Ways and Means Bill included marginal oil in Tier 1, 194 because the
Committee disagreed with the Administration's decision that a windfall profit
tax incentive for marginal oil was justified.'" This decision increased the Tier
1 tax base by approximately one-third beyond the Administration proposal.' 96
4. Tier 2
Less significant changes were made in Tier 2. The Ways and Means Bill
eliminated the phase-out of the Tier 2 tax base proposed by the Administra-
tion.'" No explanation for this decision was given in the Ways and Means
would be high relative to value. Thus, the after-tax revenues could be much higher for the
transferee than the transferor. See the example in WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 171, at
37-38.
195 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 4988(b)(2). Although the Ways and Means
Report is silent on why the 1 1/2 percent Tier 1 decline was chosen, a possible explanation is pro-
vided in Design of a Windfall Profit Tax, supra note 113, at 16:
The 2-percent rate chosen by the Administration is faster than the natural
decline rate of virtually all oil fields. It results in a narrow tier one tax base, which
consists only of the gap between the 3-percent price control decline curve and the
2-percent tax decline curve. A slower statutory decline rate could increase the tax
base significantly; however, if the statutory decline rate were reduced below about
11/2 percent, there would be properties producing below their decline curves, and
some producers would no longer be in a situation in which increments to produc-
tion affect only the amount of oil subject to the more favorable tier two tax rate. As
the decline rate is lowered below 1 1/2 percent, this would be the situation with
more and more properties. Thus, the tradeoff is between revenue and production
incentives.
The Ways and Means Committee specifically rejected statutory decline rates for Tier 1 equal to
11/4 percent and to the property's actual historical decline curve as established between 1972 and
1974. Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), June 11, 1979, at G-7.
194 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4988(e)(3).
195 In the view of the Committee, inclusion of a net income limitation on the amount of
the windfall profit may have obviated the need for special treatment of marginal oil. See Design of a
Windfall Profit Tax, supra note 113 (" ... the provision in H.R. 3919 limiting the taxable windfall
profit to net income from a property provides some relief for truly marginal properties where
costs exceed price." Id. at 18; "[the net income limitation] is intended to relieve the tax burden
on high cast properties, It could, in that sense, be considered as an alternative to establishing a
special category under the tax for marginal properties." Id, at 29).
1" See note 113, supra.
197 Compare Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4990(d), with Ullman Bill, supra note
102, 5 4990(d).
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Report.'" In addition, the Bill specified that oil released from the lower tier
ceiling price to finance tertiary recovery projects would be taxed in Tier 2, 199
clearing up an earlier ambiguity. 2oo
5. Tier 3
The Ways and Means Committee followed the Administration's proposal
to tax stripper oil, newly discovered oil, and incremental tertiary oil in Tier 3.
The Committee amended the definitions of newly discovered oil and incremen-
tal tertiary oil, however, and also decided to tax certain Alaskan oil in Tier 3.
These decisions were generally consistent with the policy underlying Tier 3 to
tax additional revenues attributable to future OPEC price increases.
a. Stripper Oil
The Committee adopted the Administration's proposal, but added a rule
to ensure that post-1978 transfers of property could not be used to create addi-
tional stripper oil. 20 '
b. Incremental Tertiary Oil
The Administration's proposal and the Ullman Bill followed the classifica-
tion resulting from the pricing regulations. The Ways and Means Bill, how-
ever, provided its own definition of incremental tertiary oil, 202
 which differed
significantly from the pricing rules. The pricing rules 203 relied heavily on DOE
certification, and limited the decontrol benefit to oil produced in excess of
estimated production without the tertiary process. Instead, in a significant
departure from the then existing DOE practices, the Ways and Means Com-
mittee adopted self-certification to reduce delays in implementing tertiary
recovery" and "to expedite the use of tertiary recovery methods. " 2" The Bill
had six requirements for self-certification: 205
 (I) one of the approved tertiary
recovery methods must be used; (2) application of the method must follow
"sound engineering principles;" (3) application of the method must "reason-
ably be expected to result in a significant increase in the amount of crude oil
198 The Administration's proposal to phase out Tier 2 by gradually raising the Tier 2
base price to the Tier 3 base price had been criticized by the staff of the Joint Committee on Tax-
ation as providing an incentive to withhold production until the phase out was completed. Design
of a Windfall Profit Tax, supra note 113, at 27. It was suggested that "folne alternative to H.R.
3919 would be not to phase out the tier two tax at all, but instead to allow it to phase itself out as
more and more of the nation's oil becomes newly discovered oil in tier three." Id. Apparently,
the Ways and Means Committee followed this alternative.
199 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4991(d).
268 See note 145 supra.
201 See note 219 infra.
202 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4991(c)(2).
203 See text at notes 79-88 supra.
2°4 WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 171, at 26.
205 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 55 4991(c)(4)(13) and 4991(c)(5).
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which will ultimately be recovered;" (4) the project must be uneconomic with-
out the special tax provision; 206 (5) the project must begin after May, 1979; and
(6) information confirming the foregoing, particularly a petroleum engineer's
certification, must be submitted. A DOE-certified project qualified without
resort to these separate tax criteria. 207 The list of approved tertiary recovery
methods followed the then-existing pricing regulations, 208 with authorization
given to the Secretary of the Treasury to add additional methods. 209 A signifi-
cant increase in recoverable oil was not considered reasonably expected if pro-
duction was merely accelerated or if the costs of the project would not be
covered."° The economic test was not explained further. Tax benefits com-
menced with the project beginning date."' Qualification as a tertiary recovery
project, and the attendant tax benefits, continued only so long as the DOE cer-
tification was in effect or the self-certified project continued to satisfy the ap-
plicable requirements. 2 "
In another departure from DOE rules, incremental measurement of oil
produced by a tertiary recovery project was abandoned in favor of a uniform
decline curve. A "base level" for the property was established equal to the
average production during the six-month period ending on March 31, 1979,
reduced by (1) one percent for each month beginning after 1978 and before the
project beginning date; and (2) 2 1/2 percent for each month thereafter and
before the current month. 213 The amount of oil entitled to Tier 3 treatment as
incremental tertiary oil was production from a property for which a qualified
project was in effect in excess of the adjusted base level,'" as contrasted with
the pricing regulations' incremental approach. 215 Thus, for example, if a quali-
fied project commenced on January 1, 1981, 24 percent of production from the
property would immediately be treated as Tier 3 oil, and by July, 1983, if the
2" This criterion is quite similar to the price regulations' test. See text at note 85 supra.
207 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 4991(c)(4)(A).
2" Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 4991(c)(6)(A)(i); 10 C F . R. $$ 212.78(c)(1)-(9)
(1980), 43 Fed. Reg. 33679 (Aug. 1, 1978).
209 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4991(c)(6)(A)(ii).
2" WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 171, at 25.
2'1
	
and Means Bill, supra note 171, 55 4991(c)(2)(A)(i) and 4991(c)(6)(B).
212 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 55 4991(c)(4)(A) and 4991(c)(5)(D)(i).
212
	
and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4991(c)(2)(B).
214 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 4991(c)(2)(A). The Committee rejected a pro-
posal to exempt all existing oil from a field where tertiary production is used. Washington Post,
June 13, 1979, at C2, col. 5. For DOE-certified projects, the amount of incremental tertiary oil
cannot be less than the price regulation amount. Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, $
4991(c)(2)(C). To determine the classification of remaining production, incremental production
is allocated pro rata as between production that would have been Tier 1 and Tier 2 oil without the
incremental tertiary provision. Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4991(c)(3)(A). The deter-
mination within a tier of which barrels have been released to Tier 3 is made by selecting the bar-
rels with the highest removal prices first. Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4991(c)(3)(B).
215 text at note 83 supra. Although the Ways and Means Committee did not explain
why it rejected the incremental approach to classifying production from tertiary projects, the staff
of the joint Committee on Taxation ascribed "administrative problems" to this approach: "No
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project continued, all of the production from the property would be classified as
Tier 3 oil.
c. Newly Discovered Oil
The Ways and Means Committee found the pricing regulations' defini-
tion of newly discovered oil too generous, and, therefore, wrote its own, nar-
rower definition. In addition, the Committee decided to provide preferential
treatment to newly discovered oil by means of the base price, tax rate, and in-
flation adjustment.
The pricing regulations defining newly discovered oil required only that
there be no production from the property during 1978. 216
 Thus, production
from shut-in or abandoned properties, and production from "old" discoveries
that had not yet been commercialized, qualified as newly discovered oil. The
Ways and Means Committee decided instead that "newly discovered" should
have a more literal meaning for tax purposes. Consequently, the Committee
required that there be no production in commercial quantities from the prop-
erty after 1969 and before 1979. 21
 The Committee also excluded from newly
discovered oil production from a reservoir penetrated by a well after 1969 and
before 1979, if crude oil could have been produced through the well before
1979. 218
 Finally, the Committee sought to prevent properties from being sub-
divided to "create" newly discovered 61. 2 "
Having refined the definition, the Committee proceeded to amplify the
benefits of being classified as newly discovered oil "[t]o provide the appropriate
one knows what production would have been in the absence of the tertiary project." Design of a
Windfall Profit Tax, supra note 113, at 26. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation suggested,
as alternatives, exempting all production from a property on which a tertiary project was under-
taken, or exempting production in excess of a high statutory decline rate. Id. The Ways and
Means Committee opted for the second alternative.
8" See note 110 supra.
217
 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 4991(a)(5)(B); WAYS AND MEANS REPORT,
supra note 171, at 28.
218 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 4991(a)(5)(C).
218 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4992(e). The Committee feared that nonquali-
fying properties would be subdivided to produce one or more qualifying properties, and,
therefore, provided a tax rule limiting transfers which would override the pricing rules. WAYS
AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 171, at 23 and 32. The pricing definition of property, however,
traces the property by means of the producer's "historical and consistent" property determina-
tions to the inception of price controls. See, e.g. , Dep't of Energy Ruling 1977-2, 5 II-A. Thus, the
pricing regulations, as interpreted by DOE, may well have contained the result sought by the
Ways and Means Committee. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, however, found the
protection offered by the pricing regulation to be insufficient:
Although various DOE rulings have recognized the possibility of a producer
transferring or "gerrymandering" property so as to obtain a higher price for
future production, there appears to be no explicit DOE prohibition on a producer
transferring part of a producing property to obtain a higher price for the produc-
tion from the transferred portion. In enforcing price controls, DOE has denied
new property classification in cases of transfers effected solely for the purpose of
avoiding price regulations. Such an evaluation procedure, of course, would have
to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis, could be subject to a substantial degree
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production incentives.""° The base price was set at $17, rather than the
regular $16 Tier 3 base price."' The inflation adjustment was increased by two
percent, compounded quarterly, above the generally applicable rate. 222 And
the first $9 of windfall profit was subject to a 50 percent tax rate, instead of 70
percent . 223
d. Alaskan Oil
The Ways and Means Committee treated Alaskan oil in much the same
way as newly discovered oil. First, it reduced the amount of oil entitled to an
exemption from the tax, but then it provided additional production incentives
through the applicable tax structure for the oil that was covered by the tax. Ex-
isting production north of the Arctic Circle would be subject to the Tier 3 tax,
rather than exempted as the Administration had proposed. 224 New production
north of the Arctic Circle would remain exempt."' This decision was consist-
ent with the policy underlying the Tier 3 tax since existing production north of
the Arctic Circle would benefit from future OPEC price increases. The special
structural treatment of taxable Alaskan oil consisted of a 50 percent tax rate,
instead of a 70 percent rate, 226 a $7.50 base price instead of a $5 to $6 base
of circumvention, and in any case does not deal with the problem of transfers
where other motives are present.
Design of a Windfall Profit Tax, supra note 113, at 24.	 -
' 2° WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 171, at 14. The Committee had been advised
that "lilt is generally believed that production of newly discovered oil is more sensitive to price
changes than other kinds of oil, and the question appears to be whether to tax it in tier three or
exempt it entirely." Design of a Windfall Profit Tax, supra note 113, at 24. The Committee
specifically rejected outright exemption, Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), June 13, 1979, at G-7, and
decided to compromise by liberalizing the Tier 3 tax.
221 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 4991(a)(1).
"' Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4991(a)(3). A similar "incentive" inflation
adjustment was used in the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. See Pub. L. 95-621, 5 101(a).
2 " Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4991(a)(2). The $9 amount was subject to the
newly discovered oil inflation adjustment, Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4991(a)(3)(B),
but the adjusted amount was not eligible for the severance tax adjustment, Ways and Means Bill,
supra note 171, 5 4991(a)(4).
224
	 production was from the Sadlerochit reservoir in the Prudhoe Bay field. It
had been reported to the Committee that "Mil production from the Sadlerochit reservoir was
highly profitable at 1978 Alaskan prices (about $5.25 per barrel), and there appears to be
relatively little risk that a tax on oil from this reservoir using a base price of $7 to $8 would
discourage production." Design of a Windfall Profit Tax, supra note 113, at 22. Production costs
would be higher, however, for the other Prudhoe Bay reservoirs. Id. Moreover, "costs are
unknown for any other Alaskan oil remaining to be discovered, and any tax on newly discovered
Alaskan oil risks having an adverse impact on production." Id.
216 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 55 4988(a) and 4992(b)(6). The Committee
specifically rejected a proposal to tax newly discovered Alaskan oil north of the Arctic Circle.
Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), June 14, 1979, at G-6.
226 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4991(b)(1)(A). Because of the lower tax rate,
no state severance tax deduction would be allowed. Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171,
5 4991(b)(1)(E); WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 171, at 31.
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price, 227
 and adjustments for reductions in the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System
tariff. 226
6. Other Provisions
a. Public Education Exemption
The Ways and Means Committee decided to exempt from the windfall
profit tax crude oil allocable to an economic interest held by a state, political
subdivision, or public educational institution, if all the net income received
pursuant to the interest was dedicated to public education or placed in a per-
manent fund, the income from which was dedicated to public education. 229
This seemingly narrow exception marked the beginning of a much larger effort
generally to exempt from the windfall profit tax crude oil interests held by
governmental units and tax-exempt organizations, many of which were located
in oil producing states. The issue could be viewed as deciding whether windfall
profit tax revenues should be retained by these taxpayers or transferred to the
federal government, a matter of intense regional concern.
b. Rejected Amendments
The Ways and Means Committee rejected (i) a plowback provision, more
lenient treatment for small producers of stripper oil, elimination of the deduc-
tion for the windfall profit tax, 23° (ii) termination of the tax at the end of 1989,
substitution of various flat percentage taxes on gross or net oil income and a flat
$3 per barrel tax, 23 ' and (iii) (one amendment)232 phase-out of Tier 2 tax, tax-
ing marginal oil in Tier 2, termination of the tax on newly discovered oil in
1990, and setting the tax rate to raise slightly more revenue than under the Ad-
ministration proposal.
127 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 5 4991(b)(1)(B). See note 224 supra.
228 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, S 4991(b)(1)(C). At the time of the Ways and
Means Committee mark-up of the windfall profit tax, the determination of the Trans-Alaskan
Pipeline System tariff was the subject of controversy. Because the wellhead price of ANS oil was
equal to the refiner's acquisition cost of crude oil less the ANS transportation costs, if resolution
of the controversy resulted in a lower tariff, the wellhead price would increase accordingly. The
TAPS adjustment was intended to prevent the windfall profit tax from applying to such increases
in the wellhead price for Alaskan oil.
222 Ways and Means Bill, supra note 171, 4992(f). The initial version of the exemption
adopted by the Committee applied only to royalty interests the earnings on income from which
were permanently dedicated to public education under the applicable state constitution. H.R.
96-3919, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Committee Print, June 18, 1979). The exemption was then
changed to have broader application. The original version was probably limited to Texas; the
revised version also covered California and Louisiana, and may have covered Oklahoma and
Alaska as well. 125 CONG. REC. H5324 (daily ed. June 28, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Ullman);
Washington Post, June 20, 1979, at Al, col. 6; Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), June 19, 1979, at G-2.
The revision applied, for example, to oil interests owned by the City of Long Beach, California.
125 CONG. REC. H5287 (daily ed. June 28, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Lungren).
2" Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), June 14, 1979, at G-6.
2" Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), June 19, 1979, at G-1 to G-3.
2]2
 Id., at G-3.
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Thus, the effect of the Ways and Means Committee mark-up was to in-
crease the tax on old and new oil, allow a deduction for state severance taxes,
and refine the treatment of newly discovered oil, incremental tertiary oil, and
Alaskan oil. The Ways and Means revisions reflected a desire to increase the
windfall profit tax burdens on known production, and provide comparatively
reduced tax burdens for what the Committee perceived as more production-
sensitive categories of oil.
C. The House Bill
The Ways and Means Committee asked for a closed rule for House con-
sideration of the tax. 233 Those seeking a stronger tax, however, sought a rule
permitting a floor vote on further strengthening changes. 234 Advocates of a
weaker tax likewise sought an opportunity for floor votes. Consequently, the
House Rules Committee cleared the windfall profit tax for floor action with
separate votes on the Committee amendments en Banc, one substitute to
weaken, and one to strengthen the tax, and a motion to recommit with instruc-
tions. 235
The weakening proposal, offered by Representatives Henson Moore and
James Jones, consisted of five separate changes to the Ways and Means Bill: 236
(1) reduction of the general tax rate from 70 percent to 60 percent, (2) phase-
out of the Tier 2 tax, (3) taxing marginal oil in Tier 2 instead of Tier 1, (4) pro-
viding incremental tertiary oil the same beneficial treatment as newly dis-
covered oil, and (5) terminating the tax on incremental tertiary oil and newly
discovered oil after 1990. The Jones-Moore substitute moved closer to the Ad-
ministration's proposal, especially during the early years of the tax, although
Jones-Moore would have raised more revenue during those years. 237 The first
2" Id., at G-2.
234 Advocates of a stiffer windfall profit tax may have read the mood of the House as in-
dicating a willingness to strengthen the tax: (1) on May 2, 1979, the House Commerce Commit-
tee•narrowly defeated a proposal to extend oil price controls through 1980, (2) on May 19, 1979,
the Ways and Means Committee approved a significantly stronger windfall profit tax than the
Administration's proposal, and (3) on May 22 and 23, 1979, the House Democratic Caucus
voted 153-82 and 124.96, respectively, in opposition to decontrol.
235 H. RES. 96-336, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. REP. 96-308, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979); 125 CONG. REC. H5283-89 (daily ed. June 28, 1979); Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), June
26, 1979, at G-6. The Rules Committee rejected votes on a series of amendments, including
repeal of the foreign tax credit and a special exemption for the first 1,000 barrels per day of pro-
duction by an independent producer. New York Times, June 27, 1979, at A21, col. 4; Wall
Street Journal, June 27, 1979, at 8, col. 2.
736 The Jones-Moore substitute is reprinted at 125 CONG. REC. 115085-89 (daily ed.
June 25, 1979). It is similar to an amendment rejected by the Ways and Means Committee. See
text at note 232 supra.
237 During the first five years of the tax, the Administration's proposal would have
raised $21.2 billion, the Jones-Moore substitute, $23.3 billion, and the Ways and Means Bill,
$28 billion. 125 CONG. REC. H5329 (daily ed. June 28, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Jones of
Oklahoma). Of course, these estimates do not reflect the tax termination provisions of the Jones-
Moore substitute.
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three changes were, in fact, embodied by the Administration's windfall profit
tax proposal. The last two changes were close questions as a matter of policy. If
newly discovered oil deserved special tax consideration, incremental tertiary oil
arguably deserved the same consideration. Moreover, the desirability of a per-
manent tax, especially on production-sensitive oil, was questionable.
The proposal to strengthen the windfall profit tax, offered by Representa-
tive Shannon, contained only one change: the statutory decline rate for Tier 1
would be decreased from 1 IA percent to 1 14 percent.'" In addition to causing
more lower tier oil to be taxed at Tier 1 rather than Tier 2, the Shannon
amendment would have extended the Tier 1 tax from July, 1984 to August,
1985.
Advocates of a stronger tax apparently misgauged the mood of the House.
The Jones-Moore substitute was approved by a vote of 236-183 239 while the
Shannon amendment was defeated by 241-172. 240 The House rejected a mo-
tion to recommit the bill with instructions to add a plowback provisionm and
then approved the tax. 242 Thus, as a result of House floor action, the windfall
profit tax was weakened somewhat, although not below the levels generally
proposed by the Administration. The momentum for a stronger tax, however,
clearly had been reversed.
D. The Finance Committee Bi1t243
Stimulated by an expressed concern for production incentives, equity, and
public purposes, the Finance Committee cut the revenues raised by the House
version of the windfall profit tax approximately in half through exemptions and
other special provisions. The Committee added six new exemptions to the tax,
expanded the one exemption explicitly adopted by the House, and added a new
exception to Tier 1 treatment. 244
"8 The Shannon amendment is reprinted at 125 CONG. REC. H5198 (daily ed. June 26,
1979). The amendment had been rejected by the Ways and Means Committee. See note 193
supra.
2" 125 CONG. REC. H5325-33 (daily ed. June 28, 1979).
2" 725 CONG. REC. H5333-36 (daily ed. June 28, 1979).
241
 125 CONG. REC. H5336-42 (daily ed. June 28, 1979).
242
 125 CONG. REC. 1-13342 (daily ed. June 28, 1979). [H.R. 96-3919, as passed by the
House, is hereinafter cited as the House Bill.] The text of H.R. 3919 appears in 125 CONG. REC.
H5316, H5321 (daily ed. June 28, 1979).
243 H.R. 96-3919, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as the Finance
Committee Bill]; S. REP. NO. 96-394, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as the
FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT].
244 The Finance Committee Bill, reported on November 1, 1979, is remarkably similar
to a September 11, 1979, windfall profit tax proposal offered by Senator John Chafee. A
technical explanation of Senator Chafee's proposal is reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Sept.
11, 1979, at J-1.
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1, Structure
The House Bill generally imposed a 60 percent tax rate, with a special 50
percent rate reserved for newly discovered oil, incremental tertiary oil, and
Alaskan oil. The Finance Committee decided instead to impose a 75 percent
tax rate on Tier 1, and retain the 60 percent rate for Tiers 2 and 3. 245
The House had limited the severance tax deduction to taxes imposed as of
March 31, 1979, out of concern for state poaching on federal revenues. The
Finance Committee liberalized the severance tax deduction by permitting post-
March, 1979 severance tax increases to be taken into account if the increase ap-
plied to the entire removal price,'" Apparently, the Finance Committee was
satisfied that the federal treasury was adequately protected if the severance tax
deduction was denied only for targeted severance tax increases. 247
 The Finance
Committee also allowed a severance tax deduction for severance taxes validly
imposed by Indian tribes.'"
The Committee further reduced windfall profit tax burdens by limiting
the taxable windfall profit to 90 percent of net income from the property249 and
by exempting from the tax oil used to produce oil or gas on the same prop-
erty.'" In a technical change, the Committee agreed to treat the owner of a
production payment as the taxpayer, reversing the House provision. 251 In sum,
although the Finance Committee increased the Tier 1 tax rate, it also sought to
mitigate liability under the tax through structural modifications.
245 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4987(a). The 50 percent rate became irrele-
vant when the Finance Committee included Alaskan oil in Tier 2, and exempted newly
discovered oil and incremental tertiary oil.
246 Compare Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4992(d)(2) with House Bill, supra note
242, 4992(d)(2).
247 The Finance Committee may have concluded that oil producers would have suffi-
cient incentive to object to severance tax increases for which producers would obtain no windfall
profit tax benefit.
249 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4992(d)(3); FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT
supra note 243, at 55.
249 Under the House Bill, the limitation was 100 percent of net income from the proper-
ty. Compare Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4989(b)(1) with House Bill, supra note 242,
5 4989(b)(1).
250 FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 54. According to the Committee,
this clarification conformed to the interpretation used for depletion purposes. Id.; Senate Finance
Committee Staff, Proposed Amendments to the Windfall Profits Tax, Oct. 5, 1979, reprinted in Daily
Tax Rep. (BNA), Oct. 5, 1979, at J-1.
2" Compare Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4992(a)(1) with House Bill, supra note
242, 4992(a); see also note 134 supra. "No special provisions are made for production payments
because the committee understands that production payment contracts usually provide for an
automatic adjustment to reflect the imposition of additional severance taxes such as the windfall
profit tax." FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 62. The Finance Committee posi-
tion was ultimately adopted by the Congress. CONFERENCE REPORT, infra note 325, at 108. The
Finance Committee also conformed the net income limitation transfer rule to reflect the possibili-
ty that a production payment owner could also be a transferee. Compare Finance Committee Bill,
supra note 243, 5 4989(b)(4)(B) with House Bill, supra note 242, 5 4989(b)(4)(B).




The Finance Committee increased the tax rate to 75 percent, 252
 but re-
duced the Tier 1 tax base significantly. Heavy oil was exempted from the wind-
fall profit tax entirely 253
 and a new category of oil known as high water-cut oil
was exempted from the Tier 1 tax. "High water-cut oil" was defined as oil pro-
duced from a property for which the ratio of water to oil produced during any
12-month period after 1977 is at least nine to one. This class of oil was not ex-
empted entirely, but was placed in Tier 2. 254
3. Tier 2
The Tier 2 tax base was altered in several significant ways. Consistent
with the changes made in Tier 1, high water-cut oil was included in Tier 2. 255
In addition, oil from the Sadlerochit reservoir in Alaska, which the House had
included in Tier 3, was placed in Tier 2 256 and heavy oil was excluded.'" By
including Sadlerochit oil in Tier 2, the Finance Committee significantly altered
the tax burden on Alaskan oil. The base price became approximately $13 in-
stead of $7.50; a severance tax adjustment was provided; and the tax rate was
increased to 60 percent instead of 50 percent. In addition, the special inflation
adjustment for the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System adjustment was elimi-
262 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243,	 4987(a)(1). The higher rate was justified
"becaus.e the production of this oil is less sensitive to price and because it receives the greatest
benefit from decontrol." FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 2. The Committee
rejected a proposal to increase the Tier 1 decline rate to two percent. Daily Tax Rep. (BNA),
Oct. 26, 1979, at G-5.
2" See text at notes 283-84 infra.
254 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(1). During the applicable 12-month
period, production must have been maintained at the "maximum feasible rate consistent with
recognized conservation principles." See FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 35,
58. The special treatment of high water-cut oil was needed "No prevent the shutting in of some
lower tier properties where the production is unusually expensive .... " FINANCE COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 243, at 27.
255
 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 4988(c)(2). See note 254 supra.
256
 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(b). Compare Finance Committee Bill, supra
note 243, 5 4988(c) with House Bill, supra note 242, 4988(c).
257
 See text at notes 283-86 infra.
In addition, the Finance Committee modified the phase out of the Tier 2 tax. The House
Bill required the Secretary of the Treasury, by regulation, to eliminate the difference between the
Tier 2 base price and the Tier 3 base price over 50 months beginning in November, 1986. At the
time, the amount of the difference was $3 per barrel. The Finance Committee decided instead to
provide a six-cent per month ($3 divided by 50 months) increase in the Tier 2 base price over the
same period. The aggregate increase in the Tier 2 base price would be approximately the same
under either bill. Compare Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4990(d) with House Bill, supra
note 242, 5 4990(d). The change was explained as a simplification measure. FINANCE COMMIT-
TEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 36. The Committee rejected proposals to tax Tier 2 oil at rates of
75 percent, 70 percent, and 50 percent. Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Oct. 3, 1979, at G-8 to G-9,
Oct. 9, 1979, at G-2 to G-3.
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nated."a The Administration had recommended that the Alaskan oil base price
be increased to $13 "Is'ince Alaskan oil does not benefit from decontrol until
the wellhead price reached $13 per barrel . . . "259
4. Tier 3
The Finance Committee virtually eliminated the Tier 3 tax base. Most
stripper oil owned by independent producers, incremental tertiary oil, and
newly discovered oil were all exempted from the windfall profit tax. 2" The re-
maining Tier 3 tax base consisted generally of stripper oil owned by integrated
oil ,companies. 26 ' Thus, most of the taxable oil fell into Tiers 1 and 2. As a
simplification measure, the Finance Committee lowered the Tier 3 base price
from $16 to $15.30 to permit the same inflation adjustment to be used for all
base prices. 262
5. The Exemptions
The Finance Committee created numerous exemptions from the windfall
profit tax, some based on characteristics of the oil, and others, on the nature of
the taxpayer. Exemptions based upon characteristics of the oil were provided
"[go encourage greater oil production . . . "263 and "to eliminate, as much as
possible, adverse effects on domestic production." 254 Taxpayer-oriented ex-
emptions were generally provided "kin recognition of the fact that it is inap-
propriate to tax additional revenues . . devoted to public uses . . ,,265
The various exemptions are described below.
a. Newly Discovered Oil
The Finance Committee exempted newly discovered oil from the windfall
profit tax, 266
 and adopted the price control definition of newly discovered oil
rather than the more restrictive House definition. 267 The Committee tersely
"8 Compare Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(b)(2) with House Bill, supra note
242, 5 4991(b)(2). Staff estimates showed that, with Tier 2 treatment, an inflation-adjusted
Trans-Alaskan Pipeline System adjustment would be almost the equivalent of exempting
Alaskan oil. Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Oct. 9, 1979, at G-3.
259 Crude Oil Tax, Hearings on H.R. 3919 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess., 48, 94 (1979) (statement of W. Michael Blumenthal) [hereinafter cited as Finance Committee
Hearings]. See note 163 supra.
290
 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 55 4988(a)(1), (2), and (4).
261 FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 30.
262 Compare Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4990(b)(1)(B) with House Bill, supra
note 242, 5 4990(b)(1)(B); see FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 38.
263
 FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 2.
264 Id. at 6.
265 Id. at 28.
266
 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4988(a)(1).
267
 Compare Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(a) with House Bill, supra, note
242, $ 4991(a)(5). See text at notes 216-19 supra. The Committee was advised by staff that the
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described its decision as follows: "Nile committee does not believe that the
logic of a windfall profit tax extends to oil which has not yet been discovered
and from which there can be no windfall." 268
 The Administration argued un-
successfully that the production gains would not be worth the revenue loss, and
that there was a windfall element attributable to future price increases dictated
by OPEC. 269 Apparently, the Committee did not accept this argument.
b. Incremental Tertiary Oil
Again, the Finance Committee not only provided an exemption,"° but
liberalized the definition of oil qualifying for the exemption. 2 " The computa-
tion of the amount of incremental tertiary oil followed the House Bill, except
that producers could reduce the base level for periods before the project begin-
ning date by the actual average monthly decline in production if it exceeded
one percent per month." 2
 Furthermore, under the House Bill, qualification as
incremental tertiary oil could terminate if, for example, the project was found
to be unnecessary or unsuccessful. This rule was criticized during the House
debate as creating uncertainty, thereby deterring investments in tertiary
recovery. 273 The Finance Committee responded by stipulating that certain
projects would be considered to continue in effect for tax purposes even if ter-
minated provided the project is certified as being ineffective or counterproduc-
t ive ,274
The Finance Committee expanded the incremental tertiary oil definition
by relaxing the House requirements for a qualifying project and by creating a
separate certification role for state agencies. The Finance Committee dropped
the requirements that the project be reasonably expected to result in a signifi-
cant increase in the amount of crude oil ultimately recoverable, and that the
project be uneconomic without the special windfall tax provision. 275 Instead,
the Finance Committee required only that the tertiary process "reasonably can
be expected to enhance the ultimate recovery of crude oil . . . "276 As ex-
plained by the Committee: ". . . it must be established that the overall
amount of production expected to be obtained from the property (or project
revision entailed little, if any, revenue loss; DOE agreed that it was unlikely that a well in pro-
duction in 1977 would be abandoned in 1978 if production was still economical. Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), Sept. 25, 1979, at G-3.
268
 FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra, note 243, at 7.
269
 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Sept. 25, 1979, at G-3.
2" Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4988(a)(2).
271 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(c).
272 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(c)(2)(A)(i).
272
	 CoNG. REC. H5308 (daily ed. June 28, 1979) (remarks of Rep. Pickle).
77+ Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(c)(6)(E).
272 See House Bill, supra note 242, 55 4911(c)(5)(A) and (B).
276 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(c)(6)(A).
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area) with the use of the tertiary process is significantly greater than the corres-
ponding amount of oil production expected under pre-project conditions. " 27
In addition to DOE certification and self-certification, the Finance Com-
mittee added certification by a regulatory agency, including a state agency.
This addition was:
intended, in part, to eliminate the need for duplicative proceedings,
to give producers some additional certainty as to the qualifications of
a project, and to reduce the de novo review obligations of the Internal
Revenue Service. Because many jurisdictions require producers to
obtain regulatory approval, and/or compulsory unitization, prior to
the undertaking of a tertiary project, the use of regulatory certifica-
tions should advance these objectives."'
Whereas IRS review of self-certified projects would be subject to generally ap-
plicable tax audit rules,"' IRS review of agency-certified projects was made
subject to a "substantial evidence" rulen° "because these projects would have
been reviewed by that regulatory body prior to the time the exemption was
claimed." 281 Under this rule, to challenge qualification, the IRS would be re-
quired to determine either that the agency's decision was not supported by sub-
stantial evidence on the record, or that evidence not in the record demonstrates
the absence of qualification. 282
c. Heavy Oil
The Administration somewhat belatedly proposed to exempt "heavy oil"
from the windfall profit tax."' As its first substantive decision on the tax, the
Finance Committee followed the Administration's proposa1 284 using the price
control definition of heavy oi1. 285 According to the Committee, most oil
2" FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 47. It is arguable that the Finance
Committee did not intend to drop the first of these requirements (expectation of aSignificant in-
crease in production): (1) in describing self-certified projects, the Committee retained the
"significant increase" language, id. at 46; (2) in describing the general rules, the Committee re-
quired that expected production be "significantly greater" than production without the tertiary
process, id. at 47; (3) in describing differences with the House Bill, the Committee mentioned
only the House's "uneconomic" requirement, id. at 51. On the other hand, the Finance Com-
mittee Bill is clear that for all purposes, mere enhancement, not a significant increase, is re-
quired. Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(c)(6)(A).
278 FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 47.
279 Id. at 49.
28° Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(c)(6)(G)(i).
281 FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 49.
282 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(e)(6)(G). See FINANCE COMMITTEE
REPORT, supra note 243, at 50.
1" President's Energy Address Fact Sheet, supra note 115. See text at notes 115-16 supra.
9" Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4988(a)(3). See Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Sept.
6, 1979, at G-2.
2" Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(e).
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meeting this definition would be classified as stripper oil or tertiary produc-
tion. 2" If so, such oil would probably have been decontrolled already, and
might well have been exempt from the windfall profit tax under other exemp-
tions adopted by the Committee.
d. Stripper Oil
The Finance Committee exempted the first 1,000 barrels per day of strip-
per well production in which an independent oil producer held an economic in-
terest. 282 The purpose of the exemption was to stimulate production "because
independent producers generally have undertaken a disproportionately large
share of domestic exploratory drilling . . . . [The exemption] should en-
courage independent producers to increase their drilling activities and thereby
supplement our domestic energy supply." 288 In addition, the Committee ex-
plained, "stripper oil has been exempt from controls since 1976 and, therefore,
will receive no benefit from the President's decontrol program . . . . [T]axa-
.
tion may lead to premature abandonment of stripper wells. "289
e. State and Local Governments
The Finance Committee extended the House "public education" exemp-
tion to any "public purpose." 29° This change was made despite the Adminis-
tration's request that the House provision be deleted. 29 ' The exemption was
described as requiring residents of consumer states to transfer money to pro-
ducer state treasuries, with no production or conservation benefits. 292 An at-
tempt to delete the exemption was rejected by the Committee. 293
286 FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 51.
282 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 55 4988(a)(4) and 4991(d). The Committee re-
jected proposals to provide a 3,000 barrel-per-day exemption for independent oil producers (even
after excluding royalty holders from the exemption), and exempting all stripper oil. Daily Tax
Rep. (BNA), Oct. 2, 1979, at G-7 to G-8. It was estimated that the Finance Committee inde-
pendent oil producer provision would exempt approximately 55 percent of all stripper oil and
render nontaxable 60 to 75 percent of all producers. Comparative Analysis of Two Bills, supra note
113, at 37. The exemption was far from simple. If, with respect to the working interest in a prop-
erty, independent oil producer ownership was (1) more than 50 percent, then all the oil from the
property was eligible for the exemption, except in the hands of an integrated oil producer; (2) ex-
actly 50 percent, then half the oil from the property was eligible for the exemption, except in the
hands of an integrated producer; (3) less than 50 percent, then oil from the property was eligible
for the exemption only in the hands of an independent oil producer actively engaged in the trade
or business of producing oil and gas. The terms "independent oil producer" and "integrated oil
company," and rules for allocating the 1,000 barrel per day amount, were derived from the
percentage depletion provisions. Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(d)(2).
288
	 COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 27 -28.
289 Id. at 7.
79° Compare Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, S 4992(f) with House Bill, supra note 242,
S 4992(0.
291 Finance Committee Hearings, supra note 259, at 93.
297
 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Oct. 10, 1979, at G-10 (remarks attributed to Senator Dan-
forth).
293
 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Oct. 10, 1979, at G-10.
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f. Indian Tribes
The Finance Committee exempted crude oil interests held by, or for the
benefit of, Indian tribes, tribal organizations, or individual members of a
tribe. 2 94
g. Medical and Educational Charities
Economic interests in crude oil held by or for the benefit of medical and
educational charities were also exempted from the windfall profit tax if the in-
terests were so held on October 2, 1979. 295 The Administration protested un-
successfully against an earlier version of the exemption, arguing that windfall
tax revenues would be cut with no increase in production and that the federal
government should be used as the means to redistribute windfall profits. 296
6. Other Provisions
a. Percentage Depletion
The Finance Committee deleted the House provision that subtracted the
amount of a windfall profit for purposes of computing the percentage depletion
deduction. 297
b. Phase-Out of Tax
The Committee decided also to phase out the windfall profit tax once the
Secretary of the Treasury had estimated that net revenues received by the
Treasury under the windfall profit tax totalled $127.1 billion. 298 The phase-out
would be implemented by exempting from the tax three percent of taxable
crude oil each month following the Secretary's determination. 299 This proce-
dure was roughly equivalent to phasing out the tax by the end of 1990, but
without the "notch" effect that termination on a date certain would produce.
The Administration had requested that the windfall profit tax be a permanent
tax. 5 O°
294 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, S 4992(g).
299 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4992(h) (referring to I.R.C. S 170(b)(1)(A)).
It was reported that the exemption "would benefit Yale and Princeton Universities, a crippled
children's home in Texas, and other schools and hospitals." Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Oct. 25,
1979, at G-18. The exemption initially was limited to the Texas Children's Hospital, but later
threatened to include most charitable organizations before being scaled back to the final version.
296 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Sept. 21, 1979, at G-4.
299 See text at note 168 supra.
299 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4993; FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra
note 243, at 70.
299 Finance Committee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4993.
'°° Finance Committee Hearings, supra note 259, at 92-93.
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7. Revenue Effects3°'
It is worthwhile to compare the aggregate net revenues raised through
1990 by the House and Finance Committee Bills. The House Bill would have
raised twice as much as the Finance Committee Bill: $276.8 billion compared
to $138.2 billion, a difference of $138.6 billion. Over half of the difference,
$71.0 billion, was attributable to the exemption of newly discovered oil. $27.0
billion was attributable to the exemption of incremental tertiary production,
$16.2 billion to the stripper oil exemption, and $12.3 billion to the heavy oil
exemption. Thus, these four exemptions accounted for substantially all of the
revenue difference between the two bills. $5.9 billion of the difference was at-
tributable to full Tier 2 treatment of Alaskan oil; $3.7 billion to the percentage
depletion change; $2.9 billion to the phase-out; $0.5 billion to high water-cut
oil; $0.4 billion to the Indian tribe exemption; and $0.2 billion to the charitable
school and hospital exemption. The incease in the Tier 1 rate to 75 percent
raised an additional $1.6 billion. 302
Thus, the Finance Committee adopted and extended the Ways and
Means approach to the windfall profit tax. The tax burdens on known produc-
tion were increased still further; even greater incentives were provided to pur-
portedly production-sensitive categories of oil; and additonal non-production
related tax relief was provided. In addition, the Finance Committee made the
tax temporary, and eliminated the reduction in percentage depletion benefits.
The result was a tax bill that would have raised less than half the revenue raised
by the Ways and Means Committee Bill. Momentum for raising revenue
would change again for the final time on the Senate floor.
E. The Senate Bill"'
Lengthy Senate deliberations on the windfall profit tax became necessary
in order to fashion a delicate balance of interests that would permit a bill to be
passed. This process involved much trial and error. Although the Senate con-
sidered numerous amendments to the tax, the ultimate senatorial consensus in-
volved a limited number of amendments, an agreement on the revenue to be
raised by the Senate Bill, and the rejection of a key amendment whose fate was
initially uncertain. What occupied the House of Representatives for 7 1/2 hours
" 1 FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 14-15. The revenue estimates
were determined by subtracting from estimated gross windfall profit tax receipts the correspond-
ing federal income tax reductions, and by assuming that the price of uncontrolled oil would equal
;30 per barrel in the fourth quarter of 1979 and would increase at the rate of inflation plus two
: percent per year. Id. at 9.
302 Id. at 14-15.
30' H.R. 96-3919, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (Dec. 17, 1979) [hereinafter cited as the Senate
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on one single day required the attention of the Senate for 150 hours over 24
days.'"
The Senate began the process of ascertaining relative voting strength by
rejecting three amendments: reducing the general rate of tax in the House bill
from 60 percent to 50 percent,'" reducing the tax rate on Tier 1 oil from 75
percent to 60 percent, 306 and substituting the House Bill for the Finance Com-
mittee Bill."' After prolonged debate, the Senate accepted an amendment that
provided a 1,000 barrel-per-day exemption for all independent producer oil, 308
expanding a similar Finance Committee exemption which had been limited to
stripper oil. 309 The independent producer amendment reduced the 1980-1990
revenues raised by the bill by $9.9 billion'" to $128 billion, a reduction that
304 125 CONG. REC. 518867 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1979) (remarks of Senator Dole).
Similarly, the Ways and Means Committee required only five days to report out H.R. 96-3919,
whereas the Finance Committee needed "80-some hours" in executive session over 28 days. 125
CONG. REC. 516843 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1979) (remarks of Senator Dole).
30 ' Rejected 32-53, 125 CONG. REC. S16869-71 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1979). The amend-
ment, even if adopted, would not have affected the Senate Bill. The amendment apparently was
intended as a test of Senate sentiment. See 125 CONG. REC. S16869 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1979)
(colloquy between Senators Boren and Packwood).
306 Rejected 32-58, 125 CONG. REC. 516977 (daily ed. Nov. 19, 1979).
307 Motion to table agreed to 50-32, 125 CONG. REC. 517181 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1979).
308 Adopted 53-41, 125 CONC. REC. SI7284-85 (daily ed. Nov. 27, 1979). Senator
Bentsen, the sponsor of the independent producer amendment, argued that it was justified
because of the resulting increase in production: (1) due to price controls, Government regulatory
policies, and the cost and difficulty of finding energy in the United States, the number of in-
dependent producers had declined in the past 25 years from 25,000 to 10,000; (2) independent
producers drill 90 percent of U.S. exploratory wells; (3) independent producers find 75 percent of
new oil and gas fields; (4) independent producers are responsible for 54 percent of new domestic
oil and gas discoveries; (5) independent producers spend 105 percent of gross oil and gas income
in drilling to find new oil and gas; (6) independent producers drilled 42,000 (84 percent) of the
50,000 wells drilled in the U.S. in 1978; (7) even with the exemption for newly discovered oil,
further exemption was required to provide capital. "It is clear ... that independent producers —
not the majors — are the driving force in our efforts to discover new energy resources in this
country." 125 CONG. REC. S17189-91 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1979) (remarks of Senator Bentsen).
Senator Ribicoff presented the opposing arguments, generally refuting the alleged increase in
production: (1) a significant portion of the benefits would go to passive royalty holders;
(2) although independents account for 75 to 80 percent of exploratory wells, they account for only
25 to 35 percent of U.S. production; this is because independents operate farm outs, develop
leases held by majors, and exploit less promising leases on the most accessible reservoirs in
mature production zones; (3) U.S. production is predominantly from giant fields, requiring ex-
pensive, long-term development; (4) since independents account for only 20 percent of the
geographical and geological survey work, their success rate is lower than the majors and their
• fields are less prolific; (5) although the majors drill less, they have found more than 60 percent of
the recoverable reserves; (6) production incentives are based upon rate of return, rather than pres-
ent cash flow, and newly discovered oil, under the Finance Committee Bill, is exempt from the
windfall profit tax; (7) independent producer drilling activity and profits had already
demonstrated significant increases; (8) independent producer return on equity, availability of
equity, and gross margins were more than adequate. 125 CONG. REC. S 17274-77 (daily ed. Nov,
27, 1979) (remarks of Senator Ribicoff).
309 See text at notes 287-89 supra.
3 i° 125 CONG. REC. 517189 (daily ed. Nov. 26, 1979) (remarks of Senator Bentsen).
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would have to be "made up" once a revenue total for the Senate Bill was
agreed to. The independent producer amendment represented the only major
Senate action to weaken the windfall profit tax. It appears that by thus accom-
modating the interests of independent producers, it became possible to develop
the necessary consensus to terminate a filibuster, increase the revenues raised
by the Senate BiII, and pass the bill.
On the day following the adoption of the independent producer amend-
ment, a motion to table an amendment increasing the Tier 2 tax rate from 60 to
75 percent failed by a vote of 39-58. 3 " This vote suggested the sentiment of the
Senate for strengthening the tax, and provided the impetus for opponents and
supporters of the tax to work out a compromise. One week later, by informal
agreement among Senate leaders, it was decided that the total revenue to be
raised by the Senate Bill from 1980-1990 would be $185 billion, 312
 an agree-
ment that would control subsequent substantive changes. The Senate then re-
jected a proposal to make the tax permanent, 31 3
 but agreed to increase the Tier
2 tax rate to 75 percent,'" and to raise the phase-out target from $141.2 billion
to $210 billion..""
The balance of the debate on the tax revolved around two amendments: a
so-called "minimum tax," and the exemption of oil interests held by states and
by state agencies and instrumentalities. The "minimum tax," in actuality,
was an amendment to impose certain tax rates, base prices, and inflation ad-
justments on newly discovered oil, incremental tertiary oil, and heavy oil, all of
which were exempt under the Finance Committee Bill. The amendment was to
supply the revenue needed to reach the $185 billion goal, and represented the
last element of the overall Senate compromise on the tax. Initially, the
minimum tax proposal subjected the three categories of oil to a 20 percent tax,
3 " 125 CONG. REC. S17403 (daily ed. Nov. 28, 1979).
312 125 CONG. REC. 517714 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1979) (remarks of Senator Dole).
3 " Rejected 39-54. 125 CONG. REC. 517721 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1979). During the
debate, Senator Long appropriately noted that "[m]pst people believe that windfall is a short
one[;) in the long run, the forces of supply and demand come into balance, and certainly all that
ought to happen within a 10-year period. Therefore, it is suggested that there ought to be a
phaseout, that this tax should not go on forever." 125 CONG. REC. 517720 (daily ed. Dec. 4,
1979) (remarks of Senator Long).
" 4 The vote was 58-35. 125 CONG. REC. 517716 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1979). The amend-
ment increased the revenues of the Senate Bill by $22.5 billion. 125 CONG. REC. 818037 (daily
ed. Dec. 7, 1979) (remarks of Senator Muskie). Proponents of the amendment noted that the
supply response to the rate increase had been estimated to change "only marginally." Com-
paraiive Analysis of Two Bills, supra note 113, at 47; see also 125 CONC. REC. 517388 (daily ed. Nov.
28, 1979) (remarks of Senator Bradley).
315 Agreed to, 68-26. 125 CONG. REC. 517725 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1979). This change
was presumably necessary to accommodate the $185 billion 1980-1990 revenue goal. According
to its sponsor, the $210 billion figure "has been reached through careful negotiation and discus-
sion on both sides of the aisle between advocates of no tax and advocates of a total tax." 125
CONG. REC. S17722 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1979) (remarks of Senator Moynihan). The amendment
increased the 1980-1990 revenues of the Senate Bill by $4.5 billion. 125 CONG. REC. 518037
(daily ed. Dec. 7, 1979) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
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$16.30 base price, and an inflation adjustment two percent above the otherwise
applicable inflation adjustment. 316 The newly discovered oil part of the pro-
posal was subsequently modified by decreasing the tax rate to 10 percent and
increasing the base price to $19.30. To accommodate the revenue loss
associated with this modification, the base price for Tier 2 oil would be reduced
by $0.25. 3 ' 7 The minimum tax proposal, as modified, was then adopted by the
Senate. 318
A more sensitive problem was Senator Danforth's amendment to delete
the exemption from the tax for oil interests owned by states and by state agen-
cies and instrumentalities. The Danforth amendment was at issue throughout
most of the Senate debate. Adoption of the amendment threatened to destroy
the fragile consensus that had been assembled for passage of the bill. Debate on
the amendment departed almost entirely from the basic dichotomy of increased
production versus the need for revenues and equitable treatment of windfalls.
The exemption clearly had nothing to do with increased oil production; rather,
its advocates maintained that application of the windfall profit tax to state oil
interests would be unconstitutional, and an invitation to further federal en-
croachment on traditional state prerogatives. 319 Advocates of the Danforth
amendment emphasized the regional nature of the exemption: from
1980-1990, $128 billion of additional revenues would go to states with oil pro-
duction; of that amount, 83 percent would go to Alaska, Texas, California,
and Louisiana."° The increased revenues would allegedly be used to induce
businesses and people to relocate in those states. According to Senator Dan-
forth, "[t]he basic issue here is the flow of economic power within the United
States."'" After extensive debate and threats of a filibuster if the amendment
was adopted, the Senate rejected the Danforth amendment. 322 Shortly there-
after, the Senate passed the windfall profit tax bill by a 74-24 vote. 323
316 125 CONG. REC. S18141 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1979) (amendment no. 777). The
minimum tax proposal was estimated to increase Senate Bill revenues by $30.8 billion from
1980-1990, 125 CONG. REC. 518185 (daily ed. Dec. 11, 1979) (remarks of Senator Muskie), and
therefore bring the Senate Bill up to the compromise revenue target of $185 billion.
3" 125 CONG. REC. S18498, SI8564 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1979). The revenue goal slip-
ped from $185 billion to $178 billion. 125 CONG. REC. 518564 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1979)
(remarks of Senator Dole).
3 " 125 CONG. REC. S18567-68 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1979).
3 " See Senator Long's lengthy statement in opposition to the Danforth amendment. 125
CONG. REC. S18461-68 (daily ed. Dec. 13, 1979).
3" 125 CONG. REC. 518055 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1979) (remarks of Senator Chafee).
321 125 CONG. REC. 518055 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1979). See also 125 CONG. REC.
S18052-70 (daily ed. Dec. 7, 1979); 125 CONG. REC. S18651-75 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1979).
322 Motion to table agreed to, 65-28. 125 CONG REC. 518674-75 (Daily ed. Dec. 15,
1979).
323 125 CONG. REC. 518863 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1979). The Senate adopted, mostly by
voice vote, numerous amendments, clarifications, and modifications with minor revenue im-
pacts: clarification of term "maximum feasible rate," 125 CONG. REC. 517669 (daily ed. Dec. 3,
1979) (colloquy between Senators Boren and Long); amendment of the definition of "heavy oil"
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As a result of action on the Senate floor, windfall profit tax burdens were
increased on knoWn production, reimposed on newly discovered, incremental
tertiary, and heavy oil, and further weakened for independent producers. But
perhaps most important of all, the Senate in fact passed an oil tax, something it
would not do in the prior Congress. 324
F. The Conference Agreement 325
The core of the Conference agreement, as with the Senate Bill, was a com-
promise on the revenues to be raised by the windfall profit tax. The first deci-
sion made by the conferees was that the revenues raised by the windfall profit
tax from 1980 to 1990 should fall exactly half-way between the House and
Senate Bills: $227.3 billion. 326 The agreement on revenues effectively limited
the conferees to deciding how the tax burden would be distributed, and pro-
vided the norm by which various configurations of substantive tax provisions
would be tested.
The basic distributional decisions involved the allocation of the tax burden
between independent oil producers and the major oil companies, and between
existing production and new production. Under the House Bill, independents
were responsible for $57 billion (20.6 percent) 327
 of the $276.8 billion raised.
to permit the determination to be made after June, 1979, 125 CONG. REC. 518035 (daily ed.
Dec. 7, 1979) (remarks of Senator Cranston); reclassification of production from properties
located in the Cook Inlet of Alaska from Tier 1 to Tier 2, 125 CoNG. REC. S 17706-07 (daily ed.
Dec. 4, 1979) (remarks of Senator Stevens), S18109-12 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1979); (1) clarification
of use of price control BPCL to determine Tier 1 oil, (2) "carryover basis" for computation of
net income limitation for transferred properties, (3) conform Tier 1 and Tier 2 base prices to
price control ceiling prices, 125 CONG. REC. 518712-14 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1979) (remarks of
Senator Wallop); exemption of front-end tertiary oil from carbon dioxide and chemical surfac-
tant injection projects, 125 CONG. REC. S18841-42 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1979); expansion of the
tax definition of "marginal oil" to include properties with an average daily production in 1978 of
up to 40 barrels and an average completion depth of at least 10,000 feet ("deep" marginal oil),
125 CONG. REC. S18843-44 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1979) (remarks of Senator Heflin); exemption of
royalties on federal lands, 125 CONG. REC. S18700.01 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 1979), S18844 (daily
ed. Dec. 17, 1979); expansion of Indian exemption to include Alaska Native Claims Settlement
Act corporations, 125 CONG. REC. S18844-52 (daily ed. Dec. 17, 1979). In addition, the Senate
rejected the following: elimination (except for heavy oil) of the amount of the windfall profit in
computing percentage depletion, 125 CONG. REC. S17726-29 (daily ed. Dec. 4, 1979),
S17802-14 (daily ed. Dec. 5, 1979); provision of a plowback credit, 125 CONG. REC. S17945-58
(daily ed. Dec. 6, 1979); substitution of an excess profits tax for the windfall profit tax, 125
CONG. REC. S18113-25 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1979); provision of a plowback credit for certain
Alaskan expenditures, 125 CONG. REC. S18125-27, S18135-37 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1979).
324
 See Note 3 supra..
325 H.R. 96-3919, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (Mar. 7, 1980), H.R. REP. 96-817, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. (Mar. 7, 1980) [hereinafter cited as CONFERENCE REPORT]; Crude Oil Windfall Profit
Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96-223, 94Stat. 229 (Apr. 2, 1980). Section references hereinafter are
to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended by the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act:
Profit Tax Act.
326 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Dec. 20, 1979, at G-5.
327 125 CoNG. REC. H1837 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Vanik). The
denial of percentage depletion on the windfall profit accounted for $12.9 billion; the 1,000 barrel-
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Under the Senate Bill, independents contributed only $1 billion (0.6 percent)
of $177.8 billion in revenues. 328 Thus, a key issue was how much, if any, of the
additional $49.5 billion in revenues needed to move from the Senate Bill to the
conference revenue goal would be borne by independents. A closely related
issue was how much of the balance of the required additional revenue would be
paid from existing production and how much from production-sensitive
categories, particularly newly discovered, incremental tertiary, and heavy oil.
The conferees were presented with numerous alternative arrangements of
rates, base prices, etc., which approximately satisfied the revenue goal. 329 In
order to reduce the number of variables to be considered, the presentation in-
corporated certain simplifying assumptions concerning the tax, many of which
would become part of the final conference decision: (1) to eliminate some com-
plexity, Tiers 1 and 2 would be merged into a new Tier 1 with a $12.80 base
price, thereby eliminating further consideration of decline rates, cumulative
deficiencies, and BPCLs; 33 ° (2) the new Tier 1 base price would not be merged
with the base price of the next tier;" 1 (3) Alaskan oil would be taxed in new
Tier I ; 332 (4) new Tier 2, comprised mostly of stripper oil, would be subject to a
per-day exemption for independents accounted for $42.7 billion; and the balance (less than $1
billion) was attributable to independent oil production in excess of the 1,000 barrel-per-day ex-
emption. See Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Conference Comparison on H.R. 3919,
item II.B (Dec. 18, 1979).
348 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Jan. 18, 1980, at G-2.
329 Staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation, Windfall Profit Tax Options (Jan. 15,
1980), reprinted in Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Jan. 15, 1980, at J-3, and Jan. 17, 1980, at 0-4
[hereinafter cited as WINDFALL PROFIT TAX OPTIONS].
"° The consequence of the old Tier I-Tier 2 distinction was a difference in base price of
approximately $7 per barrel ($13 minus $6). This difference represented the tax base attributable
solely to the decontrol of lower tier oil. The difference in base price meant a difference in tax of
$4.20 (House Bill, with 60 percent tax rate) or $5.25 (Senate Bill, with 75 percent tax rate). The
Tier 1-Tier 2 distinction entailed enormous complexity. Moreover, the Tier 1 tax base had been
significantly eroded. Under the House Bill, Tier 1 excluded marginal oil, front-end tertiary oil,
and incremental tertiary oil. The Senate Bill added to the House exclusions Cook Inlet oil, high
water-cut oil, heavy oil, "deep" marginal oil, most independent producer oil, and additional in-
cremental tertiary oil. The complexities included defining all the tax base exclusions, computing
BPCLs (three options under Senate Bill), applying decline rates (two options under Senate Bill),
and accounting for cumulative deficiencies. Finally, Tier 1 would gradually phase into Tier 2 in
any event by July, 1984. Thus, the Tier 1-Tier 2 distinction involved substantial complexity in
order to impose a somewhat higher base price on a gradually diminishing quantity of oil over a
limited period of time. The revenue reduction attributable to merging Tier 1 into Tier 2 would be
made up elsewhere.
The proposed merger of Tier 1 into Tier 2 was adopted by the conferees. Merged Tier 1
oil, with approximately a May, 1979, new oil base price, generally includes oil subject to price
controls as old oil or new oil prior to the inception of President Carter's decontrol plan. The staff
initially recommended a $12.80 base price for the merged Tier 1, which was approximately 3
cents above the Senate Bill Tier 2 base price and 22 cents below the House Bill Tier 2 base price.
The conferees eventually selected a merged Tier 1 base price of $12.81.
"' Under the House Bill, the Tier 2 base price was gradually increased to the Tier 3
base price over the 50-month period ending December 31, 1990. House Bill, supra note 242,
5 4990(d)(2). The Senate Bill eliminated the phase-up, which amounted to approximately $3 per
barrel. Senate Bill, supra note 303, $S 4990(d)(2) and 4993A(d).
332 Following the Senate Bill.
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$15.30 base price and a 60 percent tax rate; 333 (5) new Tier 3, comprised of
newly discovered, heavy, and incremental tertiary oil, would have a $16.30
base price with an inflation adjustment two percent higher than the otherwise
applicable adjustment; 334 (6) most exemptions would be disregarded; 335 (7)
royalty owners would be excluded from any special treatment for independent
producers; 336 and (8) special treatment for independent producers would be
limited to new Tiers 1 and 2. 337 The alternatives presented to the conferees in-
cluded combinations of: new Tier 1 tax rates between 65 and 75 percent; tax
rates on newly discovered, incremental tertiary, and heavy oil between 20 and
45 percent; percentage depletion alternatives; 338 and independent producer
alternatives. 339 Independent producers simplified matters somewhat by em-
phasizing that retention of full percentage depletion was more important than
exemption from the windfall profit tax. 34° The tradeoffs then reduced to the
allocation of the tax burden on existing oil production as between majors and
independents, and the allocation of tax burden as between existing oil produc-
tion and newly discovered, incremental tertiary, and heavy oil.
333
 Stripper oil was taxed at a 60-percent rate and $16 base price under both bills.
"4 Under the House Bill, newly discovered and incremental tertiary oil had a $16.30
base price and the special inflation adjustment. Heavy oil was exempted by the Senate at the urg-
ing of the Administration, and therefore could fairly be treated on a par with newly discovered
and incremental tertiary oil. Under the Senate Bill, incremental tertiary and heavy oil had a
$16.30 base price, newly discovered oil had a $19.30 base price, and all three categories received
the special inflation adjustment. The staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation recommended a
uniform $16.30 base price for these three categories of oil to simplify the tax (thus, it would not be
necessary for tax purposes to distinguish incremental tertiary and heavy oil from newly
discovered oil) and because there did not appear to be a "compelling" reason to treat any one of
the categories differently from the others. WINDFALL PROFIT TAX OPTIONS, supra note 329.
335
 Other factors, such as base prices, could be adjusted to compensate for the cost of any
exemptions as they were agreed to.
"6
 Approximately 85 percent of royalty holders were excluded from the Senate inde-
pendent producer exemption. See, e.g. , 126 CONC. REC. S2705 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1980)
(remarks of Senator Long). This result followed from a rule for royalty owners which made the
exemption proportional to the working interests held by independent producers. Senate Bill, supra
note 303, S 4991(d)(2)(A)(ii). Most working interests are not held by independent producers. But
see note'393 infra; Reese, Impact of the Windfall Profit Tax on the Royalty Owner, 29 OIL & GAS TAX
Q. 284 (1980).
'37
 It was suggested that limiting special treatment for independent producers to Tiers 1
and 2 would eliminate many of the complexities that would arise from the separate treatment of
royalty holders. WINDFALL PROFIT TAX OPTIONS, supra note 329.
333 Full percentage depletion (the Senate Bill), no percentage depletion on the windfall
profit (the House Bill), and percentage depletion on half the windfall profit.
339
 No exemption (the House Bill), 1,000 barrel-per-day exemption of independent pro-
ducer oil (the Senate Bill), 1,000 barrel-per-day exemption of stripper oil owned by independents
(the Finance Committee Bill), and taxing 1,000 barrels-per-day of independent producer oil at
30-40 percent or at half the otherwise applicable tax rates.
34° Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Jan. 17, 1980, at G-3. Perhaps there was an apprehension
that a significant inroad on the percentage depletion base might invite further attacks on percent-
age depletion. The recent legislative trend has been to narrow percentage depletion benefits for
oil and gas. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 5 501, 83 Stat. 487 (1969) had lowered
the percentage depletion rate applicable to oil and gas wells from 27' percent to 22 percent. The
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The conferees agreed to a rate structure comprised of different rates for
each tier and a separate set of rates for independent producers. Newly dis-
covered, heavy, and incremental tertiary oil are grouped in a new Tier 3, 34 '
subject to a 30 percent tax rate" on a base price of $16.55 per barrel.'" Strip-
per oil and National Petroleum Reserve oil are grouped in a new Tier 2, 344
 to a 60 percent tax rate345 on a base price of $15.20. 3 " Tier 1 oil includes
other, non-exempt production, consisting mostly of old oil and new oil,'" sub-
ject to a 70 percent tax rate345 on a base price of $12.81. 349
 For independent
producers, however, the tax rate is lowered35° to 50 percent for Tier 1 oil and
30 percent for Tier 2 oil for up to a total of 1,000 barrels per day of Tier 1 and
Tier 2 production. In addition, the House proposal to reduce gross income
eligible for percentage depletion by the amount of the windfall profit was aban-
doned."'
After agreeing on the critical variables, the conferees turned to more
detailed decisions, leaving to the end the question whether and how the tax
would terminate. The basic structure for computing the tax follows the House
and Senate Bills."' The tax base is labeled the "windfall profit," and is equal
to the removal price of the oil reduced by the adjusted base price and by the
Tax Reduction Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-12, 501, 89 Stat. 26 (1975) had eliminated percent-
age depletion for major oil companies, and instituted a schedule limiting the percentage depletion
quantity to 1,000 barrels per day per producer in 1980, and lowering the percentage depletion
rate to 15 percent in 1984.
341
 I.R.C. 5 4991(e)(1). Thus, the Tier 3 tax base is directly attributable to the Senate
minimum tax amendment.
342
 I.R.C. 5 4987(b)(3).
543
 I . R .0 . 55 4989(d)(1)(B)(ii) and 4989(d)(2)(B)(ii).
344 I.R.C. 5 4991(d)(1). If oil is described in Tier 2 and Tier 3, it is considered Tier 3 oil.
I.R.C. 5 4991(d)(2). Thus, for example, stripper oil that is also considered heavy oil is treated for
windfall profit tax purposes as heavy oil. The Tier 2 tax base is essentially the same as the Senate
Tier 3 tax base and the House Tier 3 tax base (treating newly discovered and incremental tertiary
oil as a separate tier, which in fact they were after adoption of the Jones-Moore substitute).
3" I.R.C. 5 4987(b)(1).
346
 I.R.C. 55 4989(d)(1)(B)(i) and 4989(d)(2)(B)(i),
347 I.R.C. 5 4991(c). Oil described in other tiers is not considered Tier 1 oil. Tier 1 is a
merger of "old" Tier 1 into "old" Tier 2. See note 330 supra.
346
 I.R.C. 5 4987(b)(1).
349 I. R.C. 5 4989(c). The base price for existing Alaskan North Slope production (from
the Sadlerochit reservoir) is reduced to reflect changes in the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System tariff.
1.R.C. 5 4996(d); see text at notes 228, 258 supra. The base price reduction is equal to any reduc-
tion in the tariff below $6.26.
359 I. R.C. $5 4987(b)(2) and 4992. For this purpose, royalty owners are not considered
independent producers. I.R.C. 55 4992(d)(1)(D) and 4992(d)(2).
351
 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 325, at 110. As described by Senator Long:
These special rates for independents and protection of percentage depletion repre-
sent a sound compromise for the independents in light of the strong position of the
House. This compromise recognizes the problems independents encounter in try-
ing to compete with major companies and gives them an added cash flow which
they will invest in drilling additional wells.
126 CONG. REC. S2611 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1980) (remarks of Senator Long).
352 I. R.C. Si 4987 and 4988(a).
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severance tax adjustment. The windfall profit is limited to 90 percent of the net
income from the property."' The amount of the tax is the product of the appli-
cable tax rate multiplied by the windfall profit. Removal price is subject to
related party and constructive sale rules; 354 in addition, broad administrative
authority is granted to conform removal price to fair market value."' "Ad-
justed base price" is base price adjusted for inflation, with a Iag of two calendar
quarters. 356 The severance tax adjustment is subject to two limitations. First,
following the Senate Bill, post-March, 1979, increases in severance taxes are
allowable only if the increases apply equally to the entire value of the oil.""
Second, reflecting the more restrictive House Bill, no adjustment is available to
I.R.C. 4988(6). The conferees followed the Senate net income limitation rule, with
some modifications. Thus, the net income limitation includes the "carryover basis" limitation
on property transfers created on the Senate floor. See note 323 supra. In addition, 251 of the
Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 94 Stat. 229 (1980), added a
new 5 193 to the Internal Revenue Code, permitting certain tertiary injectant expenses to be
deducted. Consequently, for purposes of computing the deemed cost depletion deduction in
determining net income, taxpayers may elect to capitalize tertiary injectant expenses.
55 4988(b)(3)(B)(iv), (b)(3)(C)(i)(II), and (b)(3)(E). This provision, created in the conference,
conforms the treatment of tertiary injectants to that accorded intangible drilling costs in arriving
at the net income limitation. Finally, the conferees decided, on their own motion, that gross in-
come attributable to production payments would be included in the income of both the holder of
the payment and the holder of the interest from which the payment was created. I.R.C.
5 4988(b)(5). Under the Senate Bill, such gross income was included in the income only of the
holder of the economic interest with respect to the oil. Senate Bill, supra note 303, §§ 4989(b)(5)
and 4992(a)(1). See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 51.4988-2; Wulf, Net Income Limitation Under Windfall Prof-
it Tax, 29 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 217 (1980); Statham and Keenum, WPT Tier 1 Crude Subject to
Built-in Excess Withholding, OIL & GAS J., Oct. 20, 1980, at 125.
I.R.C. 5 4988(c); CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 325, at 105-06.
355
	 5 4996(f).
356 (1) Tier 1 oil. The base price is the May, 1979, upper tier ceiling price, which aver-
aged $13.02 per barrel, reduced by 21 cents, I.R.C. 5 4989(c). The inflation adjustment for oil
removed during any calendar quarter is the percentage by which the implicit price deflator for the
gross national product for the second preceding calendar quarter exceeds the deflator for the sec-
ond quarter of 1979. I.R.C. S 4989(b)(1). (2) Tier 2 oil. The base price averages $15.20 per bar-
rel. I.R.C. 4989(d)(1). The inflation adjustment is the same as Tier 1. I.R.C. § 4989(b)(1). (3)
Tier 3 oil. The base price averages $16.55 per barrel. I.R.C. § 4989(d)(1). The inflation adjust-
ment is the same as Tier 1, augmented by one-half percent per quarter. 1.R.C. § 4989(b)(2). In-
terim base price rules for Tiers 2 and 3 were published as temporary regulations. T.D. 7690, 45
Fed. Reg. 23384 (Apr. 4, 1980), as amended by T.D. 7694, 45 Fed. Reg. 27929 (Apr. 25, 1980),
and T.D. 7720, 45 Fed. Reg. 63263 (Sept. 24, 1980); see also Rev. Rul. 80-320, 1980-48 I.R.B.
15. Permanent base price rules for Tiers 2 and 3 have also been published as temporary regula-
tions. T.D. 7721, 45 Fed. Reg. 64574 (Sept. 30, 1980), as amended by T.D. 7738, 45 Fed. Reg.
75206 (Nov, 14, 1980); see also Draft Regulatory Analysis, 80(10) STAND. FED. TAX REP.
(CCH) 1 6809 (1980).
357 I.R.C. S 4996(c)(3)(B). See Temp. Treas. Reg. 5 150.4996-2; Rev. Rul. 80-217,
1980-32 I.R.S. 11; Dickenson, Severance Tax Adjustment Under the Windfall Profit Tax, 29 OIL &
GAS TAX Q. 257 (1980).
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the extent the severance tax rate exceeds 15 percent."' Finally, the windfall
profit tax is imposed upon the producer of the crude oil." 9
The conferees also refined the definitions of various oil classifications. Fol-
lowing the Senate Bill, newly discovered oil is defined by the terms of the price
control regulations as such terms existed on June 1, 1979. 36° Thus, any
peregrinations in the interpretation of the price control rules are correspond-
ingly reflected in the windfall profit tax."' By contrast, the definition of heavy
358 I.R.C. 4996(c)(3)(A). This provision represents a minor accommodation to the
regional concerns surrounding the exemption for state-owned oil interests and the deduction for
severance taxes. Cf. LR.C. 5 2011 (federal estate tax credit for state death taxes — subject to a
dollar limit); I.R.C. 5 164 (federal income tax deduction for state real property, personal proper-
ty, income, and sales taxes — not subject to a limitation).
359 I.R.C. 5 4986(b); CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 325, at 106-07; Temp. Treas.
Reg. 5 150.4996-1(b); Burke and Meyer, Taxation of Net Profits Interests Under the Windfall Profit
Tax, 29 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 195 (1980).
360 I.R.C. 55 4991(e)(2) and 4996(b)(8). The House Bill contained several restrictions
on the price control definition. House Bill, supra note 242, 5 4991(a)(5). See text at notes 216.18
supra.
361 For example, the May 2, 1979, price control definition of newly discovered oil is
based upon whether oil was produced from a property in 1978. Sec note 110 supra. This definition
is controlling for windfall profit tax purposes. Sec text at note 360 supra. The March 7, 1980
Windfall Profit Tax Conference Report states, referring to a paraphrase of the price control
definition, that 1978 production would be disregarded "if that production was incident to the
drilling of exploratory or test wells and was not part of continuous or commercial production
from the property during 1978." CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 325, at 98. See also 126
CONG. REC. H1844 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Jones of Oklahoma); 126 CONG.
REC. 52839 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1980) (colloquy between Senators Bellmon and Long). On June
23, 1980, DOE proposed amendments to the definition of newly discovered oil to refine the
meaning of "production." DOE asked for comments on the above-quoted Conference Report
statement, and on whether the "changes" should be retroactive to June 1, 1979. On July 14,
1980, DOE issued Ruling 1980-3, interpreting the term "produced." 45 Fed. Reg. 48577 (July
14, 1980) (to be codified in 10 C.F.R. ch. II). Here, any production would appear to be described
by the term "produced": "Even though only 50 barrels of crude oil were produced in well tests
from a property in calendar year 1978, for example, crude oil production from the property may
not be certified and sold as newly discovered crude oil." 45 Fed. Reg. at 48579. In note 3 to Rul-
ing 1980-3, DOE expressly disavowed the Windfall Profit Tax Conference Report statement as
in any way affecting the definition of newly discovered crude oil for DOE pricing purposes. Id.
Finally, I.R.C. 5 4997(b) provides general authority to issue regulations interpreting the windfall
profit tax, "including such changes in the application of the . energy regulations for purposes of
this chapter as may be necessary or appropriate to carry out such purposes."
DOE amended the definition of newly discovered oil, effective after 1980. See note 110
supra. Consequently, for price control purposes, one definition of newly discovered oil applied
through 1980, and another in January, 1981. Thus, it is possible that (1) oil may be newly
discovered for windfall profit tax purposes, but not for price control purposes; query whether, not-
withstanding the legislative history of the windfall profit tax, such result is permissible under
I.R.C. 55 4991(e)(2) and 4996(b)(8) since the plain meaning of the tax statute is to adopt the
price control regulations; and (2) regulations could be issued under I. R.C. 4997(b) interpreting
newly discovered oil for windfall profit tax purposes in accordance with the remarks made in the
legislative history of the windfall profit tax, thus increasing the likelihood of two separate defini-
tions of newly discovered oil for 1980, with conforming definitions thereafter. It appears that, in
general, the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department will consider using the
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oil is supplied by the windfall profit tax, thereby modifying the price control
definition and most likely precluding a future change in the price control rules
from affecting the windfall profit tax. 362
 Similarly, the definition of incremental
tertiary oil is almost entirely supplied by the windfall profit tax rather than the
price control regulations. 363 Under the conference agreement, the tertiary proj-
ect must reasonably be expected to result in "more than an insignificant in-
crease" in recoverable oi1, 364 a less stringent test than the House Bill re-
quirements of an expected "significant increase" in production coupled with
the project being uneconomic without the preferential tax treatment. 365
 Senate
Bill regulatory certifications and accompanying "substantial evidence" audit
review standards have been retained, 366
 but revocation of a regulatory certifica-
tion will cause the self-certification rules to apply rather than leave qualifica-
tion generally unaffected. 367
 Furthermore, continuing tertiary qualification
generally requires that the project be in effect and affect production; the Senate
had adopted a "no fault" standard for continuing qualification of regulatory
certified projects. 366 Finally, the amount of incremental tertiary oil is produc-
tion from a property in excess of a liberal statutory decline curve. 369
authority granted by 1.R.C. S 4997(b) to revise the price control rules for purposes of applying
the windfall profit tax. 46 Fed. Reg. 24595 (May 1, 1981) (invitation for public comments on
I.R.C. S 4997(b)); Legal Times of Washington, Apr. 27, 1981, at 1.
More intriguing are the possibilities if the June 1, 1979, price control definition of newly
discovered oil is interpreted by a court to follow some new meaning, or, more perplexing, is in-
validated. Presumably, due regard must be given to judicial interpretation of the June 1, 1979,
price control regulations, although another court, even in the context of a lax case, might supply
its own definition. If, however, all or a portion of the June 1, 1979, price control regulations is
declared invalid, what happens for windfall profit tax purposes? Are such regulations, if declared
invalid, "prescribed under section 4(a) of the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973 .. • "
as required by I.R.C. S 4996(b)(8)(A)? Or do the "terms" of the June 1, 1979, regulations con-
tinue in effect for tax purposes, as might be suggested by I.R.C. S 4996(b)(8)(C)(i)?
332 I.R.C. S 4991(e)(3). For purposes of defining heavy oil, the Finance Committee Bill
referred to the terms of Executive Order No. 12153 which decontrolled heavy oil. Finance Commit-
tee Bill, supra note 243, 5 4991(e). On the Senate floor, the cross reference definition was replaced
by the actual terms of the Executive Order, and by a modification to permit oil to qualify as
heavy oil even if it did not so qualify prior to July 1, 1979. 125 CONC. REC. S18035 (daily ed.
Dec. 7, 1979) (remarks of Senator Cranston). The effect of the floor amendment may have been
to restrict the definition of heavy oil for tax purposes since the price control definition was ex-
panded on December 27, 1979, to include oil of a lighter gravity. See note 116 supra. Thus,
replacing a price control definition by a tax definition in order to liberalize tax treatment may
have had an unexpected consequence.
363 I.R.C. S 4993.
364 I.R.C. S 4993(c)(2)(A).
'6* House Bill, supra note 242, 5 4991(c)(5)(A).
366
 I.R.C. SS 4993(c)(2)(D)(ii), (d)(5), and (d)(6). For initial state agency certification"
activity, see B. Sullivan, Qualibing Tertiary Recovery Projects under the WPT Act, OIL & GAS J., Feb.
2, 1981, at 71.
362
 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 325, at 100; see generally Senate Bill, supra note 303,
5 4991(c)(6)(D).
363
 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 325, at 101; see generally Senate Bill, supra note 303,
5 4991(c)(6)(E).
369
 I.R.C. SS 4993(a) and 4993(b)(1). See Verleger, An Assessment of the Effects of the Wind-
fall Profits Tax on Crude Oil Supply, 1 ENERGY J. 41 (1980).
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The conferees adopted most of the Senate exemptions with some modifica-
tions and adjustments. All state and local governmental interests in crude oil
are exempt from tax, 37 ° but oil owned by the federal government is subject to
tax."' Certain oil interests held as of January 21, 1980 by or for the benefit of
medical or educational charities, 372 or Indian tribes or individual Indians373 are
exempt from tax. Certain Alaskan oil is exempt, depending on location."' And
I.R.C. 55 4991(b)(1) and 4994(a). Thus, the regional bias, if any, alleged by op-
ponents of the exemption has been adopted. In theory, there is nothing to prevent a state or local
government, or agency thereof, from purchasing an oil interest from a taxable entity, thereby
sharing the benefits of the tax exemption. For example, production from an old oil property
owned by a major producer is burdened by a 70 percent windfall profit tax rate, but is free from
tax in the hands of a state or local government. Provided the transfer is otherwise desirable and
permissible, the major producer could realize more after tax from the transfer, and the govern-
mental entity could pay less than the after-tax value of the property.
I.R.C. 5 4991(d)(1)(B); CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 325, at 107; see Interim
Notice, Dep't. of the Interior, 45 Fed. Reg. 28824 (Apr. 20, 1980). Federal oil was taxed under
the House and Finance Committee Bills. The Senate agreed to exempt federal oil in order to
avoid merely transferring money from one federal pocket to another, based upon the representa-
tion that state income would not, as a result, be increased. 125 CONG. REC. 518844 (daily ed.
Dec. 17, 1979) (colloquy between Senators Long and Danforth). One-half of certain federal
royalties is paid to states, however. 126 CONG. REC. S3030-31 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1980)
(remarks of Senator Long). Consequently, states would benefit indirectly from an exemption of
federal oil interests. In view of the representation to the contrary on which the Senate exemption
was based, the Senate conferees receded to the House on this issue. 126 CONG. REC. S2623-24
(daily ed. Mar. 19, 1980) (colloquy between Senators Long and Wallop); 126 CONG. REC.
S2714-15 (daily ed. Mar. 20, 1980) (remarks of Senator Long).
372 I.R.C. SS 4991(b)(1) and 4994(b). The exemption is limited to interests held on
January 21, 1980, thereby curtailing transfers made for the purpose of benefiting from the ex-
emption. The exemption is unavailable for reacquired interests or for interests transferred from
one qualifying charity to another. The Conference agreement does not include bequests of in-
terests made after January 21, 1980. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 325, at 108; see also Senate
Bill, supra note 303, S 4992(h)(1)(B)(ii).
'" I.R.C. 55 4991(b)(2) and 4994(d). The exemption also extends to the oil production
prior to 1992 of Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act corporations.
3" Under the House Bill, oil produced north of the Arctic Circle other than Sadlerochit
oil was exempt. House Bill, supra note 242, SS 4988(a) and 4992(b)(6). Other new Alaskan pro-
duction would have been taxed as newly discovered oil. Under the Senate Bill, all newly
discovered oil produced north of the Arctic Circle, including all ANS oil other than Sadlerochit
oil, was exempt. Senate Bill, supra note 303, 55 4988(a)(1) and 4993A(a). See FINANCE COMMIT-
TEE REPORT, supra note 243, at 43. The conferees agreed that all reservoirs tapped by a well
located north of the Arctic Circle, other than Sadlerochit oil, should be exempt. I.R.C.
S 4994(e)(1). In addition, the conferees exempted oil produced south of the Arctic Circle and
north of the Alaska-Aleutian mountain range divide if the well is at least 75 miles from the
nearest point on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System. I.R.C. S 4994(e)(2). These locational ex-
emptions reflect "the concern of the conferees that taxation of this production would discourage
exploration and development of reservoirs in areas of extreme climatic conditions." CON-
FERENCE REPORT, supra note 325, at 103.
There has been some discussion concerning whether the conferees' Alaskan oil exemp-
tion is constitutional. See Burke, The Windfall Profits Tax — The Power of Taxation or the Taking of
Property?, AM. OIL & GAS REP., March, 1980, 12; 126 CONG. REC. S3055-56 (daily ed. Mar.
26, 1980) (remarks of Senator Long); letter from Lloyd G. Ator, Jr., Senior Counsel, Office of
the Legislative Counsel, United States Senate, to Senator Long (Mar. 25, 1980), reprinted in 126
CONG. REC. S3056-57 (daily ed. Mar. 26, 1980).
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certain oil released under the price control program to finance tertiary recovery
projects is exempt from tax. 375
The phase-out of the tax represented one of the last major conference deci-
sions. Under the House Bill, the tax on newly discovered oil and incremental
tertiary oil, approximately 55 percent of projected 1990 production, 378 termi-
nated after 1990. 377
 The balance of the tax base would gradually phase out
thereafter as existing production experienced further natural decline. Under
. the Senate Bill, the entire tax would phase out at the rate of three percent per
month once net revenues derived from the tax reached $189 billion, 378 which
was projected to occur in 1990. The conferees agreed that a three percent per
month phase-out would begin once net revenues reach $227.3 billion, pro-
vided, however, that the phase-out of the tax may not begin earlier than
January, 1988, nor later than January, 1991.' 79
 With this finishing touch,
agreement between the conferees was reached.
G. Final Passage and Enactment
The Conference Report was approved by the House on March 13, 1980,
by a vote of 302-107. 38° After much debate, the Senate added its approval on
March 27, 1980, by a similarly wide margin, 66-31. 38 ' The President signed the
bill into law on April 2, 1980, almost one year to the day after he had proposed
'" 1.R.C. $S 4991(b)(4) and 4994(c); see Prop. Treas. Reg. 5 51.4994-2. Under the
House and Senate Bills, front-end tertiary oil was taxed using an upper-tier oil base price. House
Bill, supra note 242, 5 4991(d); Senate Bill, supra note 303, 5 4988(b). In addition, under the Senate
Bill, oil released to finance certain types of tertiary projects was exempt from tax. Senate Bill, supra
note 303, 4988(e). The conferees decided that for tertiary projects controlled by independent
producers, all oil released to finance such projects would be exempt from tax. For all other proj-
ects, the windfall profit tax is refundable to the extent that the actual price control front-end ter-
tiary benefit is less than the allowable benefit.
The front-end tertiary exemption is of limited application. Presumably, the exemption is
of no further application after January 28, 1981, the date on which President Reagan ended price
controls on domestic crude oil. See note 122 supra; I.R.C. 5 4994(c)(4)(B). For a contrary view,
see Legal Times of Washington, May 18, 1981, at 4. In addition, to the extent that the price con-
trol front-end tertiary benefit is computed net of the windfall profit tax, the front-end tertiary ex-
emption may accelerate, but not otherwise augment the total economic benefit provided the pro-
ducer, if the producer has sufficient lower tier oil to absorb the front-end tertiary price control
benefit. It is the understanding of one of the authors that certain independent producers lacked
sufficient quantities of lower tier oil to utilize fully a price control benefit computed net of the
windfall profit tax. This situation encouraged the conferees to adopt the exemption from the tax
for front-end tertiary oil, and to liberalize the exemption for independent producers.
"6
 Comparative Analysis of Two Bills, supra note 113, at Table A-5.
3"
 House Bill, supra note 242, 5 4988(a)(2).
378
 Senate Bill, supra note 303, 4993.
"9
 I.R.C. 5 4990.
38° 126 CONG. REC. H1861 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1980). The sentiment of the House was
perhaps more accurately expressed just prior to the vote on final passage when the House
defeated a motion to recommit the Conference Report by a 227-185 margin. 126 CONG. REC.
H1860 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1980). Compare the House votes on original passage of the bill, supra
text and notes at notes 239-42.
'8 ' 126 CONG. REC. 53151 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980). The Senate debated the Con-
ference Report for seven days, Mar. 19-21, 24-27, 1980. A motion to recommit the Conference
Report failed in the Senate by a 61-35 vote. 126 CONG. REC. 53134 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980).
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it. Upon signing the bill, the President remarked, "the keystone of our na-
tional energy policy for which we have waited so long is now in place."'"
The windfall profit tax signed into law by President Carter strongly
resembled his own proposal in basic structure, but bore only marginal resem-
blance in the detail. Nevertheless, the Administration had achieved its basic
goals. It adopted a program of administrative decontrol of oil prices which
Congress left intact. And it asked for and received a windfall profit tax which
would redirect hundreds of billions of dollars of domestic oil industry income to
the federal government. An evaluation of these policies is set forth below.
III. CONCLUSIONS
For all its complexity and imperfections, the windfall profit tax ultimately
may represent a positive contribution to domestic energy policy by making
possible the elimination of oil price controls and by minimizing the risk that
price controls on oil will be extended or reimposed in the future. Moreover, it is
possible that, with some important exceptions, the tax will have a relatively
small adverse impact on domestic oil production, and may, in certain cases,
create significant production incentives. In addition, the tax will provide an
important source of revenues to the federal government at a time when
budgetary concerns are receiving considerable attention.'" These effects will
be accompanied, however, by enormously complex tax rules and regulations,
substantial private and public administrative costs, extensive controversies
before the Internal Revenue Service and the courts, further federal legislative
activity,'" and distortions in domestic oil investment decisions.
The question whether the windfall profit tax actually facilitated decontrol
of domestic oil prices is both premature and beyond the scope of this article.
Clearly, many of those responsible for the tax, both within the Carter Adminis-
tration and in the Congress believed that absent some sort of windfall profits
tax, administrative decontrol would halt or be rescinded. Moreover, many be-
382 16 WEEKLY COMP. OF PRES. DOC. 584, 584-85 (Apr. 2, 1980).
1 " Even those who oppose the windfall profit tax in principle recognize its increasingly
important role as a source of revenue. See Testimony of David Stockman, Director-Designate of
Office of Management and Budget, before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, as
reported in Wall Street Journal, Jan. 9, 1981, p. 5 at cols. 2 & 3. Such reliance on the windfall prof-
it tax as a source of federal revenue is ironic. Republican senators and representatives strongly
criticized the tax on the ground that the chief beneficiary would be the Federal Treasury. See Ways
and Means Report, supra note 171, at 78-83 (minority views) (" ... who shall reap the rewards of
this bill? The federal treasury; ... " Id. at 83); Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Jan. 15, 1981, at K-3
(Senate conferees on the windfall profit tax are reported to have commented: "Once the federal
government gets used to tremendous revenues generated by the 'windfall' taxes it will be unwill-
ing — and unlikely — to give them up"; in addition, all but one of the Senate Republicans
signed a letter urging the conferees to agree to termination of the windfall profit tax).
384 See note 393 infra, for revisions considered and enacted during 1980, and possible
Reagan Administration proposals. Numerous proposals to amend the windfall profit tax were in-
troduced early in the 97th Congress. See, e.g., Daily Tax Rep. (13NA), Jan. 27, 1981, at G-3 to
G-4.
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lieved that as the September 30, 1981, date for expiration of statutory oil price
control authority drew near, the political pressure for extending price controls
might be irresistible without a tax in place, given the enormous increases in
world oil prices. 385
 If these views were in fact controlling, then one reasonably
might conclude that the windfall profit tax facilitated the realization of an im-
portant energy policy goal. As discussed above, 386 perpetuation of price con-
trols would have continued a program that discouraged energy conservation
and domestic oil production, subsidized oil imports, and hindered the develop-
ment of alternative energy sources. Decontrol will eliminate many of these
problems and substantially increase the incentive to drill for oil in the United
States. It is not surprising that despite the spectre and subsequent reality of the
windfall profit tax, domestic drilling activity has increased by almost 50 percent
since the decontrol decision was announced. 387 If the windfall profit tax actual-
ly made decontrol possible, the tax would have to be extraordinarily counter-
productive before its enactment outweighed the benefits of decontrol.
The windfall profit tax has been attacked precisely because it may have
facilitated decontro1. 388
 Since this argument starts from a doubtful premise —
that the continuation of domestic oil price controls is in the national interest —
the argument is supportable only to the extent oil price control is sound public
policy. Moreover, even for supporters of price controls, the windfall profit tax
may represent a reasonable "second best" solution since the tax responds in
part to the equity concerns addressed by price controls and also functions as a
"continuation" of price controls, albeit in another form. Obviously, such
critics would have preferred a tax that was both stronger and more permanent
than the tax that was enacted.
The tax also has been criticized extensively as constituting a confiscation
of income that rightfully belongs to oil producers. Even if its premise is ac-
cepted, this position appears to underestimate the political realities of reaching
and maintaining decontrol in an era of ever-increasing world oil prices. There
is a long history of imposition of federal controls on commodities such as
38' For example, it is possible that oil, which would have been controlled as "old" oil at
approximately $6 to $7 per barrel, will sell for more than $35 per barrel on October 1, 1981. See
126 CONG. REC. H1847 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1980) (remarks of Rep. Conable); 126 CONG. REC.
S3129 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1980) (remarks of Senator Robert C. Byrd); Wetzler, Energy Excise
Taxes as Substitutes for Income Taxes, 33 NATIONAL TAXI 321, 322 (1980) ("With hindsight, it is
likely that, despite the powerful economic case against the [oil price] controls, without the [wind-
fall profit] tax there would have been no decontrol in 1979. The enormous gap between domestic
and world oil prices, moreover, would have ensured an extension of controls in 1981.") Mr.
Wetzler was chief economist on the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation throughout the con-
sideration of the windfall profit tax.
3B8 See 5 1.B.5., supra.
" 7 See U.S. Dep't of Energy, Monthly Energy Review 50 (Oct. 1980). During the first three
months of 1979, an average of 1,460 exploratory and development wells per month were com-
pleted; from June through August, 1980, the average was 2,213 wells per month. For the same
periods, average rigs in service per month increased from 2,078 to 2,949.
386 See, e.g., 125 CONG. REC. S16849-54 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 1979) (remarks of Senator
Metzenbaum).
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wheat, soy beans, and crude oil when imbalances between supply and demand
threaten to cause sudden price increases. 389 The risk of imposing controls is
perhaps greatest in the case of crude oil because 50 to 60 percent of world sup-
ply is controlled by the members of OPEC, whose political instability, in turn,
has contributed to the instability of world oil prices. Part of any increased pro-
ducer income resulting from higher world oil prices, however, will flow
automatically to the federal government through the mechanism of the windfall
profit tax. Thus, in a sense, the tax may be viewed as an "insurance
premium" to protect oil producers against the risk of reimposition of price con-
trols in the event of a sudden increase in world oil prices. Accordingly, contrary
to the "confiscation of income" view, it is arguable that the windfall profit tax
will, in the long run, benefit oil producers by allowing a political consensus to
form for the decontrol of domestic oil, and reducing the risk of reimposing price
controls. 39 °
Another common criticism of the tax is that it tends to reduce domestic oil
production at a time when increased domestic production is in the national in-
terest. The negative production effect is attributed either to reduced revenues
or to lowered marginal returns. It is contended, for example, that simply by
depriving oil producers of revenues, the windfall profit tax curtails production
since the additional revenues would be invested in further drilling activities.
This contention is contradicted by basic economic theory. The incentive to drill
is determined where marginal costs equal marginal revenues, a determination
which is only modestly affected by the windfall profit tax in the cases of certain
types of production39 ' and is actually enhanced in the case of incremental ter-
tiary oil."' On the other hand, in the case of future production investments,
marginal decision making, and, therefore, production, may well be affected by
the tax. Thus, for example, production of newly discovered oil, tertiary oil, and
heavy oil may be affected by the windfall profit tax since the anticipated
marginal revenues from future production may be reduced by the tax. There-
fore, starting from the premise that a windfall profits tax is desirable (in order
to achieve decontrol), and assuming that the tax should have a minimal
adverse effect on production, policy-justifiable modifications of the existing tax
should tend to increase production, and, therefore, might reasonably reduce
the tax burden on newly discovered, tertiary, and heavy oi1. 393 Even these revi-
3" For example, exports of soybeans were limited in 1973 in an effort to restrain in-
creases in prices. See Executive Office of The President, Economic Report of The President 164
(1975). In addition, purchases of U.S. wheat by the Soviet Union have been limited by treaty. See
Executive Office of The President, Economic Report of The President 161 (1977).
39° It should be recalled that a separate program of oil price controls began in 1973 on a
"temporary" basis under a Republican administration.
39 ' Verleger, An Assessment of the Effects of the Windfall Profits Tax on Crude Oil Supply, 1
ENERGY J. 47-58 (1980).
392 Id., at 41.
393 This discussion parallels the debate in the Senate on the so-called "minimum tax"
on newly discovered, incremental tertiary, and heavy oil. See text at notes 316-18 supra. At the
insistence of the Administration, the windfall profit tax was ultimately imposed on these
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sions, however, would be desirable only if the windfall profit tax, as modified,
was sufficient to avoid reimposition of price controls. Some lost production due
to the tax would be preferable to the detriments of oil price controls.
It may also be expected that the windfall profit tax will result in unantici-
pated distortions of oil investment decisions. One of the authors has previously
written394 that the incremental tertiary provisions create substantial economic
incentives in certain circumstances. These provisions should induce unusual
transactions between independent and major oil companies and will cause
otherwise uneconomic enhanced recovery programs to be pursued while dis-
couraging investment in economically justifiable recovery programs. In addi-
tion, the absence of a cut-off date in the exemption for certain governmental oil
interests may lead to transfers of oil interests to governmental units in order to
"share" the benefits of the exemption.'"
Finally, the windfall profit tax is criticized as being astonishingly complex,
even by the standards of federal income tax laws, and for imposing enormous
private and public administrative costs. The complexity is attributable both to
the structure of the tax and to the multitude of definitions to be applied. Oil is
divided into numerous categories — newly discovered, incremental tertiary,
heavy, stripper, National Petroleum Reserve, Tier 1, governmental, chari-
table, Indian, Alaskan, front-end, independent producer — each of which has
its own special definitional rules and only one of which (heavy oil) is based
upon the physical characteristics of the oil. The various categories are then as-
signed to four different groups. One group is exempt entirely from the tax; the
others are subject to various tax rates, base prices, and inflation adjustments.
There are four different tax rates, two inflation adjustments, and several
systems for determining base prices. In addition, although price controls have
been terminated, 396 many of the price control rules are incorporated, and,
categories of oil, although at reduced rates. Unfortunately, the first proposals to modify the wind-
fall profit tax reflected political rather than energy policy concerns. The 1980 budget reconcilia-
tion legislation included provisions to reduce the windfall profit tax on royalty holders and on
stripper wells, neither of which reductions would appreciably have affected oil production. The
royalty holder relief measure was in fact enacted, although only for windfall profit tax liabilities
incurred during calendar year 1980. Subtitle D of Title XI of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of
1980, Pub. L. 96-499, 94 Stat. 2599, 2961 (1980). By contrast, President Reagan's energy ad-
visers have urged that the windfall profit tax be eliminated for newly discovered oil, heavy oil,
and "incremental" oil. Report of the Energy Policy Task Force to Governor Reagan (Nov. 5,
1980), reprinted in Energy Users Rep. (BNA), Dec. 4, 1980, at 21. (The advisory group also urged
repeal of the windfall profit tax on stripper oil, addition of a plowback provision if the tax con-
tinues on newly discovered oil, and earlier phase out of the tax. Id.) In addition, legislation
adopted by the House and the Senate at the end offuly, 1981, would provide substantial windfall
profit tax reductions for royalty owners, independent producers, child care agencies, and newly
.discovered oil.
394 Verleger, An Assessment of the Effects of the Windfall Profits Tax on Crude Oil Supply, I
ENERGY .]. 41 (1980).
395
 See note 370 supra.
396
 See note 122 supra.
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therefore, continued in windfall profit tax provisions, especially in the defini-
tions and the base price rules. Furthermore, the windfall profit tax base is
limited by a net income determination computed under certain percentage
depletion rules, thus requiring reference to income tax rules in order to make a
complicated series of computations. Finally, the windfall profit tax includes its
own procedural provisions for withholding, deposit, payment, reporting,
notification, and so on, adding to the substantive complexity of the tax itself.
The magnitude and complexity of the tax will undoubtedly create substan-
tial private and public administrative burdens. The Treasury Department has
been publishing, and will continue to publish, the myriad forms, regulations,
and rulings needed to implement the tax. The taxpayer service, general legal,
technical, compliance, and litigation functions of the IRS must be prepared to
administer the tax, which eventually will entail administering many of the
price control rules which so perplexed DOE. 397 Paralleling the public roles,
private accountants, record keepers, lawyers, and others will devote great ef-
fort to ascertaining, collecting, paying, reporting, planning, advising, and liti-
gating with respect to the tax. 398
Clearly, enormous public and private transaction costs will be attributable
to the windfall profit tax. This perhaps was inevitable given the size and com-
plexity of the domestic oil industry, and Congress' proclivity for writing a host
of detailed distinctions into the tax laws, many in the name of fairness, others
representing political compromises. It is understandable, therefore, that from
time to time, there has been heard a plea to employ a simple per unit or per
dollar excise in the place of the existing windfall profit tax formula. 399 It ap-
3" An early indication of the administrative problems experienced by the government
was provided in testimony on April 13, 1981, before the Commerce, Consumer, and Monetary
Affairs Subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee by representatives of the
Internal Revenue Service, General Accounting Office, and the U.S. Geological Survey. OIL &
GAS", Apr. 20, 1981, at 38; Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), Apr. 13, 1981, at G-1.
3913 The constitutionality of the windfall profit tax has already been challenged directly.
Independent Petroleum Association of America v. United States, No. C80-302 (D. Wyo., filed
Oct. 14, 1980), as reported in OIL & GAs J., Oct. 13, 1980, at 82 and Oct. 20, 1980, at 104; Energy
Users Rep. (BNA), Oct. 16, 1980, at 18. The complaint is reported to allege unconstitutionality
on three separate grounds: (1) the tax is not uniformly levied geographically since certain crude
oil in Alaska is exempted, in violation of article I, section 8, clause 1; (2) the tax constitutes a bla-
tant confiscation of private property for which no compensation is offered, in violation of fifth
amendment due process requirements; and (3) the tax also violates fifth amendment due process
requirements because the tax will decrease oil production and increase oil demand, contrary to
the purpose for which it was adopted. The government is reported to have moved for dismissal
for three reasons: (1) absence of jurisdiction due to sovereign immunity; (2) absence of jurisdic-
tion over the subject matter since no refund was claimed by the plaintiffs or denied by the Inter-
nal Revenue Service; and (3) prohibition against declaratory judgments or injunctions in federal
tax actions. OIL & GAS J., Dec. 29, 1980, Newsletter. Two other cases alleging constitutional
infirmities in the windfall profit tax have been dismissed on procedural grounds. Energy Con-
sumers & Producers Ass'n v. Miller, Civ. No. 80-132-C (E.D. Okla., June 18, 1981); Lewis v.
Reagan, 1981-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) I 9485 (D.D.C., June 9, 1981).
"9 At the end of the Ways and Means Committee mark-up of the windfall profit tax,
several proposals were made to substitute ad valorem excises for the Committee's windfall profit
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pears, however, that once the emotional and technical. investment is made in
hundreds of refinements and compromises, a momentum is established which
deters a return to simplicity.
Ultimately, as suggested above, one's view of the windfall profit tax de-
pends on one's view of oil price controls and the role of the tax in eliminating
price controls. Those who favor oil price controls, and those who believe that
decontrol could be realized and maintained without resort to a windfall profits
tax may conclude that the windfall profit tax represents bad energy policy and
bad tax policy. If oil price controls are viewed as inimical to sound energy
policy and it is concluded that a windfall profits tax was needed, at least on a
temporary basis, in order to eliminate price controls, there is a reasonable basis
for accepting, if not embracing, the windfall profit tax, with all of its blemishes,
as a somewhat complex, imperfect means to a more rational domestic energy
policy.
tax. Daily Tax Rep. (BSfA), June 19, 1979, at G-3. A similar proposal emerged during the con-
ference on the bill, arousing the strong objections of then Ways and Means Committee Chair-
man Ullman, who protested that the proposal "would involve scrapping all the work of the
House and Senate in favor of charging off 'into the wild blue yonder.' " Daily Tax Rep. (BNA),
Jan. 17, 1980, at G-3. See also 126 CONG. REC. H1844 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1980) (remarks of
Rep. Jones of Oklahoma); 126 CONG. REC. S2624 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1980) (remarks of Senator
Wallop). In formulating its windfall profit tax proposal, the Administration considered and re-
jected per unit and per dollar excises, since neither bore a defensible relationship to any "wind-
fall." See note 131 supra. Hence, the resort to the standard windfall profit tax proposal of impos-
ing a tax equal to a percentage of the difference between the sales price and a base price. The
legislative process merely "refined" the standard proposal to reflect various congressional con-
cerns.
